In March 2020, Kuldeep Singh Sengar was convicted for culpable homicide not amounting to murder in the case of the death of the gangrape victim’s father and sentenced to 10 years in prison. (File photo)
A petition filed in the Supreme Court has challenged the Delhi High Court’s December 23, 2025 judgment suspending the life sentence of former Uttar Pradesh MLA and expelled BJP leader Kuldeep Singh Sengar in the 2017 Unnao rape case.
Seeking ex parte stay of the HC order, the plea by two women — Anjale Patel and Pooja Shilpkar — contended that the “High Court has committed a grave error in law as well as on facts in granting bail/suspension of sentence to” Sengar “despite his serious criminal antecedents and his established involvement in the heinous offences…”. “Interference of” the SC “is required for complete justice”, the petition said.
Sengar will remain in jail since he is also serving 10 years’ imprisonment in the custodial death case of the victim’s father and has not been granted bail in that case.
The petitioners said the “moot question for consideration… is whether” the HC “was justified in entertaining and allowing the application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail in favour of” Sengar, “particularly when the” trial court “after appreciating the entire evidence on record, had not only awarded life imprisonment but had also directed that the accused shall undergo incarceration for the remainder of his natural life, thereby reflecting the gravity and heinous nature of the offence”.
They said it also needs to be considered “whether the” HC “erred in granting such relief without adequately appreciating the findings and observations of the” trial court, “ignoring the seriousness of the offence and solely relying upon the period of custody of approximately 7 years and 5 months, in the absence of any settled principles of criminal jurisprudence or binding precedents warranting such suspension of sentence?” Further, whether such an approach of the” High Court, “is contrary to the established parameters governing suspension of sentence pending appeal, warrants interference by this Hon’ble Court in order to uphold the sanctity of the criminal justice system and to preserve public confidence in the administration of justice?”
The plea said the HC “failed to appreciate the material evidence relied upon by the prosecution, which clearly demonstrates the barbarity and brutality of the accused, coupled with his demonstrated muscle power, financial influence and criminal propensity, as evidenced from the fact that even while the victim’s father was under judicial custody, the accused orchestrated and executed his murder to silence the family and frustrate the due course of justice”.
In March 2020, Sengar was convicted for culpable homicide not amounting to murder in the case of the death of the gangrape victim’s father and sentenced to 10 years in prison.
The plea pointed out that the Unnao case was transferred to Delhi by the Supreme Court “considering the gravity of the matter and the imminent threat to the life and liberty of the victim and witnesses… to ensure fair trial, protection of the victim/witnesses and to uphold public confidence in the administration of criminal justice”. This, it said, “itself is a judicial acknowledgment of the accused’s influence, intimidation capacity and adverse impact on the justice delivery system. However, the HC “while granting bail/suspension of sentence, has completely ignored this vital judicial determination, thereby frustrating the very object for which the trial was shifted outside the state”.
The appeal contended that the HC “has misdirected itself by granting bail/suspension of sentence to such a hardened criminal without recording cogent reasons, without evaluating the gravity of the offences, without appreciating the likelihood of tampering with evidence, threatening witnesses and without considering the settled law laid down by” the SC. “That bail cannot be granted mechanically in cases involving grave offences of rape and murder, particularly where the accused has criminal antecedents and demonstrated capacity to influence the administration of justice,” the petition said.
“The impugned order suffers from gross non-application of mind, misreading of material facts, misconstruction of settled legal principles governing bail and results in miscarriage of justice.” The petition said “the liberty of the accused cannot be elevated over the rights of the victim and society, particularly in a case where the accused has previously abused his liberty, terrorised witnesses and undermined the rule of law” and “therefore, interference of” the SC “is warranted to secure the ends of justice, restore public faith in the justice delivery system and ensure that justice is not only done but is manifestly seen to have been done”.
It said the HC “has gravely erred in law and on facts in misinterpreting the statutory definition of “public servant” as contemplated under Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and other relevant penal provisions, while considering the bail application of the accused-respondent, who, undisputedly, was a sitting MLA at the time of commission of the alleged heinous offence”.
The petitioners said “MPs and MLAs perform sovereign public duties, exercise statutory powers, draw public emoluments from the state exchequer, and are entrusted with public functions of highest accountability; hence, they squarely fall within the ambit of “public servant” for the purposes of criminal liability, particularly under the Prevention of Corruption Act and allied laws”. “However, the… High Court, without appreciating the settled legal position enunciated by the…Supreme Court in a catena of judgments recognising MPs and MLAs as “public servants”, proceeded to exclude the accused from such statutory classification, thereby extending him an unwarranted benefit of bail”.
They contended that “the reasoning assigned by the” HC to not treat him as a public servant “is not only contrary to the express legislative mandate but is also perverse, self-contradictory, and incapable of being understood on any sound principles of criminal jurisprudence. Such erroneous interpretation strikes at the root of the administration of criminal justice and undermines the statutory objective of curbing corruption and criminal misconduct by persons holding public office.”