Every criticism, strong language against judge not criminal contempt: Rajasthan High Court

The Rajasthan High Court undertook a detailed examination of the statutory framework under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. (Image enhanced using AI)

“The law thus draws a clear distinction between fair criticism, which is made in good faith and in public interest without attributing improper motives, and those acts which transgress the bounds of decency, objectivity, and restraint. Criminal contempt is attracted only where the act complained of is deliberate, public in nature, and of such gravity that it poses a real, substantial, and imminent threat to the administration of justice, or is calculated to undermine the authority of courts and erode public confidence in the judicial system,” the March 17 order added.

The bench, therefore, held the statements in question, though containing allegations against the presiding officer, were made in the context of the behaviour of an individual and were recorded as part of an investigation or grievance mechanism.

“They do not appear to be publications calculated to scandalise the judiciary, nor do they demonstrate an attempt to undermine the institution of the court as such,” it added.

Criticism vs institutional attack

• In a key clarification, the court drew a clear distinction between criticism of an individual judge and scandalising the court as an institution.
• It held that criminal contempt is concerned with protecting the authority and dignity of the judiciary (or judge), not the personal reputation or ego of a judge or a presiding officer.
• The court observed that the statements in question, even if critical, were directed at the behaviour of an individual officer and did not amount to an attack on a judge or the justice delivery system.
• At best, they (the statements) reflect individual perceptions, grievances, or dissatisfaction with judicial conduct or orders.
• The court added that contempt jurisdiction is not meant to shield a judge from criticism unless it degenerates into a deliberate attack on the justice system or a judge.

Court’s analysis: What constitutes criminal contempt

• The high court undertook a detailed examination of the statutory framework under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, particularly Section 2(c), which defines criminal contempt as acts that scandalise the court, interfere with judicial proceedings or obstruct the administration of justice.
• The bench emphasised that the power of criminal contempt is exceptional in nature and must be exercised with caution, especially when it intersects with the fundamental value of free speech.

• The central question before the court was whether narration of grievances by subordinate police officials to a superior officer, during an official inquiry, could by itself amount to criminal contempt against a judge or otherwise.
• Answering in the negative, the court held that the statements were made in response to queries during an inquiry and do not amount to criminal contempt.
• They were not voluntarily published or circulated.
• They did not criticise any judicial order or attack the institution of the judiciary or a judge.
• “The law does not impose a gag order upon truthfully narrating facts when such narration is made before a competent authority conducting an inquiry,” the court said.

From investigation to contempt reference

• The proceedings stem from a 2019 criminal case registered pursuant to a magistrate’s direction under Section 156(3) of the CrPC, involving serious allegations including rape, cheating and criminal conspiracy.
• During the investigation, the trial court expressed dissatisfaction with the manner in which the probe was being conducted, particularly in relation to the role of certain police officials.
• Orders were passed directing further investigation, and an inquiry was initiated by the additional superintendent of police.

• It was during this inquiry conducted in July 2019 that statements of several police personnel were recorded.
• These statements contained allegations regarding the conduct and behaviour of the presiding officer, including claims of misbehaviour, procedural irregularities and hostility towards police officials.
• Subsequently, on August 8, 2019, the presiding officer moved for initiation of criminal contempt proceedings against the officers, alleging that their statements scandalised the court, lowered its authority and interfered with the administration of justice.

Allegations against police officials

• The criminal contempt reference alleged that the police officials had made defamatory and intimidating statements against the judge.
• Attempted to undermine judicial authority by branding court orders as improper.
• Created an atmosphere that could erode public confidence in the judiciary.
• It was further claimed that such statements were not merely grievances but amounted to a calculated attempt to pressurise a sitting judge and obstruct the course of justice.

Defence: Statements part of official inquiry

• The police officials, including the investigating officer, denied any intent to commit criminal contempt.
• They argued that their statements were recorded strictly in the course of an official inquiry ordered by the court itself.
• They merely answered questions posed by a superior officer and narrated their version of events.
• There was no publication or dissemination of these statements in the public domain.

• They had acted in compliance with judicial directions and harboured no intention to scandalise the judiciary or attempt criminal contempt.
• They also pointed out that complaints regarding the conduct of the presiding officer had already been submitted before the registrar (vigilance), indicating that their statements were consistent with earlier grievances raised through proper channels.

Good faith complaints protected under law

• The judgment also relied on Section 6 of the Contempt of Courts Act, which expressly protects complaints made in good faith against presiding officers to higher authorities.
• The court warned that treating such complaints as contempt would have a chilling effect and render the judicial vigilance mechanism ineffective.
• “If the mere act of submitting a complaint were to be treated as criminal contempt, the entire vigilance mechanism would become redundant,” it said.
• The bench stressed that accountability within the judiciary must coexist with its dignity, and bona fide grievances cannot be suppressed under the guise of contempt proceedings.

No case for contempt made out

• Applying these principles, the high court concluded that the essential ingredients of criminal contempt were not satisfied in the present case.
• The statements were confined to an internal inquiry.
• Reflected individual perceptions and grievances.
• Did not scandalise or undermine the judiciary as an institution or any judge.
• Accordingly, the court declined to proceed against the police officials and effectively closed the contempt proceedings.