War has shaped human history in both tragic and monumental ways. From ancient battlefields to modern drone warfare, its consequences are deeply etched into political, moral, and cultural life. Yet a core question endures: Can war ever be morally justified? The just war theory addresses this dilemma, aiming to establish moral limits on humanity’s most destructive activity. Although rooted in Greco-Roman and Christian European thought, similar ideas about regulated violence appear in ancient Indian philosophy and German idealism, revealing both convergence and conflict.
Western “just war theory” began with Cicero, who believed war was justified only for self-defence or protecting the innocent. In later days, theologians like Augustine and Thomas Aquinas gave it a structure. Aquinas emphasised three conditions for a just war: Legitimate authority, just cause, and righteous intent. These became the basis for jus ad bellum: Justice of engaging in war. Self-defence is just; conquest or revenge is not. Equally important is jus in bello, the ethical conduct of war, which demands differentiating between combatants and civilians, and proportionality in the use of force. Violating these principles erodes the moral legitimacy of war. International norms like the Geneva Conventions echo these principles, but modern warfare — deploying nuclear weapons, drones, and asymmetric threats — challenges classical just war theory. When technology diffuses accountability, can morality endure?
Kant and Hegel complicate the landscape by shifting focus from external wars to internal violence, like punishment. Kant, a moral rationalist, saw punishment as retributive: Justice demands a proportionate response to wrongdoing. A murderer must not die as a consequence of revenge, but to uphold moral law. Hegel, writing in the wake of the French Revolution, took a historical view. He believed justice was embedded in “Sittlichkeit” — the ethical life of a community. Punishment restores ethical balance, reaffirming the contract between citizens and the state. While Kant separates moral law from history, Hegel integrates them, but both agree: Legitimate violence must serve justice, not arbitrary power.
Kautilya’s realism: Order over idealism
Kautilya’s Arthashastra, a treatise on governance in ancient India, offers a pragmatic approach. War, for Kautilya, is a tool of policy, not a moral enterprise. He categorised warfare into open battle, covert operations, and silent war, deploying them based on necessity. Deception and subversion were not immoral but strategic. War was a last resort, justified only when diplomacy failed, and its conduct had to align with Rajdharma — the ruler’s duty to preserve order.
Punishment, too, was instrumental. Harsh measures like torture or execution were acceptable if used responsibly to preserve state stability. Kautilya avoided tyranny through proportionality: Justice meant balance, not vengeance. His view aligns with Kant’s emphasis on moral accountability and Hegel’s historical contextualism. Unlike them, however, Kautilya prioritised survival and governance over moral abstraction.
Despite their differences, just war theory, German idealism, and Kautilyan realism converge on a common principle: Violence, if unavoidable, must be rationally and authoritatively regulated. From Aquinas to Kautilya, moral order distinguishes legitimate force from barbarism.
Present context
In light of these traditions, let us examine the India–Pakistan conflict. For decades, Pakistan has harboured terrorist networks that repeatedly attacked Indian civilians. Despite official denials, intelligence and satellite data trace these attacks to Pakistan-based groups, some allegedly supported by state actors. India, a democratic republic committed to peace, faced a moral dilemma: Whether to act or endure continued aggression.
India launched a limited, targeted military operation after exhausting diplomatic options. Civilian casualties in Pakistan were minimal. Many reports have confirmed official Pakistani complicity in funding and organising attacks. While critics labelled India’s action as hegemonic, others saw it as reluctant but necessary.
India’s ethical stance aligns with the spirit of jus ad bellum: It had a just cause, right intention, and pursued peaceful alternatives first. Military action wasn’t about revenge but about deterrence, protection, and moral responsibility. As Pakistan weaponised terrorism, diplomacy lost relevance. Proportional force became not only a strategic necessity but a moral obligation.
From a utilitarian view, limited action that prevents greater violence and saves lives is more ethical than inaction. Failing to respond would risk further destabilisation and violate the state’s duty to protect its citizens. India’s approach demonstrates a commitment to justice, avoiding excessive violence, upholding global norms, and reinforcing its role as a responsible state actor.
War, when waged within strict moral and legal constraints, may at times be ethically justifiable. Whether framed through Christian doctrine, German philosophy, or Indian realism, the guiding principle is clear: Violence must serve justice, not vengeance. India’s actions, rooted in restraint and purpose, reflect this enduring ideal.
The writer teaches at Jadavpur University, Kolkata, and was the Eugenio Lopez Visiting Chair at the Department of International Studies and Political Science at Virginia Military Institute, US
India launched a limited, targeted military operation after exhausting diplomatic options. 
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