A meeting of the Chief Ministers of Naxalite-affected states was held in Hyderabad on September 21. Much was expected of it, but unfortunately it turned out to be a damp squib. For a change, the chief ministers appear to have shown greater wisdom. Instead of behaving as provincial satraps who resent any encroachment by the Centre on what they consider their exclusive preserve, most of them wanted the Centre to initiate a composite dialogue instead of leaving the states to follow their independent initiatives. A piecemeal approach, they emphasised, would not help. The Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh is reported to have urged the Centre to evolve a unified approach to deal with the problem. Another delegate suggested the framing of guidelines by the Centre for states to initiate talks with the Naxalites.
These offers should have been grabbed by the Centre. Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil, however, said that the states will have to take their own decision regarding talks with the Naxalites, and merely offered them assistance to upgrade their police forces and accelerate the development of affected districts. A great opportunity was missed in the process. What is needed today is an integrated approach to tackling the Naxalite problem. We cannot have peace in Andhra Pradesh and conflict in Orissa. The Centre will have to involve itself to a greater extent in the overall process. If it can have dialogue with the NSCN on the Naga problem and with the Hurriyat on Kashmir, why should it be shy of sitting across the table with the People’s War, the Maoist Communist Centre and the other leading Naxalite outfits?
The Centre, in fact, holds the key to the long-term solution of the problem. Land reforms would have to be taken up with a fresh zeal. In China, according to S R Sankaran, 43 per cent of agricultural land was redistributed. The corresponding figure for Japan is 33 per cent, for South Korea, 32 per cent and for India, a pathetic 1.25 per cent. Poverty-alleviation programmes will need a fresh push. Studies show that the poorest people and the most backward districts of the country are concentrated in the Naxalite belt that stretches from Bihar’s borders with Nepal up to the Rayalseema region of Andhra Pradesh. It is this region that the Naxalites want to convert into what they call the ‘Compact Revolutionary Zone’. Tribals will have to be given a better deal and the alienated lands restored to them.
The Centre’s attitude to the problem unfortunately betrays lack of vision and long-term planning. Improving the capabilities of the police forces will not lead us far. And developing only the identified 55 backward districts shows deplorable myopia. The socio-economic dimensions of the problem have to be tackled all over. In fact, it is already being said that the number of affected districts has gone up to 125. The movement continues to grow in ever-widening circles because of poor governance and the inertia and incompetence of the bureaucracy in redressing the grievances of the people. I remember a former Intelligence Bureau director telling me, while I was conducting an inquiry into the attempted assassination of ex-Andhra chief minister Chandrababu Naidu, that the Naxal problem was in certain respects more serious than the Kashmir problem. In J-K, the contours of insurgency are well-defined, the geographical area is limited and the forces of terrorism are identified. In the case of the Naxal problem, however, the government is quite perplexed at the way it is spreading to newer areas in spite of all the efforts of law-enforcement agencies.
The problem with the Central Government has been that, while tackling the Naxal issue, it has concentrated on the law and order aspect. There is a belated recognition that the problem has socio-economic dimensions, but the efforts to tackle these have been half-hearted. The Cabinet Committee on Security, which met in Delhi on September 15, discussed various aspects of the problem. Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee later said that they would not take a ‘‘mono-dimensional view’’, and that the enforcement of law and order would be accompanied by comprehensive development of the areas affected, especially in the tribal regions.
Meanwhile, the modalities of peace talks have already run into rough weather in Andhra Pradesh. The Naxals are insisting on carrying weapons even while moving in towns and cities. This has put the government in a dilemma. While it has gone more than half way in accommodating the Naxals—by stopping police operations, lifting the ban on PW, allowing them to move about freely and to hold meetings, and not slapping any fresh cases against them—it finds it difficult to let them move about with weapons in urban centers. Any government worth its name cannot abdicate its normal, legitimate, lawful functions even while negotiating peace with an insurgent group. The operation of the Arms Act cannot be suspended to placate the PW.
The Naxal argument that armed struggle is non-negotiable and that therefore they cannot give up weapons does not make sense. Armed struggle can only be a means to an end. It cannot be the end itself. If the objectives such as distribution of land to the landless are achieved through negotiations, the raison d’etre for an armed struggle is knocked out. The PW leaders must realise that they can never capture political power in the country through armed struggle. They might be able to establish bases here and there, but these would be for temporary periods only.
The Indian State, with all its shortcomings, is no banana republic, and any insurgent outfit, howsoever strong, would never be able to achieve its separatist or secessionist designs. The only way to capture power is by joining the political mainstream. Mizos are a classic case. The ongoing peace talks represent a tide in the affairs of Naxals, which must be taken at the flood and, as Shakespeare said, ‘‘omitted, all the voyage of their life shall be bound in shallows and in miseries’’. It is a historic opportunity that must be availed.
And, God forbid, if there is resumption of violence, it is unlikely that any chief minister would take the initiative for dialogue for at least another 10 years.
The writer, a former director general of BSF, was Chairman of the one-man inquiry commission that probed the assassination attempt on Chandrababu Naidu
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