From Kargil to Operation Sindoor, India has scored its point — without escalation

There would be many differences: the Geopolitical environment, the will of the leadership in power and new weapons and equipment, which give rise to new tactics, strategies and doctrines.

India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in May 1998. The “nuclear haves” of the world condemned it and called us “irresponsible”, “rogue” nations. On February 21, 1999, the prime ministers of India and Pakistan signed the Lahore Declaration. They committed to “peaceful co-existence”, “responsibility to avoid conflict keeping in view the nuclear dimension”, and to “refrain from intervention and interference in each other’s internal affairs”.

Three months later, even before new nuclear doctrines were evolved, Pakistan violated the LoC to occupy the heights in the Dras-Kargil-Siachen sectors. The Pakistan army used the “jihadi façade”, not its “sponsored proxies”. Our intelligence and surveillance systems failed to detect the intrusion, which added to the political and military surprise. In Operation Vijay, the political mandate to the armed forces was to throw the enemy out of our territory, but not to cross the LoC or international border, primarily due to nuclear fears and international disapproval.

In Operation Vijay, the armed forces were poorly equipped. There was no Chief of Defence Staff, nor any integrated systems like the Integrated Air Defence Command and Control System, which exist today. However, at the operational level, the Army, Navy and Air Force did manage to coordinate their activities. But when the armed forces were on top of the conflict situation, India’s political leadership decided to accept Pakistan’s offer of a ceasefire.

Soon after Operation Vijay, I was invited to address a seminar organised by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. I made the following points. One, due to the nuclear factor, economic considerations, risk of high casualties and international pressure, there is a greater likelihood of limited conventional wars in the future. A limited conventional war would be limited in time, geographical area, utilisation of force levels or weaponry. There is space available below the nuclear threshold for such wars. Two, surprise and unpredictability are basic elements of a war. A limited conventional war does not mean limited capabilities. It refers to the use of those capabilities. Three, a war can be kept limited with credible deterrence. There is a linkage between credible deterrence, escalation dominance and escalation control. Four, in any future conflict, a synergised politico-military-diplomatic approach is essential for monitoring and continuous assessment.

Ever since the Kargil War, there has been much discussion on the nature of conflicts below the nuclear and conventional war threshold. A new term, grey-zone warfare, has emerged — it is described as a form of conflict that operates below the threshold of traditional warfare, utilising a combination of military and non-military tools, including state-sponsored proxies, to achieve strategic objectives without triggering an open war. It is characterised by ambiguity, deniability, and the use of unconventional tactics like cyberattacks, economic coercion, and disinformation campaigns. Briefly, the key characteristics of grey-zone warfare are: One, aggressors employ non-military or less kinetic tools which may not justify a military response; two, actions may take years, thus reducing opportunities for decisive counter-responses; three, the aggressor evades accountability, making it difficult to pinpoint responsibility and formulate responses.

In the past 25 years, Pakistan has avoided a conventional or limited conventional war. But it has continued to use its sponsored proxies (like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed) as an instrument of state policy. After the terror attack on Uri Camp in 2016, the Indian leadership, with superior kinetic capability at its disposal, dropped strategic restraint. The Army carried out a shallow “surgical strike” across the LoC. In 2019, after the horrific incident in Pulwama, India took yet another step forward. The Air Force struck Jaish’s training camp at Balakot deep inside Pakistan. As the targets were terrorist camps, these responses, although provocative, were pitched as non-escalatory.

The Pahalgam attack of April 22 hurt the very soul of India. It was impossible for the Indian government not to respond. In addition to several non-military steps, Operation Sindoor, with strong political resolve and the latest defence capabilities, was launched on May 7 to destroy nine terror camps across Pakistan. India made it known that this was a measured, non-escalatory response. When Pakistan escalated the situation and targeted India’s civil and military installations, Indian forces neutralised the Pakistani offensive and took the next step in escalation dominance. Eleven military installations utilised for escalation by Pakistan were destroyed with precision. And then Pakistan called for a ceasefire.

It would be foolhardy to ignore the spectre of a nuclear war in the Subcontinent and assume that the nuclear factor plays no role in limited conventional or grey-zone operations. Nuclear weapons remain a significant escalatory cap that demands close monitoring of the escalatory ladder. The soldiers in us may not appreciate having to give up the opportunity to exploit and strike further when the forces are in an advantageous position. But responsible political leadership, understandably, is less prone to take a nuclear risk.

Another problem here is Pakistan’s nuclear bogey and attempt to blackmail. It makes the international community sit up and intervene. During Operation Vijay, US President Bill Clinton used the nuclear factor to arm-twist Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Sharif succumbed. Vajpayee did not. During Operation Sindoor, US Vice President J D Vance warned Prime Minister Narendra Modi about Pakistan’s preparation for escalation. In both situations, India kept its cool, controlled escalation diplomatically and militarily, and achieved its political goal.

Lesson: Escalation control requires a confident understanding of the adversary’s escalation thresholds.

The writer is a former Chief of Army Staff