Germany’s post-World War II identity has long rested on pacifism, diplomacy, and a deep aversion to military assertiveness. It changed dramatically in 2022 when Russia’s invasion of Ukraine jolted Berlin into a strategic reset. Chancellor Olaf Scholz called it a Zeitenwende — a turning point — announcing Germany would commit 2 per cent of its GDP to defence spending and create a €100 billion special fund to modernise the Bundeswehr. It marked a historic departure from decades of military restraint.
In 2025, the new Chancellor Friedrich Merz doubled down on this trajectory. In his first address to the Bundestag, Merz vowed to transform the Bundeswehr into “the strongest conventional army in Europe.” He coupled this with a sweeping economic recovery package and a tough new migration policy. “Germany and Europe must become so strong together that we never have to use our weapons,” he said. To realise this vision, Merz pledged unlimited financial backing for the military, and suggested that Germany would shoulder greater responsibility within NATO and the European Union.
Defence Minister Boris Pistorius echoed this ambition, suggesting a long-term goal of raising defence spending to as much as 5 per cent of GDP — a dramatic leap from the current ~2 per cent. The Merz-led coalition secured a key parliamentary provision: Defence spending beyond 1 per cent of GDP would be exempt from the constitutionally enshrined “debt brake”. The legal framework is in place. The ambition is clear. But will the German public support hold?
Initially, it seemed so. In 2022, the emotional shock of war in Europe led to broad support for increased military expenditure. Nearly 70 per cent of Germans backed the move — remarkable in a country so wary of militarism. The special fund enabled Germany to order F-35 fighter jets, procure Israel’s Arrow 3 missile defence system, invest in cyber capabilities, and digitise command operations. For many, this was not militarism, but a belated correction of decades of underinvestment.
But by 2025, that enthusiasm has tapered. A Koerber Stiftung poll from November 2024 found that while 73 per cent of Germans favoured greater investment in European security, 58 per cent opposed Germany playing a leading role if the US retreated from global affairs. Currently, around 55 per cent support strengthening national defence. Support for the far-right AfD, which advocates a more restrained defence posture, has grown. Cracks are appearing in the national consensus.
Several fault lines now threaten the sustainability of Germany’s defence transformation.
First, economic concerns are mounting. Inflation, stagnation, and budget constraints have sharpened debates over fiscal priorities. Critics ask whether Germany can afford to spend billions on tanks and jets while underfunding schools, housing, and its energy transition. With austerity on the horizon, Germans are being forced to choose between security and social services. Many want both — but doubt whether both are affordable.
Second, implementation has been slower than expected. Bureaucratic inertia, procurement delays, and supply chain disruptions have hampered progress. The Bundeswehr remains under-equipped in key areas. Reports of soldiers lacking basic gear persist, and many major systems are still years from deployment. If voters perceive the Zeitenwende as mostly talk with little delivery, support will wane further.
Third, Germany’s pacifist tradition remains strong. On the political left and among younger voters, scepticism toward militarisation is pronounced. Some fear entanglement in foreign wars; others are uneasy with NATO’s expanding mission. In eastern Germany, with its historic links to Russia and persistent economic grievances, alignment with the West is more contested.
The political implications are complicated. Defence expansion finds strongest support among Merz’s CDU/CSU and the SPD. The Greens, though supportive of Ukraine, are divided between their anti-war roots and current geopolitical realities. The Free Democrats (FDP) support spending but worry about fiscal discipline. Meanwhile, Die Linke and the AfD oppose rearmament from opposite ideological perspectives. Parliamentary arithmetic could thus prove tricky, despite constitutional backing for the special fund.
Another challenge: Any defence procurement over €25 million still requires approval from the Bundestag’s Budget Committee. This postwar safeguard against militarism makes defence planning highly sensitive to shifting coalitions, public opinion, and political bargaining.
There’s no doubt that Zeitenwende marks a new era. For the first time since reunification, Germany is taking its defence obligations seriously. NATO allies — especially in Eastern Europe — have welcomed the shift. Even the US, long frustrated by Germany’s military hesitancy, acknowledged the change during Chancellor Merz’s visit to Washington on June 6, with Donald Trump cautiously commending the new direction.
But transformation requires more than budgets and weapons — it needs a cultural shift. Germany must forge a new strategic consensus: That military readiness is a safeguard for peace, not a threat to it. This demands political leadership, public dialogue, and tangible improvements in the Bundeswehr’s capabilities.
Critics who argue that defence spending diverts resources from social needs often ignore a fundamental truth: Without security, prosperity cannot be sustained. Germany’s export-driven economy depends on a stable global order — one now threatened by Russian aggression, cyberwarfare, terrorism, and authoritarianism. The days of complacency are over.
At the same time, defence advocates must tread carefully. German strategic culture remains cautious. Any sense that the Bundeswehr is being rebuilt for adventurism — or that civil liberties are being eroded in the name of security — could provoke backlash. Transparency, restraint, and adherence to democratic norms are essential.
Germany’s real test lies not just in spending more, but in spending wisely. That means delivering visible outcomes: Enhanced operational readiness, better troop morale, and credible deterrence. It also means preserving democratic values while projecting stability.
The Zeitenwende Plus is not a singular moment but a sustained commitment. Germany must internalise that its global role has changed — not just because of Ukraine, but because the geopolitical environment demands it. A well-equipped, principled Germany can be a pillar of European security — but only if its leaders bring the public with them, not only in moments of crisis, but through steady, transparent governance.
In the end, Germany’s defence awakening will not be measured by euros spent — but by what it defends, and how.
The writer is former ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia ASEAN and the African Union