5 min readJan 16, 2026 09:00 AM IST
First published on: Jan 16, 2026 at 07:17 AM IST
In November 2024, soon after Donald Trump got re-elected as US President, India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar made a proclamation. “I know today a lot of countries are nervous about the US, let’s be honest about that,” he said. “We are not one of them.”
It was a seemingly reasonable declaration. US-India ties had been rock solid for several decades, including during Trump’s first term, when Washington’s relations with other close partners sank. Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi enjoyed a warm personal relationship. There was an expectation that tension points from the Joe Biden era would melt away: Trump had a more moderate view of Russia than Biden. And he wouldn’t prod India on rights and democracy concerns.
The partnership got off to a predictably positive start. In February, Modi was one of the first foreign leaders to visit the Trump 2.0 White House. The two men announced a new phase of partnership. But then things went sideways in a hurry.
India’s tariffs and large trade imbalance in its favour have long galled Trump. And his hyper-aggressive approach to negotiations means that those on the other side of the table are expected to give in — on practically everything. India made significant concessions — it lowered and eliminated tariffs, it took back undocumented workers — but it wasn’t enough. Failed trade talks and new tariffs delivered the first blows to bilateral ties.
Meanwhile, India got dragged into Trump’s Russia pressure tactics. Trump generally doesn’t take a hard line on Russia, but he badly wants Vladimir Putin’s buy-in for his Ukraine peace proposal. So he sought to pressure Putin by pressuring Russia’s commercial partners to pull back from Moscow. India was an easy target. True, China imports more oil from Russia than India. But India dramatically increased Russian oil purchases after the invasion of Ukraine. India has actually increased its American oil imports in recent years, and late last year it decreased its Russian purchases. But it wasn’t enough. India’s tariff burden doubled, from 25 to 50 per cent.
Then there’s Pakistan. New Delhi has long grudgingly accepted that Washington will maintain its dalliances with Pakistan’s generals. But the speed and timing of a resurgence in US-Pakistan relations made it an unavoidable source of US-India strain. The administration went from having few engagements with Pakistan to hosting Asim Munir at the White House — more than once. And this meteoric shift played out in Operation Sindoor’s aftermath.
Another trigger for tensions was India’s refusal to do things the Trump way. Its unwillingness to praise, to flatter, to make copious concessions, hurt India. In the era of Trump, New Delhi’s calm and conventional approach to diplomacy became a liability.
Finally, there was the noise. Withering White House criticism about India’s “dead economy” and its funding of Russia’s “war machine”. The MAGA base’s ugly anti-India messaging. Problematic policies were the sad storyline of US-India ties this last year, and nasty American rhetoric was the screechy soundtrack.
New Delhi might argue its strategic autonomy gives it the flexibility to weather the US-India storm. In reality, it’s in a bad place. It faces major obstacles accessing a critical export market. It has workarounds, like an impending FTA with the EU. But these can’t replace America.
Also, future American help regarding China is uncertain. This is no small matter. Previously, Washington provided intelligence to help deter Chinese border provocations, and it partnered with New Delhi to counter Chinese power in non-military domains — like technology. More broadly, amid global tumult and unpredictability, close partnership with the US had been a rare and reassuring constant for New Delhi. Not any more.
Sergio Gor, Washington’s new envoy in Delhi, has telegraphed a desire to patch up ties. That means a lot, given his deep influence in Trump’s White House. But he’ll need to work hard to recoup the trust the US has squandered in New Delhi. One signpost to watch is Washington power dynamics. If officials beyond Trump and his top aides carve out more policy space and start driving the relationship with India, the partnership could bounce back. Beyond the White House, and especially among mid-level officials and bureaucrats, there’s strong support for close partnership with India.
But ultimately, it all comes down to Trump. Stabilising the relationship will require a presidential visit to India, for an overdue Quad leaders’ summit. He’s more likely to go if he has something big to announce, like a trade deal. For now, this much is true: Many countries remain nervous about the US. India, presumably, is now one of them.
The writer is senior fellow for South Asia at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC
US President Donald Trump imposes tariff on eight European countries. (AP Photo) 
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