Military Digest: Battle of Asal Uttar & why it was do-or-die situation for Indian troops

The Pakistani plan was, however, to by-pass Amritsar and ride along the canals to reach Beas and therefore cut off wide swaths of Punjab, including Amritsar, from the rest of the country.

The grave of CQMH Abdul Hamid at the outskirts of Village Chima near Bhikhiwind. (Express Photo by Man Aman Singh Chhina)

This eventuality had been foreseen by Indian military planners in the past. In 1950, Gen Dudley Russel reflected on the possibility that in the eventuality of a war, the Pakistan Army may try to avoid frontal assault route down the GT Road as it will involve negotiating many canals at right angles to axis of advance and may try a lateral approach where they go along canals from South West to reach Beas, where a major bridge spans the Beas river, a natural obstacle.

And this is exactly what the Pakistan Army attempted in 1965. But aided by the ineptitude of the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of Pakistan’s armoured division conducting the spearhead attack in Khemkaran and the equal incompetence of the armoured brigade commanders conducting the advance, the Indian Army’s 2nd Armoured Brigade and 4 Mountain Division displayed superior battle craftsmanship and put up a stout defence in the Battle of Asal Uttar routing the enemy attack. However, there was widespread despondency in the HQs of 11 Corps, just a day before the Pakistani attack took place. The Corps Commander, Lt Gen Joginder Singh Dhillon, was unhappy with the conduct of 4 Mountain Division and some of the infantry battalions that formed part of it.

In a scathing letter written to the Western Army Commander, Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, on September 7, the Corps Commander complained that his visit to the 4 Mountain Division HQs found the GOC and other officers wearing ‘long faces’ and that the troops he saw were slack and ‘generally uninterested’. He particularly touched upon the conduct of some infantry battalions and recommended disbanding four out of the six that he commented upon due to their poor conduct in battle. The Corps Commander wanted 4 Mountain Division to be replaced with another formation.

The Western Army Commander had his own predicament to deal with. As he mentions in his books written after the war, he had no reserves left with his only reserve formation having been moved to Sialkot sector. The Army Commander calmed Lt Gen Dhillon down and told him that this was not the time to change formations or troops and that the need of the hour was to do the best with the available resources. He advised stout defence of the Asal Uttar road junction and in addition moved 2nd armoured brigade to the area to parry any Pakistani armoured attack. This last move saved the day for India and the brigade mauled Pakistani tanks, something which is well documented in history.

It is this battle that also generated the controversy whether Army Chief General J N Chaudhuri had asked Lt Gen Harbaksh to redeploy his troops behind River Beas because of the danger of the breakthrough by Pakistan Army in Khemkaran sector. While Lt Gen Harbaksh has maintained that this conversation did happen and his then aide-de-camp former Punjab CM Capt Amarinder Singh, also asserted that he has firsthand knowledge of the order, the controversy has never really been settled.

However, it is a fact that the initial operational role of the formation charged with defending Amritsar and surrounding areas, 123 Infantry Brigade, initially after Independence, had a mandate to fall back to Beas in case the need was felt. In the early 1950s, the brigade was tasked to fight a defensive battle and delay any Pakistani attack for 72 hours and then withdraw to Beas for further battle.

This was changed after the Brigade Commander in the early 1950s, Brig Sarda Nand, found the defensive battle proposition to be incorrect.

It was also in Asal Utar that Company Quarter Master Havildar Abdul Hamid of 4 Grenadiers etched his name in history by being awarded Param Vir Chakra posthumously. He destroyed three Pakistani Patton tanks on September 8 and 9. He and his crew were in the process of destroying a fourth Patton tank on September 10 when his Jeep was hit by a shell fired by an enemy tank and he was killed.