The conflict in Syria has reached a tipping point,but not one that promises a quick end to the fighting. With or without Bashar al-Assad as its leader,Syria now has all the makings of a grim and drawn-out civil war: evenly matched protagonists who are not ready for a ceasefire,and outside powers preoccupied with their own agendas and unable to find common ground.
There is no easy way out of such a stalemated struggle,and this one threatens the stability of the whole Middle East. So the US and its allies must enlist the cooperation of Assads allies Russia and,especially,Iran to find a power-sharing arrangement for a post-Assad Syria that all sides can support,however difficult that may be to achieve.
Until now,Washington has seen the developments in Syria as a humiliating strategic defeat for Iran,and it has largely sat on the sidelines,trying to draw diplomatic cooperation from Russia. The administration and its critics alike may think that involving Iran in any resolution to the conflict would throw Tehran a lifeline and set back talks on Irans nuclear program. But a breakup of Syria and the chain of events that such a breakup would inevitably set in motion poses a graver threat to the Middle East and to Americas long-run interests in the region than does Irans nuclear program. And Iran has much more influence with the Assad leadership than does Russia.
If the Syrian conflict explodes outward,everyone will lose: it will spill into neighbouring Lebanon,Jordan,Iraq and Turkey. Lebanon and Iraq in particular are vulnerable; they,too,have sectarian and communal rivalries tied to the Sunni-Alawite struggle for power next door.
The stage is set for a protracted conflict that would divide Syria into warring opposition and pro-Assad enclaves. For now,the Assad government has enough support and firepower to keep fighting,and it shows no sign of giving up. Most members of Syrias Alawite,Christian and Kurdish minorities,along with a slice of its Sunni Arab population,still prefer Assad to what they fear will follow his fall; together,those groups make up perhaps half of Syrias population,the rest of which is largely Sunni Muslim.
The opposition,meanwhile,is winning territory,but its ranks are divided among some 100 groups with no clear political leadership. Even if Assad were to step down voluntarily,his Alawite military machine and its sectarian allies are likely to fight on,holding large chunks of territory. Syria would then fracture,with the fighting deciding who controls what area. There would be ethnic cleansing,refugee floods,humanitarian disasters and opportunities for al Qaeda.
There is still time to prevent the worst from happening in Syria. It will require difficult decisions and recalculating what is possible. The US and its allies are still focusing on international pressure and support for the opposition to bring down Assad. That is the wrong goal,because it will not end the fighting.
Instead,the aim of diplomacy should be to devise a post-Assad power-sharing arrangement that all sides could sign on to. That,rather than more pressure on the government and more bickering among the outside powers,could finally persuade Syrians who are still in Assads corner to abandon the fight.
There are reasons to hope that Russia and Iran would join the bargaining. Both wish to rebuild their damaged prestige in the Arab world. As for the West,Assads fall,without a transition plan,would be a Pyrrhic victory. A transition plan also must include Turkey,which has a long border with Syria and the military muscle to influence the conflict.
VALI NASR is dean of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University