Four years on, India must realise: On Russia-Ukraine war, a hands-off strategy is not ideal

The words of Leo Tolstoy, the most famous literary figure from Russia, capture the enormity, complexity, and unintended consequences of war. February 24, 2026, marks the fourth anniversary of the Russia-Ukraine war, but peace remains elusive as ever. It has turned into a war of attrition with little substantial gains for anyone. The ongoing war has exceeded the duration of Russia’s involvement in the Great Patriotic War (World War II), which lasted 1,417 days. In World War II, the Soviet Union achieved a decisive victory over Nazi Germany and emerged as a superpower. But Russia is unlikely to achieve anything substantial from this war.

Russia started the war with three primary objectives: Prohibiting Ukraine from joining NATO, protecting its Russian-speaking population in the Donbas region, and installing a favourable regime in Kyiv. Moscow expected a short, swift war that would force President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to either exit or surrender. But as it turns out, it was a mighty miscalculation. With European backing, the Ukrainian regime continues to resist Russian military advances even after four years of gruelling war. Moscow might have succeeded in halting Ukraine from joining NATO, but the fact that two neutral states, Sweden and Finland, joined NATO means that Russia’s insecurity persists unabated. Finland has a 1,343-kilometre border with Russia, where NATO forces will be permanently deployed for an indefinite period.

For political purposes, Russia can claim victory by showcasing roughly 20 per cent of Ukrainian territory, which includes Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia, under its control. But what matters for Russia is not territory, but long-term border security and strategic balance. With new territorial acquisitions, Russia will not acquire the elusive deterrence and security it seeks. Moreover, juxtaposed with Russia’s massive military, economic, and reputational losses, the territorial gains appear insignificant. The exact figures may never be known, but Western sources present a figure of nearly 1,75,000 military deaths and many times more injuries. Further, Russia’s economy has been sanctioned and isolated from Western economies. It will take years for the normalisation of its ties with the West. Therefore, this war has yielded no significant dividends to Moscow.

If Russia has failed to achieve its objectives, Europe has fared no better. Blinded by its idealism and moral authority, Europe presented it as a war between democracy and dictatorship and expected widespread international support. But, barring a few states, the important countries of the Global South declined to take sides and treated it as a European war for geopolitical influence. The BRICS countries refused to condemn the Russian invasion and continued their economic ties with Moscow. Because of support from the Global South, Russia was able to withstand Western economic sanctions and outperform many European economies.

Ukraine entered the war relying solely on NATO’s military and financial support. But wars of this magnitude are never waged on borrowed strength. Ukraine has lost nearly 20 per cent of its territory, six to seven million of its people have migrated to other countries, and an estimated 5,00,000 soldiers have suffered in terms of deaths and injuries. Kyiv fought the war valiantly, expecting membership in NATO and the European Union. But instead, the Donald Trump administration is pushing Kyiv to sign a humiliating deal with Russia. The ongoing peace negotiations in Geneva largely favour Russian terms and conditions: The captured territory will remain with Russia, Ukraine will not be offered NATO membership, and sanctions on Russia will be lifted gradually.

Beyond Europe, the Russia-Ukraine war has had a ripple effect on global geopolitics. The politics in West Asia has shifted in favour of Israel and the US. It would not have been possible for Israel to decimate Hamas and Hezbollah and attack Iran if Russia were not involved in a gruelling war. The Kremlin could not save Bashar al-Assad from the rebel forces and appeared helpless in saving Iran from the US assault. Even on its borderland, it could not protect Armenia, a member of CSTO, from an Azerbaijani attack. Further away, capturing Nicolás Maduro would not have been possible for the US had Russia provided the necessary weapons to Venezuela.

The Global South has avoided direct involvement but has suffered economic and geopolitical losses as a result of the war. BRICS countries treated it as a European war and did not proactively engage in efforts to mitigate the conflict. China, India, and Brazil appeared far more concerned about maintaining their balanced ties than about brokering an honest ceasefire. However, they must realise that their credibility will increase only if they contribute to the resolution of such conflicts. A hands-off approach will not take them too far.

The writer is professor, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi