‘Breach of most intimate trust’: Gauhati High Court spares life of man who killed his family

The bench heard the matter on April 7.

The bench added that the accused had caused the death of his wife and minor daughter within the confines of his residence, and the manner of assault involving repeated blows with sharp, cutting weapons reflects a high degree of brutality.

Case of murder of wife and minor daughter

The prosecution’s case centred on an incident occurring on October 13, 2023, in Barpeta. The accused, Rishab Das, locked the main gate of his residential compound and, following a dispute over the lock, launched a brutal attack on his wife using an axe.

When their minor daughter attempted to intervene to save her mother, he attacked her as well. Both victims succumbed to their injuries at the spot.

The case was committed to the court of the Sessions Judge, Barpeta, who framed a charge under Section 302 IPC and read it over to the accused, who pleaded not guilty; accordingly, the trial proceeded.

The trial court originally sentenced Das to death on October 22, 2025, classifying the double murder as a “rarest of the rare case”.

‘Deprivation of life must be just, fair, and reasonable’

The court noted that the sentencing exercise is not a mechanical reaction to the nature of the crime, but a principled balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors.

Addressing the question of whether the sentence of death imposed by the trial court can be sustained in law, the court said that the sentence exercised in capital cases is no longer unguided but is structured by constitutional principles evolved by the Supreme Court, beginning with Bachan Singh v State of Punjab, and consistently reaffirmed thereafter.

“The governing norm is that the death penalty may be imposed only in the rarest of cases where the alternative of life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed,” the order noted.

Justice Chaudhary, who authored the judgement, emphasised that the constitutional ethos supported by Article 21 of the Constitution of India demands that deprivation of life must be just, fair and reasonable, where lesser yet adequate punishment, namely, life imprisonment, can meet ends of justice, the extreme penalty ought not to be imposed.

Highlighting the framework of this inquiry, as laid down in Bachan Singh, the order referred to the Vasanta Sampat Tupare v Union of India, which further crystallised it and mandates a threefold assessment.

‘Sentencing must be crime-centric and criminal-centric’

“The court is required first to evaluate the nature of the crime and the attendant aggravating circumstances; second, to consider the circumstances of the offender, including the possibility of reform and rehabilitation; and third, to undertake a principled balancing to determine whether life imprisonment would be inadequate and whether the accused is beyond reformation,” the order remarked.

The court continued that this approach underscores that sentencing must be both crime-centric and criminal-centric, rather than merely a reaction to the brutality of the act.

Tested on this framework, the present case undoubtedly discloses grave aggravating circumstances, Justice Chaudhary added.

‘Balancing factor in favour of alternative punishment’

The court underscored the mitigating factors, such as the absence of prior criminal antecedents, socio-economic background, the possibility of reformation, and the age of the accused, and noted that it tilted the balance against the irreversible penalty of death.

It added that the sentencing court has accorded disproportionate weightage to aggravating circumstances while insufficiently appreciating the mitigating spectrum.

Considering the balancing factor, the court said that it is in favour of the alternative punishment, and the gravity of the offence is such that a sentence of life imprisonment, subject to remission, would meet the ends of justice, and the case does not satisfy the constitutional requirement for the imposition of the death penalty.

Whether accused beyond possibility of reformation?

• It is now well settled that brutality, however grave, cannot by itself justify the imposition of the death penalty. Unless a definitive finding is recorded that the accused is beyond reformation, the extreme penalty would not be unwarranted.
• The court is equally obliged to examine the criminal test, namely, whether the accused is beyond the possibility of reformation, since the penological goal of reform remains a concern of our criminal justice system.
• There is no material on record to indicate that the accused is beyond the pale of reformation or that he constitutes a continuing threat to society. The trial court has also failed to carry out the exercise mandated by law to collate such material.
• In the absence of such a finding and a collection assessment of materials, it would be contrary to the settled principles to extinguish the life of the accused when the law leans in favour of preserving it.

• It is equally well settled that the burden lies on the prosecution to establish that the accused is incapable of reformation and that life imprisonment would be wholly inadequate.
• The record is conspicuously silent on any psychological, behavioural, or institutional assessment suggesting incurable depravity. In such circumstances, the imposition of the death penalty would be disproportionate and constitutionally suspect.
• The sentencing phase must reflect a comprehensive consideration of all relevant factors, including a meaningful hearing under Section 335(2)BNSS.
• The material placed does not disclose a sufficiently informed sentencing enquiry. The absence of a detailed evaluation of mitigating circumstances vitiates the sentencing exercise, warranting appellate court intervention.
• No material has been placed by the prosecution relating to the psychological profile of the accused, his conduct in custody, or any other objective indicators that should enable the Court to conclude that he is incapable of reform.
• The Supreme Court, more recently in Manoj V State of Madhya Pradesh, has emphasised that the burden lies on the state to place such material, and absence thereof must operate as a mitigating circumstance.