Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Indian officials and commentators have increasingly suggested that India is and should be guided by the concept of strategic autonomy. What exactly is strategic autonomy? How would we know it when we see it? And has it been good for India?
Former foreign secretary Shyam Saran, the originator of the term “strategic autonomy” in Indian discourse, defined it as “the capacity of a state to take relatively autonomous decisions on matters of vital interest”. The words “vital” and “relatively” are important because “not all interests are of a vital nature, and in a multi-state landscape, one cannot ascribe absolute value to every interest”. Put differently, trade-offs and concessions are inevitable in foreign policy, but not on vital interests.
How would we know what strategic autonomy actually means for India? As things stand, official pronouncements on it are largely non-falsifiable — almost any decision can be ascribed to strategic autonomy.
Outside of government, can we assess India’s strategic autonomy? Where has India made crucial decisions in external and internal policy that run counter to the demands or expectations of China, the European Union (EU), Russia, and the US?
China has made three key demands on India, historically — abide by the One China policy (stop sheltering the Dalai Lama and Tibetans, no recognition of Taiwan); settle the border by conceding Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh; and reject a US-led containment structure in Asia.
India has largely refused to give in to Chinese demands. It has continued to shelter the Dalai Lama and Tibetans. While it does not recognise Taiwan diplomatically, it has trade and other relations with the island. Despite Chinese blandishments and coercion, it has rejected any deal on the border that concedes Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. On containment, India’s record is more mixed. While it has rejected any US-led containment of China, it has partnered the US, Japan, and Australia in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific and the Quad, both of which initiatives are a response to a rising, more assertive China.
The EU seemingly has had no very high-stakes demands on India except perhaps on trade and human rights, which India has resisted. More importantly, since 2022, it has badgered India on the war in Ukraine. It has repeatedly asked India to condemn Russia’s invasion, mediate between Ukraine and Russia more actively, reduce its dependence on Russian oil, and honour international sanctions on Russia.
Here again, India has resisted. It has never condemned Russia for the February 2022 invasion. It has modestly mediated between Russia and Ukraine, but not because of EU pressures. It has continued to buy Russian oil, even if its purchases have been reduced in recent months. And some Indian businesses may be evading international sanctions against Russia — with or without the government’s knowledge.
Russia’s demands on India are not publicly known, but we can assume it has strongly urged India to reject Western demands on the Ukraine war, oil, and sanctions. Has Russia threatened to punish India in this regard, for instance by withholding arms sales? It is hard to say, but Russia probably needs the sales as much as India. Russian leverage is therefore limited. On oil purchases, a desire to diversify supplies and to take advantage of affordable prices over external pressures accounts for India continuing to buy Russian oil.
The US is the most stringent test case for Indian strategic autonomy. Over the past decade, the US has demanded that India eliminate high tariffs on US goods and strengthen intellectual property rights, stop buying Russian oil and reduce arms purchases from Russia, commit to buying US energy, technology, and agriculture products, and prevent BRICS from anti-American actions such as “de-dollarisation”. It has also asked India to curtail relations with Iran (oil purchases and cooperation, trade and investment, the development of Chabahar port and the Chabahar-Zahedan rail link).
Overall, in relation to the US, India has stuck to its guns. The exceptions are BRICS and Iran policy. India has opposed BRICS abandoning the dollar — though it is unclear if its opposition was under US pressure or for its own reasons. And on Iran, it has curtailed relations and, most recently, avoided condemning the US war and Israeli actions in Iran and Lebanon.
In sum, India has shown a willingness to defy bigger powers, though its record is not perfect. For some critics, being stiff-necked has resulted in rigid diplomacy and no big-power friends. Other critics maintain that while India has resisted the bigger powers, it no longer voices criticisms of them on behalf of others (as it used to do in the heyday of its internationalist diplomacy). It has thereby lost influence globally. Supporters of India’s diplomacy argue that it wisely practises “multi-alignment”, which means balanced relations with bigger powers and not giving offence to them except when its security and welfare are directly threatened. As a result, India is free to focus on its internal economic development.
Who is right? The answer depends on a rigorous assessment of whether India is strategically friendless and whether that matters, whether it has lost global influence and whether that matters, and whether multi-alignment plus stubborn resistance when it counts has indeed left India free to focus on the home front to the benefit of security and welfare.
The writer is visiting professor, International Relations, Ashoka University, and emeritus professor, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore
India has shown a willingness to defy bigger powers, though its record is not perfect. (Illustration: C R Sasikumar) 
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