Metres away from the February 13 celebrations outside the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) office in Dhaka’s posh Gulshan-2 neighbourhood, at a coffee shop in Shahabuddin Ahmed Park, young women and men sit by its tall glass windows, chatting. It’s ‘Basanta Utsab’ (spring festival) and many of the women are in yellow sarees; one has a bouquet of sunflowers to match.
For Bangladesh, this is a new season, a new spring. After a violent youth-led uprising that ended two decades of an authoritarian Awami League (AL) rule and an interim government led by Mohammad Yunus, Bangladesh finds itself at another crossroad. This time, it has a new leader, the 60-year-old Rahman, who returned from London days before his mother Khaleeda Zia’s death to take over the reins of the BNP and return the party to power after 20 years.
Rahman and the BNP’s decisive victory – the party won 209 seats in the 300-member parliament – couldn’t have come at a better time for Bangladesh. The political instability had continued through the 18 months of Yunus’s interim term and the country’s relationship with India had nosedived. As he began, Rahman hit the right notes, inviting Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to his swearing-in ceremony and talking of a new beginning for Bangladesh.
Yet, Rahman’s real test begins now, and depends on how he navigates the competing pulls and pressures within his party, government and country.
Since the fall of the Hasina government, there has been a conscious effort to erase Sheikh Mujibur Rahman legacy. The few images cast him as an ‘enemy’. (Exclusive photographs from Dhaka)
His Opposition: A Rising Jamaat
As the results poured in, the one tally Rahman would have keenly watched, apart from his BNP’s, is the Jamaat-e-Islami’s.
With 68 seats, the Islamist party emerged as a distant second to the BNP, but Rahman would know that there’s more to that number than meets the eye. Up from 18 seats in 1991, the Jamaat’s performance was powered by gains in the north and south-west — areas along the India-Bangladesh border adjoining West Bengal – but the party would be especially happy with Dhaka. Of the 15 seats in the capital region, Jamaat won 6, and one in alliance, thus winning almost half of Dhaka. Since the 1990s, Dhaka has always been a bellwether of the country’s voting behaviour. The party that wins the majority in national elections has usually got all or 90 per cent of the seats in Dhaka. Not this time for the BNP.
The Jamaat’s youth wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, won the university elections held last year, with the BNP’s youth wing a distant second. The National Citizens’ Party (NCP), a student-led party born out of the protests, ended up third on most seats. The NCP managed to win only six seats in the recent national elections, that too in a tie-up with the Jamaat-e-Islami.
It’s a dramatic fall for the youth movement that captured the imagination of the nation merely 18 months ago, when its protests toppled the Hasina government.
But soon after, some of the student leaders became part of the interim government and, many say, soon found themselves on the other side, their credibility diminished as power and pelf impacted them. “The student leaders were seen enjoying luxurious lifestyles, driving in fancy cars, dining in plush hotels. Their income tax returns in the election affidavits showed income not commensurate with their income. That raised questions about the integrity and credibility of these leaders,” says writer and historian Altaf Parvez.
At the 900-year-old Dhakeswari temple in Dhaka, the sense of insecurity, amid incidents of violence against minorities, is palpable. (Exclusive photographs from Dhaka)
If the student-led movement fell as spectacularly as it rose, the Jamaat’s rise, on the other hand, has been gradual as it was targeted by the Hasina government over 17 years.
Hasina may have unwittingly paved the way for the Jamaat’s rise when, in 2017, her government recognised madrasa qualifications for university admission, paving the way for many students of religious studies to pursue higher education, including at universities in Dhaka and other cities. Dhaka university officials say more than 50 per cent higher education students are now from madrasas. Not surprising then, they say, that the Jamaat won the late 2025 university elections.
The win was a boost for the party, which anyway had a presence among the youth. Its members often help students with scholarships, paying for their tuition fees and taking care of their accommodation. “Jamaat’s politics is seen as welfare-oriented, and that’s how they campaigned,” says Zillur Rahman, president of the think-tank, Centre of Governance Studies.
