Opinion Beijing purge shows risk of being last man standing
Corruption in the PLA is a feature, not a bug. It is baked into a system where state-owned monopolies practise ‘scientific gatekeeping’ that is anything but scientific.
As one watches the dominoes fall, one thing is clear — that in the new era of the PLA, there is no safety, no immunity, and no end to the churn. (Bloomberg Photo/File) The churn in the Chinese military is not over — this was the message that reverberated through the halls of the Bayi Building in Beijing on January 20, during the plenary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Missing in action at the meeting was the second-in-command of China’s highest defence and security decision-making body, Central Military Commission vice chairman Zhang Youxia. Four days later came the unprecedented announcement by the Chinese Ministry of National Defence, that Zhang, along with CMC member Liu Zhenli, have been placed under investigation for “serious violations of discipline and law”.
In the past few years, under the garb of corruption, it seems a factional war has played out within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). It likely pitted the “Shaanxi Gang” — led by Zhang Youxia and erstwhile discipline czar (now CMC vice-chairman) Zhang Shengmin — against the “Fujian Gang” of naval and Taiwan Strait war-planners. For a time it appeared the Shaanxi clique had won. They wielded the hammer of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption drive, potentially systematically targeting rival sources of power. But the latest signals from Beijing suggest a twist that few saw coming — the rule of the Zhangs is itself in jeopardy.
Corruption in the PLA is a feature, not a bug. It is baked into a system where state-owned monopolies practise “scientific gatekeeping” that is anything but scientific. The “say it, do it” ethos that underpins Xi’s legitimacy — the promise that the Party delivers results, whether in bringing back blue skies or poverty alleviation — was undermined by a procurement system defined by bid rigging, favours in personnel appointment, and guanxi (referring to interpersonal military-industry relations).
A highly likely theory is that Xi’s response was the unleashing of the Zhangs. Zhang Shengmin, as secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission, led the charge. The targets were specific: The likes of He Weidong, Miao Hua, and former Eastern Theatre Command leader Lin Xiangyang, who rose together in the erstwhile Fujian-based 31st Group Army as well as the PLA Navy — the very men entrusted with the Taiwan invasion plans. Their downfall was swift, prompted by allegations of “major duty-related crimes” and political disloyalty. This seemed to leave the Shaanxi faction, with its roots in the Army and the Rocket Force, as the last men standing. But in Xi’s China, being the last man standing is a liability.
This perpetual churn has profound implications for global security. A military that is constantly looking over its shoulder cannot effectively prepare for war. The dismantling of the Fujian gang has decapitated the leadership most familiar with the Taiwan Strait. Now, if Youxia is purged, the PLA will be left with a paralysed command structure, and the highest defence and security decision-making body — the CMC – will be the smallest it has ever been in decades, in terms of operational strength.
As one watches the dominoes fall, one thing is clear — that in the new era of the PLA, there is no safety, no immunity, and no end to the churn. The rule of the Zhangs may have looked absolute yesterday, but in Beijing, the ground is always shifting.
The writer is staff research analyst, Indo-Pacific Studies Programme, Takshashila Institution, Bengaluru
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