Kejriwal role as ‘apex controller’ built on a single witness statement; doesn’t meet the required legal standard: Court

Court observes

The court found that this allegation, which also formed the foundation of the prosecution’s case, did not stand. “The statement relied upon, when read in isolation, does not, on its plain terms, attribute any overtly illegal act. It does not, by itself, disclose the commission of an offence or an agreement to commit one,” the order stated.

The court also noted that Kejriwal’s alleged role appeared only late in the investigation, in the fourth supplementary chargesheet. The bench observed that his name did not earlier figure in the prosecution narrative in the manner later projected.

A central weakness identified by the court was the nature of the prosecution’s main witness itself. Reddy, a liquor businessman from South India, wanted to expand his business in Delhi under the 2021-22 excise policy. He allegedly negotiated and paid “upfront money” to AAP and its intermediaries to secure favourable positions in Delhi’s liquor market.

Under criminal law, the court said, testimony from a participant in an alleged offence cannot be accepted at face value unless it is independently verified. The judge noted that Reddy’s account was effectively that of an “accomplice-like” witness, someone whose own statement disclosed participation in the very transaction the prosecution described as conspiratorial.

Such witnesses are treated as unreliable because their testimony is self-incriminating and potentially self-serving. While Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act permits reliance on accomplice evidence, Section 114 embodies a settled rule of prudence: an accomplice is presumed unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars by independent evidence. Applying this principle, the court found that the prosecution had produced no such corroboration.

The CBI attempted to rely on the statement of Reddy’s son, approver Raghav Magunta, but the court rejected this outright, noting that Magunta “does not claim to have personally witnessed the alleged meeting… his version… is hearsay and cannot constitute independent corroboration”.

Reiterating law that tainted evidence cannot validate similarly tainted testimony, the judge added: “One accomplice cannot corroborate another. Corroboration must be independent.”

Since the son’s knowledge flowed entirely from what his father allegedly told him, the court held that the prosecution was effectively attempting to reinforce one compromised account with another of the same legal character something criminal jurisprudence does not permit.

Charge

Kejriwal attended conspiratorial meetings or had knowledge of unlawful arrangements.

Court observes

The court said that while Reddy had said that 10-12 persons were present during the alleged meeting with Kejriwal, none of them was examined. “Those persons were independent witnesses who, if examined, could have provided direct evidence as to what transpired. Their statements are not before the Court,” the judge said, calling the absence a “serious gap”.

The evidentiary vacuum extended beyond witnesses. “No contemporaneous document, file noting, electronic communication, financial transaction or digital evidence has been produced to directly or indirectly connect A-18 [Kejriwal] with any alleged policy manipulation or illegal gratification.”

The court found no record placing Kejriwal in conspiratorial meetings or showing knowledge of unlawful arrangements.

Charge

CBI’s key approver Dinesh Arora claimed knowledge of policy’s evolution and alleged fund flows.

Court observes

The order highlighted that Arora never implicated Kejriwal. “There appears no reason why, if any involvement of A-18 [Kejriwal] existed within his knowledge, the same would not have been disclosed,” it observed.

Charge

Reddy claimed Kejriwal indicated that BRS leader K Kavitha would contact him.

Court observes

The court noted that the record showed no interaction between the two accused.

Other observations

The court cautioned against imputing criminal conspiracy merely because of the office a person holds. “The mere invocation of the expression ‘conspiracy’ does not dispense with the requirement of material indicating agreement and participation. Criminal liability cannot be inferred from the office held or from suspicion.”

Maintaining that prosecutions involving constitutional functionaries carry institutional consequences, the court said, “Arrest and prosecution in such circumstances have implications beyond the individual. Public confidence in institutions is inevitably affected. If it is later found that such prosecution was unsupported by admissible material, the erosion of public trust is substantial.”

Holding that the prosecution failed to cross even the preliminary threshold required for trial, the court noted that “such uncorroborated statement cannot, even at the threshold stage, constitute a legally sustainable basis” to proceed against Kejriwal.