Doomed by example

State misconduct in Adivasi lands has,of course,gone on for decades. The new twist is that in keeping with the worldwide collapse of an outdated ideology,India has lost its romance with socialism,and has begun seriously to rely on markets as a driving force of development. However surprising it may sound to some,India is now building capitalism.

Capitalism has implications for our Adivasis. In search of profits,without which capitalism cannot work,large private investors have arrived in the tribal heartlands for iron ore and natural resources. Software may not require old-fashioned raw materials,but steel industry does. As a consequence,it is not simply the forest officer and his unseemly contractor friend,as in the older days,who exploit the hapless Adivasis. A new force has arrived in the form of Indian and foreign capitalists.

To deny these Maoist claims would be an act of intellectual blindness. And it would be myopic to suggest that large-scale benefits of capitalism cannot be reaped until some groups make a sacrifice today. The latter is the hidden transcript of much economic thinking. The problem is simply this: Western capitalism could be built on the backs of the Oliver Twists of the time,but that was because the economically affluent countries of the West (as well as,later,East Asia) were not constrained by universal franchise when they started building capitalism.

India’s emerging capitalism does not have that choice. India cannot give Adivasis the right to vote,and also at the same time expect them to be willing sacrificial lambs. Indian capitalism is being built within the framework of universal franchise. India has to embrace compassionate capitalism,not robber-baron capitalism. The former is called inclusive growth in official parlance today. Adivasis will have to be brought into the mainstream of Indian economy,not as victims but its beneficiaries.

But is Maoism the answer to Maoist critiques of the Indian state or development? This is where the supporters of Maoists,both in civil society and within state organs,have seriously erred. Four big analytic mistakes have been made.

First,supporters of Maoism show alarming ignorance about the distinction between insurgency and insurgent violence. In a modern-day classic,The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge University Press,2006),Stathis Kalyvas,professor of political science at Yale,summarises hundreds of thousands of hours of research. The basic claim,now widely accepted,is that in all insurgencies the fiery rhetoric of ideologues at the highest level coexists with the everyday pursuit of desires,jealousies and vendettas on the ground level. Into high-sounding ideologies can be inserted all sorts of aims,both noble and ignoble,by the lieutenants and foot soldiers of an insurgency.

Arundhati Roy waxes eloquent over the Gandhian-style idealism of the Gond-area Maoists,with the major difference that Maoists believe in guns,not in what she calls the “humbug” of Gandhian non-violence. If she had familiarity with the research on the subject,she would not be surprised by the attacks on civilians in buses and trains. Insurgent ideologues can at best discipline the motives of foot soldiers in a small geographical area. But any large-scale insurgency ends up developing a Janus character,combining idealism and sordidness. Over the last several decades or so,we know of no exceptions. The implication should be obvious. India should get ready for more Maoist attacks not only on the police and paramilitaries,but also on civilians.

Second,a military counterinsurgency alone is rarely enough to defeat insurgents. While riots are urban,insurgencies tend to be rural,forest- or mountain-based,primarily because insurgents need safe hideouts. To construct hideouts,insurgents also build social relations and a supportive civilian environment. As a consequence,battle lines are never as clearly laid out as in a conventional war,and civilians get inextricably tied up in violence and counter-violence. Authoritarian systems can afford to ignore scores and scores of civilian deaths; democracies can’t. As Amartya Sen has repeatedly reminded us in a different context,democracies may live with routine mass deprivation,but they can’t take excessive mass suffering. Large-scale killings of civilians qualify as the latter.

India as a democracy,therefore,has had an unwritten rule about insurgencies. It has always followed a three-part strategy. Military counterinsurgency,the first part,aims to subdue the insurgents physically; more economic resources in the area of insurgency,the second part,seek to wean away the support base of insurgents and/ or buy off local elites; and persuading the insurgents to run for office or to come to a dialogue with the government,the third part,attempts a political resolution. The same three-fold strategy is necessary in the Maoist areas today.

Third,it should,however,be clear that while all three parts of the strategy should be simultaneously pursued,the insurgents will not accept a dialogue,or participate in the normal political processes,if they believe they are winning. A vast literature on insurgencies has developed around this point,and the consensus is undisputed. Groups committed to fighting the state violently do not give up,unless forced to. Those who argue that development is the only,or best,way to deal with

Maoism are making a huge mistake. Development is not possible in areas controlled by Maoists,only in those areas where they have no or uncertain control. Why would those who have built their political base by arguing that the state’s resources never reach the needy allow the government to do a better job? Maoists must be militarily subdued before development or governance in areas controlled by them can make a comeback.

Fourth,and this is the final point,even if one accepts that Maoist complaints are right,they have no defensible blueprint for the future. In the end,Maoism cannot lift Adivasis out of their abject poverty. An unqualified opposition to markets is an ideology of yesteryears,whose hollowness has been demonstrated in countries that became anti-market icons of the world: the Soviet Union and China. The former does not exist any more,and the latter has embraced markets and delivered millions out of poverty,not by embracing Maoism but by jettisoning it. Maoism does not exist in the original land of Mao any longer.

The best way to combine the potential of markets and genuine Adivasi needs is to think about how Adivasis will be given stakes in the economic uplift of their forests and lands,which only private investors will develop in the future,not the state. How does one combine market forces with Adivasi interests? We should devote our intellectual energies to exploring such middle points in a creative way,not on blindly opposing markets in Adivasi lands or equally blindly sacrificing Adivasi interests for the uncertain promise of unregulated markets.

The writer is a professor of political science at Brown University,US

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