Opinion C Raja Mohan writes: MAGA agenda is now America’s global strategy

Four major shifts stand out.

First, the NSS puts the Western Hemisphere at the top of America’s regional priorities. Determined to end decades of neglect of Latin America, it seeks to re-establish US dominance over the region by reasserting the so-called “Monroe Doctrine”.

Second, the new strategy is not about American isolationism, especially vis-à-vis Eurasia. India must prepare for a world in which Washington is selective — active where core interests are at stake, but unwilling to be the Atlas holding up the world.

Third, the NSS replaces liberal universalism with civilisational pluralism, long advocated by conservatives worldwide, including India. The NSS asserts that “nations have the sovereign right to choose their own paths; America does not seek to remake them”. This stance aligns with the preferences of several nations — including China, India, and Russia — that have pushed back against US interference in their internal political arrangements.

Fourth, economic nationalism becomes central to national security. The NSS prioritises reshoring, industrial revival, and trade balances. Trump’s sweeping tariffs — including those applied to India —flow from this structural shift: The US now evaluates partnerships through economic advantage rather than geopolitical sentiment alone.

A striking departure from both Trump’s 2017 and Joe Biden’s 2022 strategies is the NSS’s rejection of the claim that Russia and China pose existential threats to America. This signals a new dynamic in great-power relations, with unexpected challenges and opportunities for India.

For the last quarter-century, India assumed that US rivalry with Russia and China would remain an enduring feature of world politics. A potential American rapprochement with Russia under Trump would be welcome in Delhi. But India will view with greater anxiety Trump’s gestures of reconciliation toward Beijing.

The NSS is notably harsh on US allies in Europe. It castigates Europe’s liberal polities and astonishingly promises to support right-wing movements seeking to overturn the continent’s current political order. Even more striking is the depiction of the European Union — its supranational structure and regulatory power — as a fundamental threat to America and to Western civilisation. The strategy calls on European nations to reclaim sovereignty and restore traditional cultural values.

Yet, even as it confronts Europe, the NSS opens space for an entente with Russia. It reflects Trump’s conviction that peace in Europe requires a new modus vivendi with Moscow and underscores the centrality of ending the Ukraine war.

Asia, unlike Europe, is portrayed as dynamic and central to America’s future. The NSS reaffirms that a free and open Indo-Pacific remains vital to American prosperity and security. But the strategy in the region is no longer framed as an ineluctable confrontation with China. As in Europe, the US wants allies and partners in Asia to take greater responsibility for their defence by raising military spending and sharing the strategic burdens long carried by Washington.

At the same time, the NSS recognises the expansive scale of China’s economic, technological, and military capabilities and its emergence as a “near peer” of the US. This produces an inherent tension between the economic need for a reasonable commercial relationship with Beijing and the strategic need to deter China’s expansionism. How Washington manages this tension will pose major challenges for US allies and partners in Asia.

The NSS acknowledges the importance of partners — including India and the Quad — in maintaining a favourable regional balance. Yet it also underlines the need for America to preserve beneficial economic ties with China. Asia will spend the coming years monitoring the managed competition between Washington and Beijing; there is no easy way to predict how this balance will play out in real-world crises.

As a non-ally of the US, India retains greater freedom of action than treaty partners. That freedom, however, depends critically on Delhi rapidly strengthening its military deterrent capabilities. As America reduces or reshapes its security obligations, countries able to shoulder more responsibility will gain greater regional agency. For India — which seeks a larger role in shaping Asian geopolitics — this is an opportunity. To seize it, India must remain steadily engaged with Washington despite the current difficulties, and must vigorously pursue the stabilisation of ties with China.

Asia and Eurasia, of course, are not just about the US and China. India must deepen ties with both Europe and Russia while navigating the turbulence between them. In its extended neighbourhood, Delhi must reinforce partnerships with ASEAN, Australia, Japan, and South Korea.

The NSS also reframes America’s interests in the Middle East. It argues that oil is no longer the primary driver of US regional engagement and highlights new domains — nuclear energy, AI, and defence technologies — that will shape the region’s future. For India, however, both the energy and non-energy sectors of the Gulf remain of high strategic importance.

Above all, the NSS is a reminder, if indirectly, that the proposition that Delhi must pacify its South Asian neighbourhood. Any overt conflict with Pakistan will be an open invitation for Trump to test the peacemaking instincts that he so proudly highlights in the preface to the NSS.

The writer is contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express and distinguished professor at the Motwani-Jadeja Institute of American Studies, Jindal Global University