The Jamaat’s rise, amidst the Hasina government’s crackdown on the party, has sharpened the politics of identity among the youth.
In campuses and on the streets of Dhaka, veils and headscarves are more visible than ever. “It is my choice that I don’t wear a hijab, and it is my friend’s choice that she wears one,” says Nahida, a history student at Dhaka University, as she sits with her friends at the iconic Modhur canteen, the site of the 1971 student protests against Pakistan’s Op Searchlight.
Outside the office of BNP chief Tarique Rahman in Dhaka’s posh Gulshan-2 neighbourhood. (Exclusive photographs from Dhaka)
In the shadows: Hasina’s Awami League
Writer Mohiuddin Ahmed says that even in 1970, the Jamaat-e-Islami got about 10 per cent of the votes cast, but its electoral success is a “new phenomenon” made possible by the absence of the AL in the recent elections.
Analysts say this is possibly the Jamaat’s peak performance, and that it won’t be able to grow any further if the AL makes a comeback. Not an impossible proposition given the unpredictable nature of politics, observers say.
Jalal Uddin Sikder, an Associate Professor of Political Science at North South University, says, “AL can and should be revived for the sake of inclusive politics, but that has to be done without Hasina.”
Since the fall of the Hasina government, AL leaders have been at the receiving end of violence and harassment, with a report by news agency Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha saying that within a year of the Yunus-led interim government, over 700 cases of murder or attempt to murder were filed against more than 5,000 ministers, MPs and senior officials across 50 police stations in Dhaka.
At Dhaka University. In 2017, the Hasina government recognised madrasa qualifications for university admission, paving the way for students from those institutes to pursue higher education at universities in Dhaka. (Exclusive photographs from Dhaka)
Lawyers appearing in some of these cases say many are instances of “political vendetta”. “Many AL supporters or leaders were not involved in the shooting of students and protesters; some were not even in the country or at the spot where the shootings took place. So many have been charged with false cases to implicate them while unfortunately many of the AL leaders and workers and police involved are sitting comfortably abroad, engaged in wholesale denial of the atrocities they carried out,” says Sara Hossain, Senior Advocate in the Bangladesh Supreme Court.
With Hasina, her sister Rehana and key ministers of the party having sought political asylum in India, UK, Europe, Australia and the US, those who stayed on in the country are bitter about having to fend for themselves. Across the country, AL offices are shut, with some used as godowns and toilets.
Speaking from a hideout inside Bangladesh, an AL leader says what has worsened their situation is that Hasina has not expressed regret or remorse or apologised for the shooting of about 1,400 youngsters during the protests. “That puts us at risk. Those sitting in Kolkata and Delhi can say what they want, but we have to face the music back home,” he says.
There is a sense among many party leaders that the only way the party can survive is if Hasina “apologises” and then nominates an “interim leadership” in Bangladesh that can continue to project the party’s policies.
They say that the few AL leaders who continue to have a degree of acceptance and credibility can be asked to step up and lead the beleaguered party. “But they need Hasina’s blessings,” says a local leader.
Outside BNP’s Gulshan office, people gather for an impromptu jamming session. (Exclusive photographs from Dhaka)
BNP’s rise and win
With the AL out of the picture for now and the Jamaat snapping at his heels, Rahman will have to walk a thin line. If he governs by retribution, the kind that Bangladesh’s two most political dynasties have always engaged in, his promise of offering a new start to the country will sputter even before he begins. And if he governs by reconciliation, he risks alienating his base.
All bets are off on which of the two paths the first-time parliamentarian will choose.
So far, Rahman has shown restraint in his language against the AL and India — since both are seen as interlinked. While he referred to the AL as “ekti dal” or “a party”, he was careful not to make anti-India statements despite the mood on the ground.
