7 min readOct 20, 2023 03:11 PM IST
First published on: Oct 20, 2023 at 07:17 AM IST
Publication of initial statistics from the Bihar caste census has evoked cynicism, anxiety and excitement. All three are predictable responses and manifest the limitations of our public sphere.
The cynical response comes from the ruling party at the Centre. While occasionally flaunting its OBC credentials, it has consistently opposed a caste census (though in Bihar, it has taken a somewhat different position). In its opposition, the party seeks to hide behind the convenient fig leaf that such a census will undermine (Hindu) unity. In any case, a government that postponed the basic task of conducting a census cannot be expected to employ sound information as the basis for public policy.
Anxiety over the caste census is witnessed among self-appointed cosmopolitans who think that by not counting caste, we can make it disappear. This group includes well-meaning critics who think that a caste census will encourage sharper caste identities and the politicisation of caste. Such anxiety represents the thinking of the Indian state in the matter of social justice.
But what is more worrying is the misplaced excitement caused by the caste census. Some opponents of the BJP wrongly think that the caste issue can be a counter to the BJP’s Hindutva. Even if this were a correct assessment — which it is not — it would be a bad way of upholding a measure aimed at addressing the question of caste-based inequalities. Some excitement emanates from the belief that counting caste is the weapon for doing away with caste.
It is true that Bihar’s caste census opens the door for a more informed public policy on matters of social justice. However, merely conducting a caste census is no guarantee of such a policy shift — particularly in view of the populist pressures parties have themselves built and under which they operate. The Bihar government announced the “numbers” and much of the discussion today surrounds these primary numbers almost without reference to the complex phenomena they may reveal once they are put to further analysis. Above all, the Bihar census has not yet published the socio-economic information also gathered through this historic exercise. The second backward classes commission (Mandal commission) was handicapped not only by the lack of contemporary enumeration but also a methodologically adequate database to measure backwardness.
A valuable exercise such as the caste census invites many questions of critical importance. But the publication of primary numbers has produced excitement irrespective of the real implications of a caste census. One is the finding that the OBCs (as understood by the current methodology of deciding which classes are backward) account for over 60 per cent of Bihar’s population. But we forget that while the count tells us which caste has what numbers, backwardness of these groups is still something to be defined, debated and measured.
Current political wisdom takes recourse to the idea that all “shudra” communities are backward. This is a problematic and dangerous logic. Problematic because it refuses to take into account contemporary backwardness in the social and educational realm; dangerous because it accepts the idea of the Hindu social order as the prism through which backwardness and social justice are to be understood. In 1979-80, this was an unavoidable path adopted in the absence of verifiable and authentic data on the socio-economic condition of various groups. With the tool of the caste census now, it is necessary that the prism of varna status is downplayed and concrete factors defining social and educational backwardness taken into consideration.
Secondly, the Bihar numbers have already given rise to discussion about the inadequacy of 27 per cent reservation for the OBCs. This is indeed an important issue and politically attractive agenda given the numbers of communities that currently qualify as backward. But rarely does one see in the ongoing discussion any mention of principles that should inform the question of extent of reservation. Rather, the principle of gross numbers alone is invoked: OBCs are above 60 per cent, so let us move beyond the 27 (and overall 50) per cent cap. This argument receives traction in view of the demands by various dominant communities for their inclusion among the backward classes. In other words, “reservation” as a tool of public policy is commonly understood as a proportionality mechanism. Ironically, this is the argument adopted by the less backward rather than the more backward.
A corollary to this, which will inevitably follow, is the argument that all castes need to receive the benefits proportionally. This will benefit the castes with larger numbers and federative organisational existence. The proportionality argument also ignores its impact on political representation. An investigation into the share of different caste blocs in positions of power has advantages and yet, if we stretch that logic, the same idea restructures the concept of representation to mean that every community can be represented truly only by its own members. This cuts at the roots of the idea adopted by the Constitution, whereby it is possible for a representative to represent a mixed electorate.
In this backdrop, how can we make better use of the data that a caste census will throw up? It is necessary to insist on publication of all data — particularly data on socio-economic conditions of caste groups. Communities trapped in menial work, traditional occupations and precarious employment need to be identified.
The next step equally testing our collective patience will be to use the socio-economic data to map backwardness afresh. This step will face a hurdle from numerically larger and relatively less handicapped castes. For them and for politicians seeking shortcuts to momentary popularity, it is far too convenient to adhere to pre-existing wisdom on backwardness and adopt radical postures without necessarily serving the cause of social justice. But this second step will truly determine whether we are willing to engage with the question of caste and social justice or want to engage in shadow-boxing in the context of empirically untested wisdom.
The third step will be to ensure that the more backward communities not only get the benefits of affirmative action in large measure but also on priority basis. This will require a revisiting of the so-called reservation regime and reimagining social justice policy. This would require three moves: Understanding backwardness holistically, that is, resulting from multiple systems of social discrimination; doing away with frozen blocks of more and less backward sections and experimenting with a backwardness index, and thirdly, incentivising in private employment inclusion of persons with high backwardness index.
After all, counting caste can only be a pseudo-radical gesture unless coupled with more fundamental shifts in the social justice policy.
The writer, based in Pune, taught political science and is chief editor of Studies in Indian Politics
It is true that Bihar’s caste census opens the door for a more informed public policy on matters of social justice. However, merely conducting a caste census is no guarantee of such a policy shift — particularly in view of the populist pressures parties have themselves built and under which they operate.
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