Opinion C Raja Mohan writes | India-Europe deal isn’t a byproduct of Trump’s America. It’s been long in the making

These developments, however, are not accidental byproducts of the current turbulence in Indian and European ties with Donald Trump’s America. Both India and Europe remain deeply invested in their massive economic partnerships with the US and have no intention of weakening their respective security bonds with Washington. What we are witnessing, rather, is a deliberate diversification by both sides — a conscious effort to de-risk their ties with an assertive China and a mercurial America.

After India-EU FTA, here’s a list of what who gains what

The agreements on trade, defence cooperation, and mobility unveiled this week were not conceived overnight. They reflect a sustained diplomatic effort that stretches back to the early years of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first term — an effort that is too often overlooked in the broader narrative of Indian foreign policy.

For much of the post-Independence era, Europe scarcely figured in India’s geopolitical imagination. Delhi habitually viewed the continent through the prism of Russia’s rivalry with the West. Europe, for its part, interpreted Asia through a narrow frame: An India encumbered by protectionism and a China open for business. By the time Modi took office in 2014, ties with Europe had sunk to a low. The strategic partnership announced in 2004 had stalled. Free trade negotiations were suspended in 2013. Annual summits were put on hold. Bilateral relations with key European states, including Italy, were deeply strained.

The first task was repair. The Modi government moved early to resolve difficult bilateral issues, reopen political channels, and rebuild trust. The revival of the annual India-EU summits in 2016 became a turning point. Simultaneously, Delhi began to shed its habit of treating Europe as a “flyover continent” en route to the US. Europe, too, initiated a fresh strategic review of India in 2018, setting the stage for the resumption of trade talks in 2022 — a full decade after they were suspended.

This diplomatic reboot extended beyond Brussels. Delhi revitalised ties with major European capitals — Paris, Berlin, London, Rome, Madrid, Warsaw — and reached out to Europe’s sub-regions: The Nordics, the Baltics, Central Europe, and the Mediterranean. New connectivity initiatives like the India-Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) widened the horizon. Security cooperation expanded in the western Indian Ocean. Defence industrial collaboration picked up pace. Advanced technologies — from green hydrogen to semiconductors — moved to the centre of the agenda. Even on contentious issues such as climate change, human rights, and Russia’s war in Ukraine, Delhi and Europe found pragmatic common ground to advance bilateral ties.

This week’s breakthroughs are the cumulative results from that diplomatic investment and political will to overcome entrenched scepticism in both Brussels and Delhi. But India has little time to linger in celebration. Trade liberalisation, once agreed upon in principle, requires enormous bureaucratic mobilisation to move from negotiation to signature to implementation. Defence cooperation, by nature, is slow, and calls for sustained high-level engagement if it is to yield tangible results.

In many ways, India’s moment with Europe today resembles the summer of 2005, when Delhi and Washington crafted a new framework for bilateral cooperation. What followed in the US case was an unprecedented mobilisation across governments, businesses, think tanks, and civil societies. Two decades later, one can debate whether India fully capitalised on the strategic possibilities the US opened up. That debate must not be replicated with Europe in future.

With Europe, India must generate both the ideas and momentum. Delhi also needs creative institutional engagement and an expanded presence across Europe’s multilingual and multinational geography. Yet, the moment could not be more auspicious. India and Europe share similar priorities: Internal economic and institutional reform, strengthening defence capabilities, narrowing the technology gap with the US and China, and diversification of strategic ties.

On trade, the journey has been especially striking. The BJP government began as a sceptic of free trade and dramatically walked out of the RCEP in 2019, reinforcing India’s image as a reluctant liberaliser. What followed was a significant strategic reorientation: The recognition that India gains more by negotiating with complementary economies in the West rather than competing with manufacturing hubs in East Asia.

Since exiting RCEP, India has stitched together a chain of free trade agreements — with Australia, the UAE, the European Free Trade Association, the United Kingdom, Oman, and New Zealand. The FTA with Europe will be the capstone of this new strategy.

Success with Europe must now spur Delhi to accelerate the upgradation of the Australia agreement, revive prospects with Canada, and nudge Washington toward a more stable trade compact. India should also begin exploratory discussions with members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Unlike the RCEP, dominated by China, the CPTPP excludes both Beijing, the manufacturing hegemon, and Washington, now an increasingly capricious trade partner.

India’s partnership with Europe stands at a turning point. The challenge now is to move from breakthroughs to delivery and from frameworks to outcomes. For India and Europe alike, this is a moment not just to diversify partnerships but to expand their agency in shaping the emerging international order.

The writer is contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express. He is a distinguished professor with the Motwani-Jadeja Institute of American Studies, Jindal Global University, and holds the Korea Foundation Chair at the Council for Strategic and Defence Studies, Delhi