C Raja Mohan writes: A question at Davos — are we back to the era of kings?

Domestic resistance to Trump’s monarchical impulses was visible in the “No Kings” rallies that swept across the US in 2025. Internationally, however, America’s overwhelming power and its capacity to inflict economic and political pain have initially encouraged allies and adversaries alike to accommodate Trump’s assertive unilateralism. This calculus may yet change. The European Union, accused of caving in to Trump’s tariff pressures, now appears to be stirring in response to his renewed insistence on acquiring Greenland.

American scholars, including Stacie Goddard, Abraham Newman, and Paul Krugman, see “neo-royalism” as a move away from rule-bound, institutional governance and back towards personalised authority. In such systems, foreign and economic policies are no longer anchored in the institutional definition of national interest, but shaped by the preferences, grievances, and transactional instincts of the sovereign and his inner court. The erosion of the institutional checks on Trump, the scholars argue, will mean the US can neither pursue a productive national strategy nor sustain the foundations of the international order.

To grasp the magnitude of this shift, it is worth recalling how the modern global order came into being. From the 17th century onwards, and especially through the 19th and 20th centuries, foreign policy ceased to be the private enterprise of kings and became a rational, institutionalised activity. In Britain, France, the US — and later in the Soviet Union, China, and India — diplomacy was conducted by trained elites operating within formal bureaucracies. These institutions represented the state rather than the sovereign, emphasising continuity, predictability, and strategic coherence. Even strong, charismatic leaders were constrained by legislative committees, party structures, ideological doctrines, and professional diplomats. The Cold War reinforced these traditions. Communist states built rigid, centralised foreign-policy apparatuses, while America’s foreign-policy establishment embodied the technocratic confidence of liberal internationalism.

The modern system rested on the assumption that the sovereign’s personal whim and fancy had been replaced by institutionalised processes. The weakening of bureaucracies, the erosion of elite authority, and the rise of personalised politics have produced a world that resembles our pre-modern past. The primary driver of this transformation has been a profound disenchantment with elites, particularly in the US.

Over the last three decades, the bipartisan foreign-policy establishment — widely acknowledged as the custodian of US interests — has been discredited by costly failures: The Afghan and Iraq wars, repeated financial crises, social dislocation from hyper-globalisation, and enabling China’s rise. Large segments of the American electorate concluded that the self-selected “expert class” was far removed from the interests of the ordinary people and consumed by groupthink. Into this vacuum stepped Trump, presenting himself as a sovereign who would sweep aside technocrats and globalists. His disdain for NATO, scepticism towards international organisations, and enthusiasm for tariffs as instruments of personal authority all found ready political support. They also exposed how weak the institutional constraints on leaders have become.

Whether the Trump turn towards royalism is temporary or structural remains an open-ended question; it would depend a lot on the US’s internal political trajectory. The forces that propelled Trump — economic insecurity, cultural polarisation, and distrust of elites — are strong for now, but his coalition is also showing several cracks. Meanwhile, it is clear that neo-royalism is not confined to the US. Leadership styles in Russia, China, and Turkey suggest a broader global pattern.Even as neo-royalism reshapes foreign policy from the top, neo-feudal tendencies are eroding the state from below. If neo-royalism is about the capture of state power for personal gain, neo-medievalism points to the weakening of the state itself and the rise of actors operating beyond its control. Technology giants now govern vast parts of the digital realm. The political influence exercised by social media platforms, satellite networks such as Starlink, or data-driven firms like Palantir underscores the growing role of private power in shaping war, peace, and domestic politics. The medieval analogy — multiple, overlapping authorities and a global aristocracy of technocrats, corporate leaders, and digital gatekeepers — is no longer merely academic.

The return of kings and lords — both metaphorical and real — is reshaping the international landscape. Neo-royalism concentrates power at the top in sovereign leaders ruling through courts and loyalists. Neo-feudalism disperses power across private actors and transnational networks that undermine state authority. Together, they weaken the structured state system that emerged in the modern era.

For India, this presents a great challenge in pursuing its national interests. Delhi’s continuing difficulties with the Trump administration are clear evidence. In dealing with the rise of new monarchism and medievalism, India and other middle powers will need strong institutional coherence at home.

The writer is contributing editor for international affairs at The Indian Express. He is associated with the Motwani-Jadeja Institute of American Studies at the Jindal Global University and the Council for Strategic and Defence Studies, Delhi