Punjab and Haryana High Court news: Holding that use of the expression “f*** off” in a workplace email though “uncouth and discourteous” does not amount to sexual harassment, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has quashed an FIR alleging sexual harassment, ruling that criminal liability under the provision requires a clear sexual element and not merely offensive language.
“The same (remark), though undeniably uncouth and discourteous, does not, in its ordinary sense, carry any sexual overtone or insinuation, directed at the modesty or sexuality of the complainant,” the Punjab and Haryana High Court said on April 18, adding that it “lacks the essential ingredients of Section 354A IPC.”
Justice Kirti Singh dierected the petitioner to deposit Rs 20,000 in the Poor Patient Welfare Fund at PGIMER, Chandigarh within one month. (Image enhanced using AI)
Key findings
- It is also pertinent that the context of the communication in the present case prima facie arises out of a work related interaction.
- No doubt the standards of decorum ought to be maintained in every such correspondence.
- Yet at the same time, a solitary instance of an abusive remark, in the absence of any element of sexual intent or pattern of conduct, would not meet the threshold of criminal culpability under the penal provision intended to address gender-based harassment.
- The expression attributed to the petitioner, even if taken at its face value and accepted in its entirety, lacks the essential ingredients of Section 354A IPC (sexual harassment).
- Where the uncontroverted allegations and the material collected fail to disclose the basic ingredients of the offences alleged, the continuation of criminal proceedings would not serve any useful purpose, but would amount to abuse of the process of law.
Offensive Language vs Sexual Harassment — Where Courts Draw the Line
"The expression, though undeniably uncouth and discourteous, does not, in its ordinary sense, carry any sexual overtone or insinuation directed at the modesty or sexuality of the complainant — it lacks the essential ingredients of Section 354A IPC."
— Justice Kirti Singh, Punjab & Haryana HC | April 18, 2026 | FIR quashed in Gurugram workplace email case
WHAT QUALIFIES AS SEXUAL HARASSMENT vs WHAT DOESN'T
✅ Section 354-A IPC Covers
⚖️
Must Have a Sexual Element
Unwelcome physical contact with sexual overtones — touching or advances of a sexual nature
Demands for sexual favours — explicit or implicit requests tied to employment or otherwise
Showing pornography against someone's will — forced exposure to sexual material
Sexually coloured remarks — comments intrinsically directed at a person's modesty or sexuality
Criminal liability requires sexual intent — not just offensive or hurtful language
❌ What Falls Short of the Threshold
🚫
Offensive But Not Criminal
A solitary abusive remark — single instance without pattern of conduct does not meet criminal threshold
No sexual overtone — language that is rude or discourteous but not directed at gender or sexuality
Work-related context — offensive exchange arising from a professional dispute, not gender-based targeting
No physical contact or demands — absence of any of Section 354-A's four specific categories
"F*** off" in a work email = uncouth · Not sexually coloured · FIR quashed
Delay also mattered: Incident — October 2018 · FIR filed — February 2019 (4 months later) · After legal notices, salary demands and contractual dispute. HC noted timing supported the mala fide argument.
📌 HC's Key Principle
A solitary abusive remark, in the absence of any element of sexual intent or pattern of conduct, does not meet the threshold of criminal culpability under Section 354-A IPC — even if the language is inappropriate. Decorum must be maintained in workplaces, but not every breach of decorum is a criminal offence.
VERDICT
FIR and all proceedings quashed. Petitioner directed to deposit Rs 20,000 in Poor Patient Welfare Fund, PGIMER Chandigarh within one month. Continuation of proceedings would have amounted to abuse of process of law.
Background of case
The petitioner, director of a private firm, approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court seeking quashing of the FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising from allegations of sexual harassment.
The complainant, who had alleged sexual harassment, had joined the company a few years ago.
In October 2018, ahead of a key company event, she sought four days’ medical leave due to a health emergency.
The petitioner requested her to defer the procedure until after the event, which led to a series of emails exchanged on October 17, 2018.
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During this exchange, the petitioner used the phrase “f*** off”, following which the complainant resigned the same day. Her resignation was accepted, and her official email account was suspended shortly.
The dispute escalated into a contractual conflict. The company issued a legal notice in November 2018, alleging breach of contract and seeking compliance with confidentiality obligations.
In response, the complainant raised claims for unpaid salary, notice period compensation, legal expenses, and also sought an apology. Further correspondence followed in December 2018.
The FIR alleging harassment and abusive conduct was ultimately registered on February 22, 2019, more than four months after the incident.
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Petitioner’s case
Senior Advocate Kunal Dawar, along with advocate Jagjot Singh, appearing for the petitioner, argued that the FIR was filed with mala fide intent to pressurise him in a contractual dispute.
It was contended before the Punjab and Haryana High Court that the alleged remark was made in the course of a professional disagreement and did not carry any sexual connotation.
The petitioner emphasised that there were no allegations of physical contact, sexual advances, sexual harassment or demand for sexual favours.
At best, the exchange amounted to a “mild verbal spat” in which an inappropriate word was used, which cannot attract the offence of sexual harassment.
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It was also argued that the delay in lodging the FIR, coupled with the complainant’s monetary demands and legal notices, demonstrated that the criminal process was being misused as a tool of coercion.
Opposition by state, complainant
Deputy Attorney General Anmol Malik opposed the petition, submitting that the allegations raised issues that ought to be tested during trial and that the complainant’s statement under Section 164 CrPC had already been recorded.
Counsel for the complainant argued that the remark constituted a “sexually coloured” statement and that the petitioner had misused his position as a company director to harass and humiliate her.
The complainant urged the court to allow the prosecution to proceed.
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Court’s analysis
The Punjab and Haryana High Court examined whether the allegations, taken at face value, disclosed the ingredients of an offence under Section 354-A IPC.
Referring to settled principles laid down by the Supreme Court, including in State of Haryana vs Bhajan Lal, the court reiterated that proceedings can be quashed where continuation would amount to abuse of process or where no offence is made out.
The Punjab and Haryana High Court also analysed the statutory framework of Section 354-A IPC, noting that sexual harassment encompasses acts that are intrinsically sexual in nature, such as unwelcome physical contact, demands for sexual favours, showing pornography, or making sexually coloured remarks.
Delay
The Punjab and Haryana High Court also took note of the timeline, observing that the alleged incident took place in October 2018, while the FIR was lodged only in February 2019, after multiple legal notices had been exchanged between the parties.
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This, the court noted, supported the petitioner’s contention that the proceedings may have been initiated with an ulterior motive arising from a contractual dispute.
Final order
Allowing the petition, the Punjab and Haryana High Court quashed the FIR dated and all consequential proceedings, including the final report.
However, it directed the petitioner to deposit Rs 20,000 in the Poor Patient Welfare Fund at PGIMER, Chandigarh, within one month.
Justice Kirti Singh dierected the petitioner to deposit Rs 20,000 in the Poor Patient Welfare Fund at PGIMER, Chandigarh within one month. (Image enhanced using AI)