Opinion Trump’s new National Security Strategy: Big promises, bigger contradictions
From clashing worldviews to MAGA factionalism and an ambiguous China policy, the NSS exposes the paradoxes shaping America’s global posture
As much as America’s allies and partners are likely alarmed by the new NSS, Beijing is also likely to note the strong undercurrent of competition. In the American system, the President is required by law to submit a national security strategy to Congress. Coherence of said strategy, unfortunately, is not a statutory requirement. This incoherence of the new National Security Strategy (NSS) released by the Donald Trump administration late last week is evident in several domains. But three stand out glaringly.
First, there is an incoherence in terms of the vision of the world and America’s place in it. This is as much a product of the ideological flux within the US as it is an outcome of the nature of Trump’s politics —riddled with grievances and a desire for self-aggrandisement. At one level, the document outlines a vision of the US as still the preponderant global power. At the same time, it views the world as increasingly multipolar and divided into spheres of influence. This tension runs through the document, which lashes out at earlier elites for having pursued a “fundamentally undesirable and impossible goal”. They supposedly misunderstood American interests, miscalculated global engagement and placed “misguided and destructive bets on globalism.” In contrast, the Trump administration seemingly is defining its goals more narrowly. Its strategy eschews talk about democracy and global influence, and instead focuses on ensuring homeland security, economic vitality, industrial capacity, military superiority and the “restoration and reinvigoration of American spiritual and cultural health”.
Yet, even as it narrows America’s ambitions, the NSS underscores an inherent desire for maintaining American global primacy. The difference is that Trump wants others to foot a larger share of the bill for this, while positioning the US as an offshore balancer that can provide “favourable treatment on commercial matters, technology sharing, and defence procurement.” Indeed, the NSS explicitly says that the US will “organise a burden-sharing network, with our government as convener and supporter”. Whether this transactional value proposition being offered to allies can ultimately sustain American primacy is another matter altogether.
Second, the wrangling between different segments of the MAGA coalition is evident in the disjointed nature of the NSS. Across the document, one can find uneasy compromises between the primacists, prioritisers, ideologues, isolationists, pro-business elements and economic nationalists. For example, the sections on economic security and policy towards Europe are clear wins for economic nationalists and MAGA ideologues, respectively, represented by Vice President JD Vance. On occasion, the perspectives of different groups align. For instance, the isolationists and ideologues would pretty much agree on the primacy of the “nation-state” and the threat from “sovereignty-sapping incursions of the most intrusive transnational organisations”. At other times, however, there is a clear inconsistency. For example, there is an inherent tension between the goal of strengthening “America’s historic advantages in science, technology, industry, defence, and innovation” while preventing “meritocracy to be used as a justification to open America’s labor market to the world”. Likewise, there is friction between the security of Israel being a “core interest” and concerns around lobbying and influence operations that seek to steer American policies or involve America in foreign conflicts.
The third broad aspect of incoherence is in terms of how the NSS envisions the future of the US-China relationship. For starters, the document explicitly states that in order to thrive at home, the US must successfully compete in the Indo-Pacific. The relationship with China is key to this. The NSS calls to “rebalance America’s economic relationship with China, prioritising reciprocity and fairness to restore American economic independence”. It adds that “trade with China should be balanced and focused on non-sensitive factors”. In addition, it wants to work with allies and partners to ensure America’s “prime position in the world economy” and so that “allied economies do not become subordinate to any competing power”. Likewise, the document commits to America maintaining “a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain”, ensuring a balance of forces with allies that can “deny any attempt to seize Taiwan”, and promises to develop “strong measures” to keep the waterways of the South China Sea open. In fact, across the document, competition with China finds oblique mentions in every area. For instance, when discussing American policies in the Western Hemisphere, the NSS warns about “foreign influence” and “non-Hemispheric competitors” across domains.
Consequently, as much as America’s allies and partners are likely alarmed by the new NSS, Beijing is also likely to note the strong undercurrent of competition. Of course, the incoherence and transnational nature of the strategy should take some of the edge off for those in Zhongnanhai.
The writer is chairperson, Indo-Pacific Studies Programme, The Takshashila Institution
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