C Raja Mohan writes: On Maduro, there’s a reason for Delhi’s restraint — and a window of opportunity in the region

The talks between the Maduro establishment and the US are not new. The Biden administration sought to befriend Maduro after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine in order to bring Venezuelan oil into the global markets strained by Western sanctions against Moscow. In the last few weeks, there have been continuous negotiations between Maduro and Washington, but they were unsuccessful in the end. It remains to be seen if Washington and Caracas can now negotiate a sustainable arrangement in the coming days.

A strategic reorientation of post-Maduro Venezuela, long the hub of anti-American activity in the region backed by Cuba, Iran, Russia, and China, would mark a dramatic change in the region’s geopolitics at three levels: The reassertion of American dominance over Latin America, an acceleration of the rightward political drift across a continent long shaped by left-wing populism and criminal mafias, and a direct challenge to Cuban, Russian, and Chinese ambitions in Latin America.

Critics at home have asked why India did not speak out more forcefully against an American action that violates international law. But India showed similar restraint after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and during the US and Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. During the Cold War, India routinely condemned Western interventions while glossing over Soviet ones — reflecting its alignment with Moscow. Today’s India is sparing in moral sermons directed at major partners. Delhi no longer entertains an innocent belief in the magical powers of international law. It is only on Chinese violations of sovereignty that India speaks of international norms. After all, India is at the receiving end of Beijing’s territorial expansionism. Venezuela, in contrast, is distant from India’s core strategic concerns.

There is another factor reinforcing Delhi’s restraint: India does not have much skin in the Latin American game. Brazil, as the largest country in Latin America, always has things to say about the region’s developments. But it is internally divided; and so is Latin America as a whole. While Brazil’s President Lula da Silva has condemned the US operation, his opponents at home have welcomed it. Many conservative parties across Latin America have supported Maduro’s ouster from power in Caracas.

Over the decades, Russia and China have invested big in the Maduro regime as part of their broader effort to contest US primacy in the Western Hemisphere and herald a post-American order in the world. India has never identified with these objectives, despite its general rhetoric about a “multipolar world”. After all, the US is India’s most important partner; and Delhi’s real focus has been on building a “multipolar Asia” or limiting Chinese dominance in Asia.

Yet, to treat Venezuela merely as a distant spectacle would be a mistake. For decades, Indian foreign policy had its priorities — intense focus on the immediate neighbourhood, the extended neighbourhood, and great powers. Latin America and Africa have remained marginal to the Indian diplomatic effort notwithstanding the episodic engagement.

That neglect is no longer sensible. The “Year of Trump’s Tariffs” has forced India to diversify its export markets. In that quest, Latin America, with its combined GDP of around $5.5 trillion and a population exceeding 650 million, remains an under-explored commercial terrain. India’s annual bilateral trade with the region is underwhelming at $45 billion. Any comparison with Beijing is unfair, but the fact is that China’s trade with the region stands at about $500 billion. And the city-state of Singapore does as much trade with Latin America as India.

Trump’s revival of a muscular Monroe Doctrine — now sharpened by what his National Security Strategy calls the “Trump Corollary” — is aimed squarely at curbing China’s economic influence in the region. As the US pressures Latin American states to rethink their dependence on Chinese capital, technology, and markets, many in the region will seek diversification rather than simple substitution. India will have a lot of room to explore wide-ranging commercial opportunities in the region.

In the end, there is no escaping that India’s celebrated internationalism has remained superficial in Latin America. Although Rabindranath Tagore visited Argentina more than a century ago in 1924, India’s engagement with the region has remained shallow. Roads in Delhi named after South American heroes like Simón Bolívar and José de San Martín coexist with a striking lack of political literacy about Latin American history, economics, and society among Indian elites. The past fascination with Fidel Castro or Che Guevara produced more posters and T-shirts than purposeful policies. High-level Indian political visits remain infrequent, commercial diplomacy thin, and institutional presence limited.

As South America enters a new political phase — shaped by deep internal churn and restructured great power relations — India must seek to deepen and widen its own footprint in the region. Tailing its BRICS partners is not much of a strategy. Delhi needs sustained political attention and targeted trade diplomacy in the region. Above all, India needs a serious effort to understand the region on its own terms.

The writer is contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express and a distinguished professor at the Motwani-Jadeja Institute of American Studies, Jindal Global University