In a nation plagued by many controversies, many of them avoidable, a serious problem that threatens to create a rift between the Northern and Southern states is the delimitation issue.
Article 81(1) mandates that the Lok Sabha shall consist of not more than 530 members who have to be chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies in the states; another 20 members are to represent the Union Territories. Currently, the Lok Sabha has a strength of 543 seats. Article 81(2) requires the allotment of seats to each state to be in proportion to its population, with the further condition that the ratio between the population of a state and the number of seats allocated shall, as far as practicable, be the same for all the states. Article 82 requires the readjustment of seats after the completion of each Census, and it will now have to be done under the Delimitation Act, 2002.
From 1951 to 1971, the readjustment of seats took place after each decennial Census, with states gaining or losing a few seats depending on their population. The 42nd Amendment, passed during the Emergency, when most opposition members were in jail, froze the number of seats allocated based on the 1971 Census and declared that there would be no reallocation till the results of the 2001 Census were published.
Unfortunately, this amendment gave no reasons for postponing the readjustment. In 2002, when Atal Bihari Vajpayee was the prime minister, the readjustment was postponed by another 25 years by the 84th Amendment to the Constitution. This time, the reason for not allocating seats according to each state’s population was striking: “Keeping in view the progress of family planning programmes in different parts of the country, the Government, as part of the National Population Policy strategy, recently decided to extend the current freeze on undertaking fresh delimitation up to the year 2026 as a motivational measure to enable State Governments to pursue the agenda for population stabilisation.”
Thus, all elections to Parliament and the legislative assemblies have been based on the 1971 Census for the last five decades. Although no Census has been held since 2011, any readjustment of seats based on population proportionality will result in a reduction of seats for southern states. The reasons that justified the 84th amendment prevail in 2025 as well because the freeze on delimitation has not resulted in population stabilisation.
An article by Alistair McMillan in Redistricting in Comparative Perspective, a publication of the Oxford University Press, points out that while the estimated population increase from 2001 to 2026 for the entire country is 38.2 per cent, the increase in the population of Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand has been 55.33 per cent, and 51.4 per cent for Bihar and Jharkhand. In contrast, the increase in Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and Karnataka has been 15.5 per cent, 28 per cent and 24.2 per cent respectively.
Although Article 81 mandates the same proportionality for all states, this is only “so far as practicable”. These words in Article 81(2) have enabled significant departures from proportionality. For example, Goa has two members in the Lok Sabha for a population of 1.5 million, but New Delhi, with a population of 33.80 million, has seven. Similarly, the northeastern states have a larger number of MPs in proportion to their population. The framers of our Constitution never anticipated that the growth of population would be so unequal that it would render the principle of population proportionality an unfair and inequitable yardstick.
But the more fundamental question is: Do we need a Parliament with more than its current strength of 543 members or the current limit of 550 members? Equally, do we require more MLAs in each state?
An examination of the functioning of Parliament and state assemblies over the last 30 years establishes that an increase in their numerical strength will make no difference. If the number of MPs had been increased to 700 in the last decade, it would have resulted neither in better laws being passed nor in the improved functioning of the Lok Sabha.
There are several disadvantages to having more legislators. In the first place, there is a huge cost to the exchequer by way of increased housing and other infrastructural expenses with zero benefits. Further, under Article 75(1A), the strength of the Council of Ministers can be up to 15 per cent of the total number of members for the Lok Sabha. Therefore, one could have a cabinet of 90 to 100 ministers at the Centre. There would be a similar increase in the size of cabinets in the states with little or no improvement in administration or in resolving India’s economic and social challenges.
It is, therefore, necessary to complete the Census but discontinue the process of delimitation based on the principle of population proportionality. It is advisable that Articles 81, 82 and other constitutional provisions are amended to freeze the current strength of Parliament and every assembly, irrespective of the results of any decennial census. This is particularly necessary because the principle of population proportionality has become unworkable due to asymmetric demographic changes.
Otto von Bismarck famously remarked, “Politics is the art of the possible, the attainable — the art of the next best.” Any fresh delimitation that disrupts the existing proportionate strength of states may result in unrest in the southern states. The practical solution to the divisive issue of delimitation is to amend Articles 81, 82 and the other connected articles and place a constitutional cap of 550 members in the Lok Sabha with other consequential changes. The principle of population proportionality must be abandoned. The need of the hour is a united India, not a bigger Parliament.
The writer is a senior advocate.
In the specific context of delimitation, caste census data could be used to redraw electoral boundaries in a manner that could alter the electoral mobilisation of castes. 
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