Opinion How India used the International Solar Alliance to show its diplomatic heft and create a new market

Ten years ago, on the first day of the Paris climate talks COP21, the ISA was launched by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and then French President Francois Hollande to boost solar energy in developing countries and to mobilise $1 trillion in solar power by 2030. It was announced as a new coalition of about 120 “solar-rich” countries, or those optimally located between the tropics of Cancer and Capricorn with excellent potential for solar deployment. There was scepticism from several quarters: An energy grouping of mostly developing countries with poor or no energy access, a publicity exercise soon-to-be-forgotten, a deflection from the intense scrutiny on India over its role in either securing or scuttling a global climate deal at Paris. But the ISA did not fade away and lived on after the Paris COP.

On December 6, 2017, about two years from its launch, the ISA formally came into force and acquired the status of an international organisation. The story of ISA’s creation reveals India’s diplomatic success in capturing an issue-specific governance area — in this case, solar energy — and straddling the G77 and G20 blocs in enabling the formation of a new treaty-based, international organisation. It was an important shift in India’s foreign policy where climate change became a point of consideration to further India’s strategic interests. First, to take a leadership role in a climate-adjacent space and reinforce its seriousness about domestic climate action. Second, to assert its global power by creating a new international organisation.

India’s lead role in the steering and operationalisation of the ISA cannot be viewed independently of the rapid rise in solar PV (photovoltaics) installations in India and its own solar ambition. In 2015, India had an installed capacity of just under 3 GW, but it ramped up its earlier solar energy target five-fold to an audacious 100 GW of solar power capacity. Buoyed by the falling prices of solar energy globally, India saw great success with a new business model based on the aggregation of demand coupled with bulk procurement in two sectors: Light-emitting diode (LED) bulbs and photovoltaic (PV) solar electricity. There was a realisation that the size of the Indian market could be leveraged to enhance the adoption of low-carbon technologies, while simultaneously reducing their prices and strengthening the markets for these technologies in other developing countries. The ISA was thus conceived as a “market-making” mechanism to direct the flow of finance and technology towards the “solar-rich” countries in the Global South with enormous market potential for solar deployment. Money is reaching parts of the world where it is needed the most, and technology is going where it has the best chance to succeed.

The ISA proved to be a diplomatic win for India in a multipolar world as it leveraged a new geography of “sunshine states” to forge a new treaty-based international organisation. India not only reached out to “solar-rich” developing countries with shared interests, but actively brought on board developed countries and other non-state actors with keen financial interests in these untapped markets. The partnership with France was complementary to India’s diplomatic thrust and particularly influential in shaping the private sector and non-state participation. The ISA’s unique structure is best described as “soft law in a hard shell”: It uses the “hard” legal infrastructure of a treaty while relying on “soft” opt-in obligations to involve a range of participating actors in its implementation.

Ten years on, even if the collective progress under the Paris Agreement itself is lackluster, the climate architecture it laid down allowed India to stake a claim to a leadership role on the global stage. The Paris Agreement’s NDC-focused approach (climate action based on national priorities) gave India an opportunity to advance its own template of low-carbon and climate-resilient growth to the world through new, bespoke organisations such as the ISA, Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI), and Global Biofuels Alliance. It exemplifies a flexible multilateralism where new institutions stem from the shared interests of the Global South, but rely on the faculties and capabilities of the Global North and non-state actors for future implementation.

Countries left COP30 in Belém demanding greater implementation, and these India-led institutions are well-positioned to be vehicles of action-oriented delivery. Mobilisation of funds, including from the private sector and philanthropic investment, will be key to successful implementation in the coming years. With varying degrees of legal form, each of these institutions provides an alternative venue to mobilise finance and technology from a wide range of sources. From a negotiation perspective, this ties back into India’s core strategic interest — finance for climate action — and paves the way for an argument demanding greater accountability from the developed world for a tangible pipeline of implementation plans.

India’s G20 Presidency showcased its ability to bridge economic divide, build consensus, and drive decisions in the backdrop of significant geopolitical turmoil. With India’s bid to host COP33 in 2028, it has the opportunity to spotlight successful implementation through these bespoke institutions, elevate the lived experience and climate priorities of the Global South, and set the agenda for the multilateral process charting climate action through the next decade.

Jha is the author of The Making of International Solar Alliance: India’s Moment in the Sun. Views are personal