His personal style, too, has been a departure from the past. While the grammar of speeches made by Bangladesh’s leaders still carry Sheikh Mujib’s imprint – the raised index finger, the stern, admonitory tone – the BNP leader has a different style, says Jyoti Rahman, political analyst and executive editor of Counterpoint Bangladesh, a news portal.
“He is more conversational and adopts a more town-hall meeting style. We can see he has been influenced by the British political campaigning style, which has resonated with the youth here. So he has successfully broken out of Mujib’s mould,” he says.
Recalling his interactions with Rahman, Rashed Al Mahmud Titumir, Professor of Economics at the Department of Development Studies of the University of Dhaka, says, “He is a very good listener, gets into difficult issues and asks tough questions. He only promises what he can deliver.”
That being the case, everything Rahman says and does will be closely watched.
The iconic Modhur canteen, the site of the 1971 student protests against Pakistan’s Op Searchlight. (Exclusive photographs from Dhaka)
What next for Rahman
Rahman has a personnel challenge at hand. He has to learn to balance his team — a mix of young advisers who are seen as “imported” from the UK and who accompanied Rahman when he landed in Dhaka on December 25, 2025, and the senior leadership of the BNP who stayed on and braved the Hasina regime.
But beyond that immediate task of team management, he faces three major challenges: an unstable law and order situation, a fragile economy and the ever-vexing India angle.
He will also have to get to work to get the country’s internal security in order, one that had deteriorated under the watch of the Yunus interim government.
Hindu-Muslim-Buddhist-Christian unity council leaders have alleged over 2,700 incidents of violence against minorities in the country in the last year-and-a-half.
While some dispute the number, the insecurity is palpable. Standing inside the 900-year-old Dhakeswari temple in Dhaka, Manindra Kumar Nath, a minority leader, says, “We are living in fear, and in tension. This is our country as well.”
Saying that the “cycle of revenge” has to end, writer and historian Altaf Parvez says, “Many had high hopes from Yunus, but he failed to act as Nelson Mandela did in South Africa to reconcile between the polarised groups. Now it is for Tarique Rahman to act.”
But that will be easier said than done, many argue, as the BNP chief will face resistance from his own party activists who stayed on and “braved” the Hasina regime while Rahman was in the UK.
Rahman’s second major challenge will be to manage the fragile economic situation. Inflation rates are rising, the country is operating under an IMF-backed reform programme and real GDP growth has slid to about 4% in FY25, well below the recent historical trajectory of 6-7%. Private investment has also declined sharply, while public development spending has been cut significantly.
“The new government inherits an economy that is more stable but structurally strained… the macroeconomic story over the last two years is not one of recovery, but of pause. The harder phase, rebuilding confidence, investment and employment, begins now,” says Ashikur Rahman, Principal Economist, Policy Research Institute of Bangladesh.
And, finally, the diplomatic challenge for Rahman lies in whether he can reset Dhaka’s ties with New Delhi.
While Rahman has played down Hasina’s extradition issue by saying “legal process” will be followed, he has said that foreign policy will be decided keeping in mind the “interests of Bangladesh” — a safe formulation applicable to all ties, be it with China or India or Pakistan.
“India should deal with the BNP in a positive manner, and they should develop good ties with the party in power. Delhi can reach out to people by giving visas for medical treatment and to students. That will build a strong, positive atmosphere in favour of India, which is not the dominant spirit on the streets right now,” says Rezaul Karim Lotus, Editor of the Daily Sun, one of Bangladesh’s English language dailies.
Somewhere in these celebrations and the challenges, the protests and the politics, it’s the weight of memory that hangs heavy. Of the ideals of liberation, the search for identity and stalled promises.
Outside BNP’s Gulshan office, two men sing as they strum their guitar: “Ondhokar ghore kagojer tukro chire/ Kete jay amar somoy, tumi gecho chole jaoni bariter otole/ Jemon shukno phool boiyer majhe roye jay (In a dark room, tearing pieces of paper, my time passes/ You have left, yet not left the depths of the house — like a dried flower that remains pressed between the pages of a book).”