Opinion Blaming India for Baloch militant attacks will not help Pakistan. It will only make matters worse
Pointing fingers at neighbours is a poor substitute for proper governance, societal inclusion, and equitable development
The endless bloodlust in Balochistan will persist as each purge by the Pakistani military births new grievances, trauma, and recruits, who take to the gun (Photo: AP) While managing modern-day swathes of what is Pakistan today, British colonisers coined a maxim: “Rule the Punjabis, intimidate the Sindhis, buy the Pashtun, and honour the Baloch”. Nuance in recognising the four major ethnicities was key. Unlike the religiously fired Pashtun, the Baloch was always more nationalistic towards his land, tribe, and Sardar (chieftain). Therefore, the British routinely “honoured” the martial stock of Baloch and their Sardars with titles (e.g., Nawab, Tumandar, etc.,), decorations (e.g., Khan Bahadur, Durbar medals, etc.,), political autonomy (Sandeman system), military recognition (Baloch Regiment), and even jagirs, allowances and subsidies.
However, Pakistan’s Independence in 1947 undid the British patronage of the Baloch. They were numerically the smallest and therefore expendable. Integration into Pakistan was also testy, with the Kalat Khanate declaring independence. Finally, the Instrument of Accession led to the first Baloch revolt against Pakistan by Prince Abdul Karim’s Dosht-e-Jhalawan militia. Almost immediately, the Baloch felt politically marginalised, economically exploited/denied, with a sense of tribal/autonomy indignities. The reality was hard to ignore as arguably the “richest” region (in terms of natural resources) became the poorest with resource exploitation without equitable revenue-sharing. Further, there was discrimination in employment opportunities and the systematic surrender to “outsiders” in initiatives under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which hurt local sensibilities. Consequently, symbols of the Pakistani state, like the military or foreign investments like the Gwadar Port, and outsiders like the Chinese, became eyesores.
Various insurgent groups emerged against the Baloch’s perceived diminishment and “enforced disappearances”, for example, the Popular Front for Armed Resistance, Parrari, Bugti Militia, and the Balochistan Liberation Force (BLA). The late Nawab Akbar Bugti, who was brutally killed in Pakistani military action, had insisted, “We, the Baloch people, believe that the best way to die is to die fighting. We Baloch are the masters of our own destiny. And if that is taken away from us, then life doesn’t really matter”. For the honour-bound Baloch who had historically fought the Persians, Afghans and British colonists, the replacement of the proverbial “outsider” by the Pakistani state was only natural.
Today, Balochistan is one of the world’s longest-running insurgencies with tens of thousands of fatalities and countless “enforced disappearances”. Islamabad-based Pak Institute for Peace Studies noted 2025 as amongst the worst years with 699 recorded attacks (34 per cent increase over the previous year) and 21 per cent increase in fatalities. But the situation has far worsened in 2026 as the latest coordinated militant attack under “Operation Herof” or Black Storm by the BLA (at places like Quetta, Gwadar, Mastung, Nushki, etc.) officially accounted for the deaths of 31 civilians, 17 Pakistani security personnel, and nearly 150 Baloch militants in reprisals. The BLA contests the official figure and instead claims the killing of 84 Pakistani security personnel and the taking of 18 as prisoners.
The sheer scale, brazenness and sophistication (including suicide bombers) of the coordinated attack points to the vast local support for the insurgent movement, as also the widespread animus against the Pakistani state. A perilous attempt by Pakistan to deflect the blame game towards India by ascribing the Baloch militants as Fitna al-Hindustan (or India’s seditious move) does not cut ice locally, as Baloch disillusionment and insurgency are historic and organic. Balochistan is not contiguous to India as it is 500-1,000 kms away from the Line of Control with no linguistic, cultural, religious, or social engagement between the two. Barring the unsubstantiated claim of the “Indian hand” in the insurgency in Balochistan, no independent evidence is publicly available to suggest Delhi’s involvement. If anything, the Baloch insurgent camps and their leading BLA leader, Bashir Zaib, are widely believed to be based out of Afghanistan, ruled by Pakistan’s own creation, the Taliban.
The endless bloodlust in Balochistan will persist as each purge by the Pakistani military births new grievances, trauma, and recruits, who take to the gun. The hit-and-run tactics of the Baloch militants are a low-cost model that fits well with the local topography. Also, the BLA is not a monolithic organisation but an umbrella set-up with varied tribal groupings that run parallel to other groups like the Balochistan Liberation Front and Baloch Republican Army factions. No singular “drive” or decapitation of a militant leader will kill the Baloch movement. The subliminal sense of denied honour, bloodied memory, and a civilisational culture of revenge conjoin to perpetuate the cycle of repression-revenge-reprisals.
Pakistani denial on Balochistan seeks to dangerously simplify a complex reality by delegitimising dissent (by calling the movement “anti-national”, “India-supported” or “hybrid war”) and worse of all, legitimising coercion (with military operations, civic denials, and discriminations under the garb of “patriotic duty”). While it may be expedient and convenient for the Pakistani state to externalise homegrown conflicts, history is instructive: This only radicalises dissent, deepens ethnic alienation, and prolongs conflict. Till the time the underlying issues of the Baloch grouse are addressed, and state accountability is fixed, such attacks are likely to increase. The so-called “sanitisation operations” by the Pakistani military with impressive kill-rates of Baloch militants will only add fuel to the local disaffection.
With neighbouring Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province already reeling under attacks from Pashtun groups like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Pakistan can ill-afford a similarly bleeding Balochistan province. Pointing fingers at neighbours is a poor substitute for proper governance, societal inclusion, and equitable development.
The writer is a retired lieutenant-general and a former lieutenant-governor of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Puducherry
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