A new dawn — or false?

Consider Mahatma Gandhi’s classic answer to this question. Individuals are necessary,he said,but not sufficient. Without organisations,big political campaigns cannot be launched,let alone victories achieved,but without individual drive,energy and leadership,organisations cannot be created. Defeating Jinnah in 1920 on the organisational question,Gandhi built a mass-based Congress party. He later led the Salt March,demonstrating the immense power of his individual charisma,but he never ceased to emphasise the value of organisations.

Indeed,Gandhi added a third dimension to his answer. Not only are individuals and organisations necessary,the message is also important. Why are you mobilising the people? Why do you want their support? What is the objective? Since the Gandhian days,the mainstream of Indian politics has known the three-fold formula of success: leadership,organisations,message.

This brief historical probe should put Rahul Gandhi’s UP defeat in perspective. At an intellectual level,oddly enough,the defeat only proves Rahul Gandhi’s own argument: that a stronger Congress organisation on the ground is needed. All pollsters reported that people liked his sincerity of purpose and doggedness,but we also know that many,perhaps most,voters don’t want to waste their vote.

Political scientists have a term for such voter conduct. They call it “strategic voting” — liking someone,but voting for someone else,because the one you like may not win. If,after Rahul Gandhi’s rally,there is only a skeletal Congress organisation trying to convince voters,whereas others have full-bodied organisations that repeatedly go to voters and create an atmosphere of strength and potential winnability,a lot of voters will simply vote pragmatically for a likely winner.

Although the organisational argument is intellectually important,one should also note that Rahul Gandhi cannot take much political solace from it. Intellectuals can afford such theoretical comfort; politicians have to do something about it. The question is: why was he unable to build a solid organisation in UP?

Rahul Gandhi’s great performance in the 2009 parliamentary elections in UP gave him a unique opportunity and also lent him an aura of strength. But we know that his attempt at rebuilding the Congress organisation in UP began only over a year back. The immediate focus after 2009 was on Tamil Nadu. The Congress organisation in UP lost its vigour in the 1990s because of the Mandir-Masjid chorus of Indian politics. The organisation was dented further by Mayawati’s Brahman-Dalit Bhaichara Abhiyan that began in 2002-03. One can’t rebuild a decimated organisation in a state as large as UP in a year or two. A longer,more sustained focus on organisational rejuvenation was necessary.

The inadequacy of the message,the third Gandhian plank of success,is also noteworthy. When all parties are harping on the corruption of Mayawati,one needs product differentiation. It is not politically wise to tell UP voters that they are so backward that they go begging for a job to Mumbai,even if that is true. It is better to tell them how prosperity and greatness of a once mighty and proud,though currently faltering,state will be restored. While campaigning against Lalu Prasad,Nitish Kumar did not simply point to the depths to which Bihar had fallen,but also spoke of how to revive the glory of Bihar. Symbolically,Akhilesh Yadav’s free laptops aligned better with the new aspirations of UP than Rahul Gandhi’s pointers to UP’s begging bowls in Mumbai.

Huge though the defeat is,an imminent political death of the Gandhi dynasty can’t be inferred from its UP setback. Today,the Congress has no better campaigner than Rahul Gandhi. Priyanka Gandhi undoubtedly exudes a flair for campaigning,but she remains largely untested. The fruits of rebuilding the Congress organisation,to which Rahul Gandhi appears to be committed,will only come later,not right away. Because of the party’s reliance on the Gandhi family ever since the suspension of internal Congress elections in 1973,mass leaders,capable of heading campaigns,simply have not emerged. Unless there is a revolt inside the Congress,the chances of which are not bright,the Gandhi dynasty will remain at the party’s helm.

We will,however,miss a vitally important message of UP,if we limit our focus to the Gandhi family and its future. We not only need to ask why the Congress did not do well,but also why both national parties — the Congress and the BJP — fared so badly. The BJP,after all,has a bigger organisation on the ground in UP than the Congress.

Both the BJP and the Congress tend to view UP as an instrument of power in Delhi. Historically,too,UP has never been viewed regionally,at least since 1947. When I grew up in the state,we never thought of UP,only of the nation. We always saw UP as the maker of national political fortunes and took pride in it. After I became a political scientist,I began to see the folly of that pride.

In many political and intellectual quarters,it is generally argued that proximity to Delhi is good for development,for it brings resources. An opposite hypothesis,in light of some new theories of development,needs to be taken seriously. It is possible to suggest that UP suffered for it never looked after its own interests,invariably putting India ahead of the state.

Perhaps the average UP voter has figured out that the national obsession is a significant reason for UP’s backwardness. It may also be that UP’s redemption lies in bringing a regional party to power. It is striking how regionally oriented the SP campaign was. It did not talk about the nation,only about UP. If the national parties want to recapture UP,they might also have to focus on what is good for UP,not simply on how UP makes it possible to come to power in Delhi.

The nature of the challenge is manifestly clear. UP has roughly 18 per cent of India’s population,but a mere 5-6 per cent of the nation’s GDP. For purely economic reasons,the nation can ignore UP,for it does not contribute much economically to the national pie. But in terms of human welfare,which includes literacy and health,it is vital to India’s record. Improving mass health and literacy in UP will not only lift the state but also the whole nation,for roughly every fifth Indian lives in the state. Numbers matter.

What is the best way to respond to this challenge? Unfortunately,the SP’s election manifesto is fiscally unrealistic. It talks mainly about how much the state will spend on welfare programmes,but it does not speak much about where the resources will come from. It is fast becoming a truism of development that without generating a high growth rate,massive welfare expenditures simply cannot be undertaken. An NREGA-like programme,costing $8 billion annually,would not have been possible in an India of 1950-80,when the annual economic growth rate was a mere 3.5 per cent.

Can the SP deliver UP out of its misery? Can it also undo its awful past when it promoted vigilantism,not law and order? Akhilesh Yadav’s promise cannot be doubted,but one’s promise is not equal to performance. If the SP can’t reform its ways and deliver,it will also be thrown out of power in the next round of elections.

Bihar has had a new dawn. Will UP? Woh subah kabhi to ayegi.

The writer is Sol Goldman Professor of International Studies and the Social Sciences,and Director,India Initiative,Brown University
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