Indian Navy in South China Sea: Naval drills may have helped improve interoperability, but they are strategically inconsequential

Indian analysts cite the recent India-ASEAN maritime exercise (AIME) in the South China Sea as an example of India’s use of hard power in support of political goals. The exercise, which took place between May 2 and May 8, 2023, involved two frontline Indian warships, Satpura and Delhi, and was the first time India conducted maritime drills with ASEAN partners as a bloc. Its seeming purpose was to signal resolve to China, whose assertiveness in the South China Sea has alarmed Southeast Asian states. That this was a high-priority engagement for India was evident from the fact that Navy Chief Admiral Hari Kumar was in Singapore to flag off the exercise.

Notably, New Delhi has so far refrained from holding multilateral military exercises with ASEAN. One reason has been India’s reluctance to provoke Beijing. While India and China have their differences, Indian policymakers regard the South China Sea as a contested zone dominated by China, in which India has little strategic equity. That, arguably, is still the case. While India’s security posture in the Pacific has altered over time, with New Delhi more inclined to conduct naval operations in the Western Pacific, the country’s security establishment remains cautious. Despite the advancement of India-ASEAN relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership and expanding defence cooperation, New Delhi remains leery of military operations in disputed areas of the South China Sea.

This assessment might seem to contradict more upbeat accounts of AIME in the media, but it is not without merit. The maritime exercise came about as a result of extensive consultations between ASEAN and India. In recent years, regular meetings held under the auspices of the ASEAN-India Dialogue Relations, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the East Asia Summit (EAS) have helped India and ASEAN refine their agenda for military cooperation. For New Delhi, defence engagement with ASEAN is a logical extension of collaboration in other areas under the ‘Act East Policy’. But India is just one of many ASEAN partners to witness an upgrade in the military partnership. China, the US, and Russia have all held naval exercises with the Southeast Asian bloc; India is the fourth ASEAN dialogue partner to be doing such exercises.

The record of ASEAN’s naval engagements is instructive. Long reluctant to engage militarily with extra-regional powers, 2017 marked the Southeast Asian bloc’s first multilateral naval exercise. It was ostensibly motivated by the belief that the association’s overt focus on economic issues had diminished attention to security issues, particularly in the South China Sea. While ASEAN had expanded the Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) in 2011 to include eight new members, including China, India, Russia and the US, it remained averse to combat drills with extra-regional powers. In 2018, when the Southeast Asian bloc conducted its first-ever naval exercise, it was, ironically, with China, a seeming attempt by regional states to reassure Beijing that it was not an adversary but a potential partner. In 2019, the United States became the second ADMM partner to hold joint exercises with ASEAN, followed by Russia in 2021.

Indeed, ASEAN’s military engagements seem to have a performative dimension. The association’s security initiatives appear intended not so much at the achievement of tangible outcomes but to display solidarity with multiple partners. Southeast Asian experts characterise ASEAN’s penchant for diversified engagement as a desire for balance. The diverse policy toolkit is an attempt to achieve outcomes without conflict. But this also constrains the bloc’s ability to make hard choices.

New Delhi, for its part, seeks a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Indian decision-makers stress the need for nations to adhere to maritime law, resolving disputes peacefully and without violence. But India desists from taking a hard stance on China’s violation of norms in the South China Sea, confining naval exercises to non-disputed areas of the South China Sea. The purpose of Indian military exercises is to improve interoperability and emphasise high-seas freedoms. It is not to challenge China’s maritime aggressiveness or its excessive territorial claims.

The pattern of the naval exercises last week was well in keeping with this understanding. The sea phase of AIME was held mainly in the exclusive economic zone of Vietnam and in international waters along the transit route to the Philippines; participating units stayed well clear of the disputed seas near the Spratly group of islands or Scarborough Shoal. Not surprisingly, Chinese militia forces snooped on the formation but did not disrupt the exercises.

To be fair, there is more than a China-rationale to India’s maritime operations in the South China Sea. India, which has long seen itself as a net-security provider in the Indian Ocean, recognises the growing importance of the South China Sea for trade and connectivity. It also sees the region as a potential market for Indian arms exports. Indian naval presence in the region is a way of burnishing New Delhi’s credentials as a reliable partner and capacity builder.

But India’s activism in maritime Southeast Asia still falls short of “realist” depictions. As useful as the naval drills last week may have been to improve interoperability, they are strategically inconsequential. The limiting of naval manoeuvres to non-disputed regions of the South China Sea is likely to have been perceived by some as a concession to Chinese vanity.

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The writer heads the Maritime Policy Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi