That the gunning down of Orissa Deputy Inspector General DIG of police Jaswinder Singh was attributed first to Naxalites and then to errant security personnel can and has raised facile questions about managing information. The real question, for the state government and for everyone serious about the Naxalite threat is this: how capable are the armed “radicals” to strike at the state’s security apparatus and how well-prepared is the police. Southern Orissa is particularly affected. If one were to give broad reasons one would list the following: the gulf between the field commanders and those sitting in the headquarters; inadequate training in anti-Naxal operations, poor equipment and a failure to counter Naxalite propaganda among tribals.
Ever since the Naxalite infiltration in the state began in the early 1990s, the system of policing to counter their presence has been a big mess. As many as 20 out of 30 districts are now plagued by the presence of extremists. The administrative machinery is often ineffective. Not surprisingly, a sense of insecurity is evident among the police personnel posted for duty in the southern districts, and many — right from a top-level officers to the constable down the line — consider anti-Naxal duties a punishment rather than a challenge.
They really cannot be blamed for such a mindset. Difficult terrains, lack of essential equipment and an indifferent top administration have all combined to make the force that fights the Naxalites a highly demoralised one. Even simple requirements are not met. The Armed Police Reserve Force, which has to scan the deep forests for Naxalites, needs jungle boots but are given canvas shoes which do not work even in the plains. They require lightweight raincoats but are provided with heavy tarpaulin overcoats. To add to this is the confusion created by top officers who do not possess much experience in anti-Naxal operations but are quite happy to give directions to those actually working at the ground level.
Viewed against this background, the spate of attacks at an alarming regularity by the ultras does not surprise. Ultras have targeted the police at will in Malkangiri, Koraput and the Gajapati districts, laid siege to the Koraput district headquarters town in 2004 and looted arms. In 2002 more than half a dozen policemen were blown up in a landmine blast. Then there was the R. Udayagiri jail break earlier this year, a glaring example of how a prison located in a highly vulnerable area was not reinforced despite a similar raid by Naxals and tribals in 1998.
It is time for the political leadership and police brass in Orissa to put their heads together and draw up a workable anti-Naxal strategy. Merely asking for financial help from the Centre every time there is a Naxal assault can at best be news for the media. It offers no solution. Since the Centre has now made it more or less clear that it was for individual states to come up with plans to check the problem, the Orissa government — rather than expecting New Delhi to evolve a national policy — must come up with a strategy that will work for its specific requirements.
But the primary job for the Orissa government is to shore up its anti-Naxal fighting force. It needs to concentrate on building up a committed cadre of trained officers and men that can take on the might of the militants under extremely hostile conditions. They need to be provided with the required weapon power and other infrastructure and imbued with self-confidence from the assurance that the government will back them to the hilt.
DIG Jaswinder Singh’s murder underlines the urgent need for Orissa to get its act on fighting Naxalites together.