4 min readJul 8, 2026 03:30 PM IST
First published on: Jul 8, 2026 at 03:30 PM IST
There is a founding bargain underlying every modern nation. In Britain, it was parliamentary sovereignty; in France, republican citizenship; and in India, constitutional pluralism. America’s arrangement was of another order entirely: The management of paradoxes rather than consensus. An editorial in this newspaper (‘Happy birthday, America, no more an only child’, IE, July 4) marking its 250th Independence Day referred to the US President as “undermining the foundations on which the American story was built”.
I argue, however, that long before Donald Trump or the strategic competition with China, the US relied upon a framework of productive paradoxes inherent in its societal conceptions, political traditions, and governmental structure. The fine balance that accommodated them is wearing thin.
Liberalism and power are at the heart of the first paradox. In America’s telling, it is the champion of political ideals that have inspired movements in every corner of the globe. And yet that very republic has also made itself the preeminent geopolitical force of the modern age. There has always been an equilibrium in its foreign policy between principle and what strategy demands: Human rights rhetoric alongside hardheaded national interest calculations, or the promotion of democracy hand-in-hand with an alliance of convenience. Such contradictions have not weakened American leadership so much as enabled it.
The second is in the domain of intellectual culture. No nation has embraced pragmatism more enthusiastically, and few have been as confident in the universal applicability of concepts born out of it. But it also bred a kind of missionary zeal in the belief that American models were of universal import. The nation that instructed the rest of the world to be sceptical of orthodoxy has often been singularly confident in its own.
The economy constitutes the third paradox. Despite America’s status as the preeminent global capitalist economy, time and again, rapid growth has given way to calls for some measure of social protection, be it under the New Deal or the Great Society. Americans have long held entrepreneurs in high regard. Still, they have also looked to the government to provide a buffer against insecurity. Contemporary ideological divisions frequently frame market mechanisms and social welfare provisions as opposites, when they should be considered mutually supportive.
The fourth is found in democracy proper. The US has put in place one of the sturdiest constitutional arrangements in history, even as it has nurtured a healthy distrust of authority. One need only recall the Revolution to understand why: It was a revolt against the concentration of power. While this scepticism has been good for individual freedoms and civic life, too much of it leads to paralysis and a loss of faith in institutions, leaving collective issues unaddressed.
Finally, immigration and national identity present the most consequential paradox. The US is a country made up of waves of immigrants. And yet, each generation has been met with forceful arguments that such newcomers are an affront to national cohesion. Whether it is the 19th century’s unease with Catholics and Asians or today’s apprehensions over Latin American migrants, immigration has time and again provided the stage for Americans to argue over who really belongs.
History is full of examples of America reinventing itself in the face of outside challenges. But can it muster the political wherewithal to deal with its own constitutive paradoxes? America’s prospects rely less on global pre-eminence and more on a renewed command of the art required to hold contradiction in check.
The writer teaches at Jadavpur University, Kolkata, and was the Eugenio Lopez Visiting Chair at the Department of International Studies and Political Science at Virginia Military Institute, US
History is full of examples of America reinventing itself in the face of outside challenges. But can it muster the political wherewithal to deal with its own constitutive paradoxes? 
Share
