An innocuous tweet by the Russian Embassy in India last week was loaded with strategic intentions and couldn’t avoid reference to the ongoing conflict with Ukraine. It read: “On October 26, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, (and) Rajnath Singh discussed the situation in Ukraine. Sergei Shoigu conveyed his concerns about possible provocations by Ukraine with the use of a ‘dirty bomb’.”
Earlier, in a briefing on radiation security threats by the chief of nuclear, biological and chemical protection troops Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, the Russian Ministry of Defence said that it has information about the Kyiv regime’s planning to commit a provocation by exploding the so-called “dirty bomb” or low-power nuclear warhead. This was followed by Vladimir Putin monitoring the annual exercise of the Strategic Forces.
Russia also escalated its accusations that Ukraine plans to detonate a so-called dirty bomb, claiming in a letter to the UN Security Council that Kyiv would in turn use the fallout from the explosion to blame Moscow for using a tactical nuclear weapon.
Meanwhile, in a joint statement, the US, France and Britain — three of the other nuclear powers on the UNSC – asserted that Russia’s claims were “transparently false”. They suspect that Russia might use a dirty bomb in a “false flag” attack, possibly to justify Moscow’s use of nuclear weapons as it finds itself on the back foot in eastern and southern Ukraine.
Russia has repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons. Immediately after the invasion of Ukraine, Putin ordered Russia’s military on February 27 to put its deterrence forces, which include nuclear weapons, on “special alert”. He had explained to his Defence Chiefs that this was because of “aggressive statements” by the West, amid widespread condemnation of his invasion of Ukraine. On September 21, he reiterated his threat to use all types of weapons by asserting that it is not a bluff. This clearly brings out that his threats so far had not been taken seriously or lacked credibility.
Perhaps, Russia’s intent is to deter the West from direct involvement in the conflict by periodic nuclear sabre rattling. Nuclear deterrence is a mind game and therefore, restraints on the outbreak of nuclear war are mainly intellectual, ethical or doctrinal. There is wide agreement within the strategic community that the first use of nuclear weapons, even if against military targets, is likely to be less for the destruction of the other side’s military forces and more for warning, redress, bargaining, punitive or deterrence aims.
Moreover, the use of tactical nuclear weapons is likely to be more escalatory if instead of being launched locally or tactically, they are launched against cities. Past NATO planning envisaged the immediate use of hundreds of nuclear weapons in reply to a conventional attack in Europe by the Soviets. But nobody considered this possibility seriously. Similarly, the Soviets remained largely hostile to the idea that a nuclear war could be fought in a highly limited manner that is in the form of small-scale nuclear exchanges carried out for bargaining purposes.
Moreover, the use of a “dirty bomb” by Ukraine itself is very unlikely. A “dirty bomb” is a conventional bomb containing radioactive, biological or chemical materials disseminated in an explosion. The term is often used interchangeably with radiological dispersal device (RDD), a bomb where radioactive materials are used.
A dirty bomb consists of a conventional high explosive and a quantity of radioactive material such as Caesium-137. There are numerous radioactive sources used in medicine, industry and agriculture that could be used to fabricate a dirty bomb. Deaths and injuries caused by the blast of conventional explosives and long-term radiation exposure effects would be minimal. Its impact would be immense in the social, psychological and economic disruption caused by radioactive contamination. This would cause considerable fear and panic in the population. However, such radiological devices are more likely to be used by terrorists than regular forces locked in a conflict. In fact, RDDs are not held in the known inventory of regular forces of any country as their effects in field conditions away from cities would be sub-optimal.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict can, at best, be categorised as a limited war as the stated aims of both sides are restricted. While Ukraine aims to restore its territorial integrity, Russia has reduced the scope of its war aims. On June 29, Putin declared that the “ultimate aim” of the Russian war in Ukraine is “the liberation of the Donbas, the defence of its people, and the creation of conditions which would guarantee the security of Russia itself.” This reflected a downward shift from the goals he proclaimed in the first days of the war — “unconditional consideration for Russia’s legitimate interests in the sphere of security, including recognition of Russia’s sovereignty over Crimea, achieving the objectives of the Ukrainian state’s demilitarisation and de Nazification, and ensuring its neutral status.” Deliberately raising the risk of a nuclear exchange is a tactic that fits in the context of limited war. This aims to put pressure on the other side to de-escalate its activities or seek negotiations.
Preparations for large-scale conventional wars are prolonged and painful but not for a nuclear exchange. This is reflected in Putin’s announcement of a partial mobilisation on September 21, which signalled a major escalation of the war and caught the world’s attention. Putin was forced to do this because of battlefield reverses and a shortage of personnel. World Wars I and II were characterised by a totality of war effort and participation by all including drafting, war mobilisation, training, etc. In Russia, the war is being run by the government with little attention to morale or support from the civilian population.
Since nuclear weapons exist, they may be used. However, their use will continue to be threatened repeatedly. Such threats per se are a kind of use. Nuclear weapons deter nuclear war and not a conventional war. It is apparent that Russia is resorting to nuclear signalling to impose restraint and caution on the opposite side. Fears of Russian nuclear weapon use are exaggerated and threats remain incredible.
The writer is a former Vice Chief of Army Staff and Southern Army Commander
