In a recent essay, Stephen Walt argues that the international system is moving away from cooperative leadership towards the behaviour of a predatory hegemon. Major powers, he suggests, are increasingly willing to extract advantage, impose costs and limit accommodation when dealing with weaker states. In such a system, diplomacy and intent matter less than material capability. For India, this shift is especially consequential. A country that lacks sufficient economic scale, technological control and institutional strength is less insulated by alignment or rhetoric.
This context is important for assessing current debates on India’s foreign policy. Recent commentary in Indian media has focused on the present government, arguing that changes in the external environment have revealed limits in India’s ability to translate ambition into influence. While this observation has merit, interpreting it as a sudden policy failure risks overlooking deeper structural factors. The developments visible today reflect conditions that have accumulated over time.
The international environment has become more competitive. Major powers are more transactional and place greater emphasis on economic leverage, technological dominance and control over supply chains. In a system shaped by predatory hegemons, outcomes are influenced primarily by a country’s ability to mobilise industrial, technological and administrative resources. States with limited capacity in these areas face constraints on their strategic choices, regardless of leadership or diplomatic posture.
India entered this phase of global competition with enduring limitations.
Much of the current discussion focuses on the gap between stated objectives and available capabilities. Claims regarding strategic autonomy, global leadership or expanded influence are now being assessed against practical outcomes. This reassessment is useful. It highlights a long-standing challenge: Aligning national ambition with the institutional and economic foundations required to support it.
That challenge has developed over several decades.
Since economic liberalisation, India has prioritised growth, integration and stability. These priorities generated significant benefits, including expanded markets, increased investment and improved living standards. At the same time, they did not consistently translate into the development of strategic industrial capacity, technological self-reliance or coordinated state action. Industrial growth remained uneven across sectors. Dependence on imported technologies persisted. Defence production advanced gradually. Research and innovation capabilities developed in specific areas but not at scale. Administrative systems became adept at managing complexity, but less oriented towards speed and coordination.
In comparison, other rising economies treated economic development as closely linked to strategic objectives. Political authority, state institutions, capital and long-term planning were aligned to support industrial capacity, infrastructure and technology development over extended periods. India did not follow a similar path consistently. Instead, it relied on a combination of market mechanisms, external partnerships and diplomatic flexibility to manage constraints.
These outcomes reflect institutional patterns rather than decisions by any single government or political ideology. Bureaucratic reform in India has progressed incrementally. Authority is distributed across ministries and agencies, and decision-making processes emphasise procedure and consensus. Strategic coordination exists, but varies across sectors and over time. Large initiatives often move through extended phases of approval and implementation. Responsibility is shared across institutions, and timelines are influenced by multiple stakeholders.
Political competition has also shaped this environment. Long-term initiatives related to capacity building have been debated across party lines. Governments have balanced reform objectives with political and administrative considerations. Over time, this has contributed to gradual change rather than rapid transformation.
The present government has sought to strengthen infrastructure, industrial policy and defence manufacturing. These efforts have produced measurable progress in several areas. At the same time, structural change requires sustained implementation and coordination across institutions, which necessarily unfolds over extended periods.
Viewed in this light, current debates are best understood as part of a broader reassessment of India’s strategic position. The emphasis on rhetoric and leadership risks drawing attention away from underlying issues of state capacity. Adjustments in messaging or personnel alone are unlikely to address these constraints.
Walt’s argument is relevant because it highlights the conditions under which influence is exercised. Predatory hegemons respond primarily to leverage. For India, expanding strategic options depends on building industrial capability, strengthening technological ecosystems, and improving coordination and urgency across state institutions.
This does not remove the responsibility of any government to align claims with capacity. Managing expectations remains important. At the same time, it is more accurate to view current challenges as the result of long-term institutional evolution rather than short-term policy choices.
The more constructive discussion, therefore, concerns priorities rather than attribution. India’s strategic challenge is structural. Addressing it requires sustained effort across political cycles, consistent bureaucratic reform and long-term investment in national capabilities. Changes in tone or leadership alone are unlikely to alter outcomes without parallel progress in these areas.
The writer is a research fellow at the Takshashila Institution
The more constructive discussion, therefore, concerns priorities rather than attribution. India’s strategic challenge is structural (Willy Kurniawan/Pool Photo via AP, File) 
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