5 min readOct 17, 2025 03:21 PM IST
First published on: Oct 17, 2025 at 03:20 PM IST
Pakistan seems to be doubling down on its engagement with the extra-regional players in an attempt to redraw the security calculus in the subcontinent. Accompanied by the Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on this occasion, Pakistan’s military chief Asim Munir made his third visit to Washington, DC, recently. This renewed spark in the US-Pakistan relations has raised alarm bells in New Delhi. The anxiety was especially piqued as Asim Munir became the first Pakistani military chief — during his previous visit to the DC — to be hosted at the White House. The fact that this newfound US-Pakistan bonhomie comes in the immediate aftermath of the four-day India-Pakistan conflict in May is worth some attention.
Pakistan recently also signed a mutual defence agreement with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). While the finer details of the agreement have yet to be revealed, it inevitably strengthens KSA–Pakistan’s traditional patron-client relationship, which, in turn, threatens to undo decades of carefully nurtured India-Saudi relations. There is a possibility that Pakistan can again become a factor in India-Saudi relations, something which New Delhi worked hard to weed out.
But while all these developments have a bearing on India’s security interests in the subcontinent, it is equally important to analyse how China might be assessing Pakistan’s diplomatic outreach.
Islamabad’s attempts to court its traditional patrons strike at the heart of the patron-client relationship that has come to describe the China-Pakistan nexus lately. Beijing’s financial and security assistance has proved critical in sustaining Pakistan, especially as the latter found itself increasingly isolated globally on the political and economic front. However, Pakistan’s quest for relative autonomy through varied partnerships threatens to shrink the space for China’s oversized influence over Pakistan.
At the very outset, China may view Pakistan’s manoeuvres as soft hedging. Recently, China’s reported withdrawal from one of the CPEC’s significant projects — the ML-1 railway line — which connects Karachi to Peshawar, forced Islamabad to turn to ADB to fund the upgradation of a critical segment of the ML-1 railway line. The $60 billion CPEC project, which forms the core of the China-Pakistan economic partnership, has failed to meet bilateral expectations. The line is also critical to the development of the Reko Diq copper and gold mine in Balochistan, in which Trump has expressed interest.
Pakistan’s tilt towards the US, among other things, could be read in this light. Moreover, despite growing apart over the last decade or so, there remains a deep-seated fascination within the two countries for each other.
Yet while it may be embarrassing for Beijing to see its ironclad and all-weather ally flirting with its arch-rival — the US, it may not be concerning as much at this stage. The fact that Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khwaja Asif, only days after the Trump-Munir-Shareef meet at the White House, stated that their strategic future aligns with the Chinese rather than the Americans for the latter has proved to be unreliable, must be comforting.
Nonetheless, Beijing has reasons to worry going ahead, and the extent of its anxiety would depend on the underlying quid pro quo, and more importantly what Pakistan is willing to offer. One such probable low-cost offering could entail granting the US military access to Chinese warplanes and defence equipment being operated by Pakistan. The Chinese have themselves long extracted similar advantages by exploiting Rawalpindi’s inventory of American weapons and equipment.
It is in this context that the Pakistan-Saudi mutual defence treaty also assumes significance. Given that the US and the Saudis are treaty allies, it is plausible that the Pak–Saudi defence treaty becomes a backdoor for American access to Chinese inventory. The fact that 80 per cent of Pakistan’s current defence import is serviced by China makes this proposition even more attractive. And, therefore, Beijing may only be welcoming of this agreement, so long as it is borne out of Riyadh’s frustration with Washington.
Another casualty of Pakistan’s attempts to please its traditional patrons could be China’s game plan in the subcontinent. If Beijing’s actions lately are anything to go by, they suggest a growing inclination on its part to position itself as the chief and the ultimate mediator in the region — be it as a broker between sub-national entities in Nepal and Myanmar or as a facilitator of trilaterals with Pakistan and Afghanistan and Pakistan and Bangladesh.
However, Pakistan’s invitation to extra-regional countries to the subcontinent comes at the expense of China. Beijing’s interests in the region are best served if Pakistan continues to play a subordinate role, which has limited choices and no alternate patron. It allows China to dictate and coordinate policies in the region.
From India’s perspective, it might not be a bad idea for Pakistan to pursue relative autonomy from China’s oversized influence, if it weakens the China-Pakistan relationship.
The writer is with Takshashila’s Indo-Pacific Studies programme
The key meeting is scheduled for Feb 19 at the US Institute of Peace, a leading think-tank. (File photo). 
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