India should reconsider its decision to shelter Sheikh Hasina

India’s role in the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 is well-documented. Merely days after Pakistan’s brutal military crackdown on Bengali protesters on March 25, 1971, a symposium was convened at Sapru House in New Delhi to deliberate India’s strategic response. During the discussions, K Subrahmanyam, an Indian international strategic affairs analyst and Jaishankar’s father, observed that the unfolding political crisis presented India with the “opportunity of the century” to recalibrate its strategic environment through decisive intervention. In retrospect, it is worth questioning how effectively this opportunity has been leveraged over the ensuing decades to advance India’s long-term security and strategic interests.

Unlike contemporary instances — such as the United States under Donald Trump seeking a transactional arrangement with Ukraine — India extended its support to Bangladesh without negotiating a post-war strategic framework. This generosity included hosting nearly ten million refugees for nine months during the course of the war.

Given this immense contribution, it is not unreasonable for India to expect that Bangladesh would refrain from adversarial behaviour or allow its territory to be used by hostile powers such as China or Pakistan. However, bilateral relations have not been shaped by any enduring sense of loyalty. Instead, they are influenced by the volatile trajectory of Bangladesh’s domestic politics, which has oscillated between periods of military rule and fragile democratic transitions.

Among the central political actors, the Awami League — under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina — has consistently maintained a pro-India orientation. In contrast, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), founded by General Ziaur Rahman, has often adopted a posture more aligned with Pakistan and markedly anti-India. Compounding this dynamic was the Islamisation of Bangladesh’s polity during Zia’s rule from 1976 to 1981. This period witnessed the rise of Islamist groups whose ideological frameworks continue to underpin campaigns of anti-minority violence — particularly against Hindus — which remains a contentious issue in India-Bangladesh ties to this day.

Ultimately, however, the ties are shaped by both security and economic imperatives. On the security front, recent statements by Muhammad Yunus, head of Bangladesh’s interim government, have provoked concern in New Delhi. In seeking to court greater Chinese economic involvement in Bangladesh, Yunus made veiled references to India’s northeastern states — an act perceived in India as an encroachment upon its sensitive geopolitical concerns. India’s subsequent decision to cancel the transshipment facility for Bangladesh is widely interpreted as a direct response to Yunus’s overtures toward Beijing.

From India’s perspective, the evolving China-Pakistan security nexus already constitutes a formidable strategic challenge. Should Bangladesh choose to align itself with this axis — potentially forming a tripartite Bangladesh-China-Pakistan security framework — it would represent an unprecedented escalation of regional threats to India. Such a development could effectively negate the strategic gains India secured with Bangladesh’s liberation in 1971 and precipitate a paradigmatic shift in South Asia’s security architecture, potentially triggering an arms race and regional instability. Yunus must recognise that he now operates not as a civil society actor or development advocate but as a political leader bearing national responsibilities. His recent rhetoric, which resembles the language of advocacy often heard in donor forums, must evolve to reflect the complex imperatives of statecraft and regional diplomacy.

Owing to economic and cultural dimensions, the relations between India and Bangladesh are vastly different from India-Pakistan. Bengali nationalism plays a very interesting role in cementing this relationship between the two nations. According to Navine Murshid, author of India’s Bangladesh Problem, “The creation of Bangladesh had a contradictory effect on the West Bengal psyche – pride on behalf of their ethnic kin but also a sense of loss – because it was premised on Bengali nationalism and it was not clear where, if at all, Bengalis in West Bengal fit into that struggle.” Over the years, a host of treaties and agreements have been signed. In 2015, during Prime Minister Modi’s visit, 22 agreements were signed. While the Bangladeshi refugee issue has been a matter of political controversy, more than a million people travel every year legally from Bangladesh to India. In 2017, half of India’s revenues from medical tourism came from Bangladesh. In 2019, the top tourist-sending country to India was Bangladesh, with 2.58 million Bangladeshi tourists visiting India, whereas less than half of them came from America. Furthermore, Bangladesh offers a massive market for onions, sarees, rice and other items.

Given his advanced age, Yunus is unlikely to be a long-term political actor — either within Bangladesh or in the broader regional context. Nevertheless, India must not allow Bangladesh to play the “China card”, nor permit China to leverage Bangladesh as a strategic counterweight against India. In a notable gesture of diplomatic sensitivity, Sri Lankan President Aruna Kumara Dissanayake recently affirmed that “Sri Lanka will not permit its territory to be used in any manner inimical to the security of India.” It would be both prudent and constructive for Yunus — and the interim government in Dhaka — to make a similarly unambiguous declaration. Such a move would go a long way in rebuilding mutual trust and reaffirming Bangladesh’s commitment to a stable and cooperative South Asian order.

Shaikh Mujibur Rehman is the author of Shikwa-e-Hind: The Political Future of Indian Muslims. Views are personal.