Opinion Celebrate Constitution by respecting checks & balances
One concrete step that can reinvigorate parliamentary democracy is to mandate a minimum of 100 sitting days for each calendar year. More sittings would enable thorough debate, ensure greater time for scrutiny, give the Opposition a platform to articulate concerns.
One concrete step that can reinvigorate parliamentary democracy is to mandate a minimum of 100 sitting days for each calendar year. On November 26, we celebrated Constitution Day. At the end of this week, the country will commemorate December 6, the death anniversary of B R Ambedkar. The Winter Session of Parliament started on December 1. These dates are more than a sequence — they form a lens through which to examine the health of our republic, the erosion of legislative functioning, and the urgent need to reclaim accountability.
When the Constituent Assembly debated the structure of the future republic, Ambedkar’s clarity in rejecting a presidential system was unmistakable. He argued that India required a system where the executive remained continuously responsible to the legislature, ensuring that no single individual could claim untrammelled authority. He envisaged that India embrace a model of collective responsibility rather than vest power in one supreme leader or institution. The parliamentary system was chosen because it was inherently more accountable, deliberative, and reflective of the people’s sovereign will.
Yet, the space between the ideals he articulated and the reality unfolding before us has grown wider.
Nowhere is this drift more evident than in the functioning, or rather, the shrinking of Parliament itself. While the first and fourth Lok Sabha met for an average of 135 and 123 days, in recent years, its sittings have declined to a historic low. The 16th Lok Sabha averaged 66 sittings per year, and the 17th Lok Sabha slumped to just 55 sitting days annually, the lowest for any full-term Lok Sabha since 1952.
This reduced duration has been accompanied by less scrutiny of the executive. Of the 179 bills passed by the 17th Lok Sabha (excluding finance and appropriation bills), 35 per cent were approved after less than one hour of debate. Only 16 per cent of introduced bills were referred to standing committees. Thus, even as sittings shrink, the government has leveraged its majority to push through legislation with minimal deliberation.
This degrading of parliamentary norms is further reflected in a disquieting trend: Members of the treasury benches disrupting proceedings, and an unprecedented escalation in the suspension of Opposition Members of Parliament, even for raising legitimate questions.
Ambedkar had warned against such danger. He feared that India might replace constitutional methods with authoritarian shortcuts, encouraged by a political climate that elevates leaders rather than institutions.
Besides institutional imbalance lies another grave threat: The weakening of India’s federal structure. Ambedkar and the framers were unequivocal that India would be a “Union of States,” a federal system in which the Union and the states derived their authority from the Constitution and not from each other. Today, federalism itself is under visible strain. The increasing centralisation of fiscal powers, reflected in shrinking tax devolution, growing dependence on centrally designed schemes, and the functioning of the GST Council, has constrained the autonomy of states. The partisan role of governors, along with the rising use of central agencies against political opponents in Opposition-ruled states, has transformed constitutional instruments into levers of coercion. The sidelining of institutions like the Inter-State Council further erodes the cooperative spirit Ambedkar envisioned.
To reverse this decline, restoring accountability must be the foundational goal of our political life. The battle must be waged on three fronts simultaneously: Politically, through mobilisation and electoral choices that prioritise democratic integrity; ideologically, through the reaffirmation of constitutional values against sectarian narratives; and legally, through challenging arbitrary executive action and defending institutional independence in courts and public forums.
One concrete step that can reinvigorate parliamentary democracy is to mandate a minimum of 100 sitting days for each calendar year. More sittings would naturally enable thorough debate, ensure greater time for scrutiny, give the Opposition a platform to articulate concerns, and reestablish Parliament as the centre of democratic decision-making.
The Constitution is not merely a document to be celebrated once a year, nor is Ambedkar merely an icon to be garlanded. Both represent a vigilance we must exercise to prevent power from being absolute. The strength of a democracy is not measured by the size of its mandate but by the rigour of its checks and balances, the independence of its institutions, and the courage of its citizens to defend their sovereign will.
The writer is general secretary, Communist Party of India

