Crossing the safety hurdle

Fissile materials usable for nuclear explosive purposes do not occur naturally. They are obtained from the operation of nuclear facilities, that is, reactors, enrichment plants and reprocessing plants. When a country supplies another country with either such a nuclear facility or fissile material, it needs to be reassured that none of the material or facilities so transferred will be used for nuclear explosive purposes. A safeguards system is a mechanism meant to give credible assurance both to the supplier and the international community that such items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses.

•What is an IAEA safeguards agreement?

A safeguards agreement can either be negotiated bilaterally by the supplier and the recipient, as in the case of the US-China nuclear cooperation agreement, or it can be an arrangement by which the IAEA administers the safeguards system. The international community has entrusted the IAEA with the application of safeguards whenever they are required.

IAEA safeguards are measures through which the IAEA seeks to verify that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful uses.

•What materials are subject to IAEA safeguards?

The safeguards system aims at detecting the diversion of nuclear material. Such material includes enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium-233, which could be used directly in nuclear weapons.

•How do facilities come under safeguards?

Facilities are subject to safeguards only to ensure that they are not used to produce materials for non-peaceful purposes. The IAEA maintains in respect of each safeguards agreement an inventory that lists all materials and facilities that will be the subject to safeguards.

•When do safeguards terminate?

Safeguards are terminated on facilities when it has been determined that the facility is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards. Safeguards are terminated on materials listed in the inventory when it has been deleted from the inventory according to established norms. When all material in the inventory has been deleted and all facilities listed in the inventory have been determined not be usable, then the safeguards agreement stands terminated.

•What are the different types of safeguards agreements maintained by the IAEA?

There are three types of safeguards agreements administered by IAEA. They are:

a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements CSA: Virtually all comprehensive safeguards agreements have been concluded by non-nuclear weapon states pursuant to their obligation under the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT to do so. However, comprehensive safeguards agreements are also required under other bilateral or multilateral arrangements, as for example, the Argentine-Brazilian Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy. Such agreements follow the structure and content set out in Agency document INFCIRC/153 Corr.. CSA cover all nuclear materials and facilities in such states.

b Item-specific Safeguards Agreements: These cover only specified materials and items and are often the result of conditions agreed upon with a state supplying the items in question to another state and are based on the provisions in document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2

c Voluntary Offer Agreements: The NPT does not require the nuclear-weapon states to accept safeguards provided for in that treaty. However, all five have concluded safeguards agreements under which they have voluntarily offered nuclear material and/or facilities from which the agency may select to apply safeguards. These so-called voluntary offer safeguards agreements VOAs generally follow the format of agreements based on INFCIRC/153 Corr., but vary in the scope of materials and facilities covered, for instance, excluding those with national security significance

•What type of safeguards agreement will IAEA have with India?

India is not a signatory to the NPT. It has currently a number of safeguards agreements with the IAEA, all as a result of one or more items subject to safeguards being transferred to India by another country. They all conform to INFCIRC/66/Rev2. However, the scope and range of materials covered by these safeguards agreements vary. The new agreement will be a voluntary safeguards agreement that will conform to INFCIRC/66/Rev.2. India already has one such voluntary safeguards agreement with the IAEA in connection with TAPS.

•What are the competing interests of the IAEA and India in negotiating such an agreement?

The IAEA will need to be assured that no material or facility subject to safeguards, either as a result of the safeguards being applied due to a bilateral agreement between India and a foreign supplier or as a result of a voluntary offer by India, are diverted to non-peaceful purposes. India will need to be assured that a binding safeguards agreement does not result in any adverse security implications either in the short- or long-run.

•Can these two interests be reconciled?

Yes. INFCIRC/66/ Rev.2 is perfectly capable of being adapted to suit both the IAEA and international interests in assuring no diversion of safeguarded material to non-peaceful purposes and the Indian national security interests.

•How have these two interests been accommodated in the new agreement?

The agreement has not been made public. But there are enough provisions in INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 to accommodate both interests. The fact that the Indian government the party most affected by the agreement, the Department of Atomic Energy and the IAEA negotiators have an agreed text should give comfort both to the international community and the Indian public to be assured that all interests have been preserved.

The writer is visiting fellow at IDSA and National Maritime Foundation balachandrangopalanhotmail.com