The recent arrival in Taipei of three retired Indian service chiefs has led to media speculation about the message that Delhi was sending, about “India’s options” in case of a military operation by Beijing to reunite Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This speculation was lent a sharp edge by American analyst Ashley Tellis’s recent comment that India’s vulnerability to Chinese domination, “guarantee(s) that New Delhi will never involve itself in any US confrontation with Beijing that does not directly threaten its own security.”
The three chiefs were in Taiwan to participate in a seminar on maritime affairs, organised by a Taiwanese think-tank. These Track-2 discussions would, obviously, be of an academic nature. But so prickly is China about Taiwan and so charged is the Sino-Indian relationship with mistrust that the visit may invite caustic comments from Beijing.
As a matter of fact, the Republic of China or RoC (the official designation of Taiwan and its associated islands) has, for many years, been welcoming senior retired officers of the Indian armed forces to participate in conferences and visit its military units and defence installations. The reason is quite simple: The RoC as one of the world’s most insecure nations welcomes any sign of support from any quarter — especially from India, a nation of consequence with which it has some convergence of security interests.
The RoC lies a mere 112 miles across the Taiwan Strait from its giant neighbour, the PRC, which represents an omnipresent threat of military invasion and forcible integration. Beijing has denuded the RoC’s international support by bullying or bribing many nations into withdrawing formal recognition. The RoC is today, recognised by only 13 countries, including the Vatican and a handful of small Pacific islands.
The Republic of China was established in 1912, after the downfall of the Qing Dynasty, and the assumption of rule by the Kuomintang (KMT) party as the legitimate government. In 1927, a civil war broke out between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) but the 1937 Japanese invasion led to a truce and the two parties formed a united front to fight the common enemy. Resumed after World War II, the civil war ended in 1949 with a Communist victory. The CCP under Mao Zedong took control of mainland China, and the defeated RoC government, headed by Generalissimo (a military rank above Field Marshal) Chiang Kai-shek fled to the offshore island of Taiwan.
Post-WW II, the RoC, having emerged as one of the victorious Allies, was granted a seat on the UN Security Council. However, with the Communists staking their claim as the legitimate government of China, the UN, in 1971, expelled the RoC and gave its seat to PRC. Even as the US switched its recognition from RoC to the PRC, Beijing declared that it would use force if the RoC ever declared independence. This brings us to the interesting US policy of “strategic ambiguity” with respect to the RoC.
After their 1972 détente, Nixon and Mao issued the joint “Shanghai Communique,” which acknowledged that “there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of it.” Thus, Washington’s “one China” policy helped the US sit on the fence while maintaining good relations with both the PRC and RoC. Seven years later, in 1979, the US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which approved unofficial relations between the US and Taiwan and committed the US to providing Taiwan with “defensive weapons”. So far, the US has, through diplomacy and military posturing, conveyed a message of deterrence to China without actually committing itself to military intervention in the defence of Taiwan.
India’s relationship with the RoC can be traced back to the WW II deployment of the 100,000-strong Chinese Expeditionary Force (CEF) for the defence of Burma. Mauled by the Japanese, the CEF withdrew to India, where a centre was opened in Ramgarh for its re-training and re-equipping by the Americans. In February 1942, when Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek visited Ramgarh, he was invited by the Indian National Congress to address its 53rd session (underway in Ramgarh).
While Chiang’s visit was meant to convey China’s solidarity with India in the fight against Japanese aggression, he
also expressed support for India’s freedom struggle. In June 1942, Gandhiji wrote to Chiang, conveying that the Allied war effort would be far better served if Churchill assured India of self-determination, under the Atlantic Charter. Chiang promptly wrote to US President Roosevelt pleading India’s cause and seeking his intervention in the cause of “justice and equity.” (Srinath Raghavan, The Most Dangerous Place)
India recognised the PRC in 1950 and for years stood by a “one China” policy, without reciprocity from the Chinese about J&K and Arunachal. Though India-Taiwan relations have remained low-key because of apprehensions about China’s adverse reaction, the two countries established trade and cultural ties in 1995 — diplomatic representatives were posted in New Delhi and Taipei.
India-China relations plummeted after the 2020 Galwan incident, which compelled India to counter-mobilise in Ladakh. While the Sino-Pakistan military nexus will ensure that India has its hands full on land and at sea, the compact but robust Indian Navy remains fully committed to safeguarding India’s interests across the Indo-Pacific. Consequently, there is as much chance of India involving itself militarily in a Taiwan Strait crisis as there is of US paratroopers landing in Ladakh.
Given a shared and ever-increasing threat from the PRC, there is a significant mutuality of interests between India and the RoC. Apart from the obvious benefits to be gained from the regular exchange of military intelligence, Taiwan’s unique position as the world leader in semiconductors makes it a desirable friend and partner.
While the three former chiefs would make their recommendations to the government, New Delhi must retain a degree of caution and scepticism in this emerging relationship because historically, the RoC is not only the originator of the vexatious 9-Dash Line in the South China Sea, but has also refused to recognise the McMahon line, and insists that “Southern Tibet” belongs to China.
The writer is a former chief of naval staff
The CCP under Mao Zedong took control of mainland China, and the defeated RoC government, headed by Generalissimo (a military rank above Field Marshal) Chiang Kai-shek fled to the offshore island of Taiwan. (Illustration by C R Sasikumar) 
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