5 min readJul 28, 2026 06:48 AM IST
First published on: Jul 27, 2026 at 03:34 PM IST
The US and Iran have been at odds since the 1979 Revolution, portraying each other as agents of violence or destruction. But this kind of mutual “othering” has not led to war; for all the posturing, there has been deterrence, and a good deal of indirect negotiation, conducted with the necessary restraint. Identity is part of why the rivalry has held on, but it does not explain why things come to a head in direct military terms at some junctures and not at others.
For decades, Washington has worked to stymie any regional power that might challenge its hold on the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, Iran has been building up its missile arsenal and its network of armed allies, edging closer to nuclear threshold status. In the eyes of the US, intervention may well be required to forestall an unfavourable change in the regional balance.
Tehran has a very different read on the same situation. It does not view American sanctions and bases, nor the military presence and ties with Israel and the Gulf monarchies, as mere deterrence or defensive measures. Instead, it sees them as a containment plot or, worse, an attempt at regime change. Neither side thinks of itself as the aggressor, yet both end up in a spiralling conflict. That is the security dilemma in a nutshell.
One would be hard-pressed to see it as a 1914-style chain-ganging. In 1914, chain-ganging described the way that rigid, interlocking alliance commitments quite literally chained the major powers of Europe to one another and pulled them into a worldwide war over an isolated Balkan quarrel. Washington and Tehran have not let go of the reins entirely; both still hold considerable leeway when it comes to calibrating escalation. Allies and their proxies can apply pressure, but it is the leaders who make the call on whether to intervene and to what extent.
In that light, conflict should be seen less as reflexive entrapment and more as a contest over projects led by competing regional orders. The US wants to keep a Middle East propped up by American power, Israeli might and connections with Arab autocrats. Iran, for its part, is intent on creating a zone where American influence has been largely neutralised and political power is in the hands of states and movements that are turning their backs on Washington.
This is no simple matter of short-term security or a dispute over territory. It is a war to establish who will set the rules and hierarchies and be recognised as the true centre of power. Wars ultimately hinge on calculations of deterrence. Deterrence is only as strong as the other side’s commitment to its red lines and its resolve to retaliate. When that is called into question, a leader may feel justified in a limited strike to put right any credibility deficit, imagining he can avoid an uncontrollable escalation. But it is a dangerous assumption. It makes the use of force seem like a sustainable option to both sides, each thinking it is restoring deterrence when in fact they are tearing down the old constraints that kept the rivalry from becoming direct conflict.
So this war is not the result of some ancient hatred or a case of being trapped by one’s allies. At root, it is a symptom of a larger problem: The failure of a mechanism of controlled hostility. Washington and Tehran have been vying for decades without coming to blows. The balance was tenuous, but it held because they knew they would be the ones to suffer if things went off the rails. They have not suddenly found cause to be at each other’s throats; they have had reason enough for that. What has altered is the calculus on the cost of waiting, the credibility of red lines and the shape of the regional order to come.
Globalisation has seen to it that the technologies underpinning Western military strength are now widely diffused. Iran’s ability to put shipping in the Strait of Hormuz in jeopardy makes it plain that the most powerful countries can no longer rely on their preponderance of force to achieve political or commercial ends. In an era when power is more about disruption than destruction, the diffusion of technology is wearing away at the advantages of dominant states. The current war is therefore best explained as a crisis of deterrence within a broader struggle to define the Middle East, where the mechanisms of traditional containment are evidently gone.
The writer teaches at Jadavpur University, Kolkata, and was the Eugenio Lopez Visiting Chair at the Department of International Studies and Political Science at Virginia Military Institute, US
This war is not the result of some ancient hatred or a case of being trapped by one’s allies. At root, it is a symptom of a larger problem: The failure of a mechanism of controlled hostility. 
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