Even as he sketched out the post-war political order in Europe, Roosevelt also laid the foundations of the US-Saudi partnership that became central to America’s Middle East strategy and the global hydrocarbon system. Washington’s assured access to Saudi oil was matched by strong American security guarantees to the House of Saud.
Roosevelt and Abdulaziz differed sharply on how to address Jewish aspirations for a homeland in Palestine. The Saudi monarch insisted that the solution must lie in Europe, not Arab lands. Yet, for eight decades, Riyadh and Washington did not allow their differences over Palestine to overwhelm a mutually advantageous strategic partnership.
The meeting between MbS and President Trump this week is about rebooting that partnership through a new and far-reaching grand bargain. The agenda goes well beyond oil to focus on building a broad-based economic and technological relationship, strengthening bilateral security cooperation, and reordering the Middle East.
For MbS, the visit is also about securing valuable American support for his own looming succession. King Salman, now 89, is frail and has long delegated day-to-day governance to his son. Saudi successions have rarely been straightforward. This one is especially delicate: King Salman broke with the traditional practice of passing the throne horizontally among the sons of Abdulaziz and instead concentrated power vertically in the hands of his own son.
MbS has sidelined most potential rivals within the royal family, but he must still ensure that nothing disrupts the establishment of a durable “Salman line” within the House of Saud. American endorsement could be critical.
Equally important for MbS is strong US backing for his sweeping Vision 2030 agenda. At the heart of his ambition is the transformation of Saudi Arabia from an extractive state into a diversified, globally competitive economy and a more open society.
MbS is driving an unprecedented restructuring — building new industries in technology, tourism, entertainment, logistics, and green energy; opening social space long policed by conservative clergy; empowering women; promoting “moderate Islam”, and constructing giga-projects like the NEOM city. Critics point to his coercive methods and curbing of dissent; supporters see the long-overdue drive towards modernisation.
In a turbulent region, MbS also seeks solid security assurances from Washington. With the US Senate opposed to a formal defence treaty, Riyadh is pursuing an intergovernmental agreement with the Trump administration. Saudi Arabia wants access to advanced weapons systems — including the F-35 — greater technology transfer, and a pathway to building domestic defence-industrial capabilities.
Civil nuclear cooperation is another priority. Atomic accord with America is not just about diversifying the kingdom’s energy sources, but also a symbolic parity with regional rival Iran that has built a vast nuclear programme.
Artificial intelligence is central to MbS’s vision of a post-oil future. He wants to make Saudi Arabia a global AI hub by investing in massive data-centre capacity, attracting leading US AI firms, funding frontier research, and embedding AI across government, defence, health, and logistics.
MbS also wants Washington to acknowledge Saudi Arabia’s new self-image as a rising regional and global actor. He has shed the famously passive Saudi foreign policy of the past and is determined to step out as a consequential player in the Middle East and beyond.
For the US, Saudi Arabia remains an indispensable partner. Washington needs Riyadh’s cooperation in stabilising the Middle East and retaining US primacy. More immediately, Trump wants Saudi recognition of Israel and the expansion of the Abraham Accords.
Obstacles, though, abound. Riyadh insists on a “credible pathway” to Palestinian statehood as a precondition. While the bar MbS has set is low, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces intense pressure from his far-right coalition partners to avoid any gesture toward Palestinian statehood. Trump, meanwhile, is pressing Netanyahu to show some flexibility.
This week also brought a significant diplomatic boost for Washington. The UN Security Council’s November 17 resolution on Gaza essentially endorses the US-drafted plan for ending the conflict through international oversight, humanitarian stabilisation, and a phased political transition. It calls for a powerful International Stabilisation Force — made up largely of peacekeepers from Muslim states.
A new “Board of Peace” will serve as Gaza’s interim administration, with authority eventually transferable to a reformed Palestinian Authority. The resolution gestures toward a “credible pathway” to Palestinian self-determination, signalling future statehood without offering immediate guarantees. The resolution passed with Russia and China abstaining is a clear sign that Trump is having his way in the Middle East, at least for now.
A Saudi-Israel normalisation and an expanded Abraham Accords could herald a different political architecture for the Middle East. India, which has good relations with both Israel and Saudi Arabia and is a strong supporter of the Abraham Accords, can only benefit from the normalisation of ties between Tel Aviv and Riyadh and participation in a new era of peace and prosperity in the Middle East.
Yet Israel’s reluctance to concede even minimally on Palestinian statehood, and the resistance of its supporters in Washington to any American grand bargain with MbS, means expectations of a dramatic breakthrough must be tempered.
The writer is contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express and a distinguished professor at the Motwani-Jadeja Institute of American Studies, Jindal Global University, Delhi
MbS also wants Washington to acknowledge Saudi Arabia’s new self-image as a rising regional and global actor. He has shed the famously passive Saudi foreign policy of the past and is determined to step out as a consequential player in the Middle East and beyond. 
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