‘Bid to scandalise court’: Gujarat High Court dismisses suspended judge’s plea, warns of contempt

The Division Bench made these observations in regard to written submissions independently filed by the petitioner after the judgment had been reserved. In those submissions, the petitioner alleged that a senior judge of the Gujarat High Court “is having good control over all branches of the High Court” and was “capable to instruct/direct to his junior judge.”

The petitioner approached the HC challenging disciplinary proceedings initiated against him, seeking quashing of the inquiry, revocation of his suspension and transfer of the inquiry to another senior judge.

As per the petitioner, he was placed under suspension on December 16, 2024, due to “contemplated disciplinary proceedings”. A chargesheet was issued on January 25, 2025, comprising six charges. The court judgment noted that the allegations included that the judicial officer had “developed intimate relations with an outsourced clerk and had also extended financial help to her and also utilised the services of court employees to assist in her business venture”. The charges also alleged that he “obstructed the functioning of CCTV by getting it blocked and that he failed to maintain regularity in holding his (court) sitting and he was aso found using his mobile and engaging in prayers while presiding over the court”. The chargesheet, the HC judgment noted, also levelled a charge that he had “threatened peons to withdraw their statements recorded by the president of the Industrial Court in Ahmedabad.”

The petitioner had earlier approached the Supreme Court twice — first challenging his suspension and later seeking quashing of the departmental inquiry and also the transfer of the inquiry to “an independent and impartial Senior Judge or to any other judge of any High Court other than the Gujarat High Court. However, both petitions were withdrawn with liberty to pursue remedies before the High Court.

During the departmental proceeding that was initiated by a Single Judge of the HC, following the reply filed by the petitioner to the chargesheet, the petitioner made an application for change of the inquiry officer, which was rejected. Thereafter, the petitioner moved an application for “dropping of the inquiry on ground that no complaint had been made against him along with a sworn affidavit”. The application was rejected.

Arguing before the HC in the present petition, Senior Advocate Percy Kavina, appearing for the petitioner, argued that the charges were vague and that no departmental inquiry against a judicial officer could be initiated in the absence of “a written complaint accompanied by an affidavit with verifiable materials.” Reliance was placed on Ministry of Law and Justice guidelines as well as an earlier Division Bench ruling in the petitioner’s own case.

The petitioner argued that since “admittedly, there was no complaint against the present petitioner, the very initiation of the inquiry stood vitiated.”

Opposing the plea, Senior Advocate Gautam Joshi appearing for the High Court argued that the petitioner had made “every attempt… to thwart the inquiry” and should not be granted relief. Joshi contended that it is well settled that courts should not interfere in cases where chargesheets are challenged as it would amount to ensure that “truth of the allegations are not determined”. Joshi also submitted that the inquiry had not arisen from any complaint by a litigant, but from information received by the HC itself that “the conduct of a judicial officer is improper.”

Accepting the submissions made by Joshi, the HC held that the statutory rule does not require any complaint for initiation of inquiry. The HC said, “It cannot be forgotten that the Disciplinary Authority in respect of the judicial officer is the High Court… The power to initiate an inquiry against a judicial officer rests solely with the Disciplinary Authority and the only requirement… is the formation of an opinion by the Disciplinary authority… to believe that there are good and sufficient grounds to initiate an inquiry.”

Interpreting the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971, the court said, “The statutory rule does not contemplate the requirement of there being any complaint, oral or written, for initiation of inquiry.”

Rejecting the petitioner’s reliance on the Ministry guidelines, the court held that the guidelines applied only to complaints made by disgruntled litigants against judicial officers and could not restrict the disciplinary powers of the HC. The bench observed that “the guideline is essentially in respect of the complaints that are being lodged by the litigants who have grievances against the judicial officers.”

The court further held that “The highest judicial body is conferred with the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings… and this power is an independent and absolute power.”

The HC also refused to entertain the petitioner’s contention that the charges were vague, observing that such objections could be raised before the inquiry officer during the inquiry proceedings and not in writ jurisdiction at this stage.

Taking strong exception to the allegations made by the petitioner, the Division Bench held that imputing that a senior judge could direct or control junior judges “clearly constitute a criminal contempt”. The court held that the assertions are “clearly an act which scandalises and lowers the authority of the Court… and would also amount to an act which tends to interfere with… judicial proceedings and… obstruct the administration of justice…”

While dismissing the writ petition, the HC directed that the papers be placed before the Division Bench dealing with contempt matters “to initiate further proceedings, if it so desires” and also directed the petitioner to remain personally present before the contempt bench on the next date of hearing on June 15.