Sheikh Hasina’s address last week was both an important political statement and a serious attempt to gauge the level and spread of support for her. The event was hosted virtually by the Foreign Correspondents’ Club, South Asia, in New Delhi. Hasina announced that she would return to Bangladesh and is prepared to face any consequences, or even risk to her life. Recalling the legacy of her father Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the freedom struggle and the Liberation War of 1971, she spoke of her exile in 1981, 1983, 1985 and arrest, and even assassination attempts in 2004. However, Hasina recalled the then Army-backed caretaker government’s attempt to stop her entry and mass welcome to Dhaka in 2007, which has a significant reference to her return to Bangladesh in the coming December. The bigger question arises: Does Hasina’s proposed return reopen political competition in Bangladesh? Or does it deepen divides in an already polarised system? The answer shapes the future of the Awami League (AL), Bangladesh’s domestic politics, and its relations with India.
Hasina put forward three main demands: To lift the ban on the AL, release political detainees and restore media and judicial independence. She has cited Mohammad Yunus’s statement in which he called the July movement “meticulously designed”, and also offered this as evidence of political conspiracies behind the 2024 movement. She has also alleged that judicial investigations were being blocked and questioned the legitimacy of the current political arrangement. All of this carries two insinuations: First, to re-establish the deep symbolic significance of the “spirit of 1971” and the legacy of the AL and second, to prepare the political ground for her return. Notably, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is now also staking its claim as a custodian of the legacy of 1971. According to it, the armed struggle was led by General Ziaur Rahman, and he announced Bangladesh’s liberation. Yet, after Mujib’s assassination, Rahman also tried to establish Islamic politics constitutionally, along the same lines as Pakistan.
Thus, BNP’s politics at the current moment doesn’t allow space for AL. Bangladesh’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has expressed outrage over Sheikh Hasina’s live interaction with the media from Indian soil. The government reiterated its demand for her extradition under the Extradition Treaty of 2013. It stated officially that permitting such political activity from India can be directly detrimental to bilateral relations.
Historical context is important here. Every major political transition in Bangladesh has had an India dimension to it — from the Liberation War of 1971 to Hasina’s exiles. India has always advocated democratic politics rather than extra-constitutional arrangements. However, in her last stint in office, Hasina gave little space to political opponents, which was criticised both domestically and internationally.
Even today, despite the ban, AL, the oldest political party, has a strong pan-Bangladesh presence and support base. It is likely that if the recently concluded February elections had been inclusive, the AL would have been the second-largest political force. According to opinion polls, it retains influence over 30 per cent of voters. Given this, if Hasina returns, its supporters could well take to the streets to welcome their leader as they did in 2007. For the present establishment, this creates political unease. Their concern is likely that if political space eventually opens up, the AL could quickly reorganise itself. This was also why Hasina’s address was not allowed to be broadcast in Bangladesh. Prime Minister Tarique Rahman has yet to build a strong hold on the public. On the other hand, given the Jamaat-e-Islami’s (JeI) longstanding rivalry with the AL, he may accommodate the AL’s political activities as a strategic means of counterbalancing JeI and contain its radical politics.
India has been working to restore the warmth and depth of the relationship with Dhaka. Prime Minister Narendra Modi invited his Bangladeshi counterpart to the BRICS summit to be held in New Delhi. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar also travelled to Dhaka to attend former PM Khaleda Zia’s funeral. This was followed by the visit of Lok Sabha Speaker Om Birla and Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri to Rahman’s swearing-in ceremony. Yet, these efforts have not yielded any concrete, meaningful political assurance and trust. PM Rahman’s hesitation about growing closer to India is apparent: He chose Malaysia and then China for his initial foreign visits. During his China visit, agreements were reached on sensitive matters such as the Mongla port, which carries security concerns for India.
Several issues remain between the two countries. First, the renewal of the 1996 Ganges Water Treaty, about which Bihar and West Bengal have reservations. Second, the agreement on Teesta water-sharing. Third, the formal extradition of Sheikh Hasina. Fourth, normalising cross-border trade. Given Bangladesh’s shifting politics and changing strategic environment, these issues have renewed relevance. Regarding extradition, the treaty contains a ground for refusing extradition in cases of political offences. Specifically, Article 6 of the treaty refuses extradition for politically motivated cases.
Both countries have complex interdependencies on resources, connectivity, trade and energy. The development of India’s Northeast and Bangladesh is also interwoven. Delhi and Dhaka must ensure that political differences do not overshadow the larger imperative of infrastructure and deeper regional development.
Bangladesh’s challenge is to seek resolution of its political differences through democratic processes and within the bounds of law. Bangladesh’s political system must accommodate its oldest political force through democratic competition. This will determine not only Sheikh Hasina’s future but also Bangladesh’s democratic path.
The writer is professor, School of International Studies, JNU