BrahMos missile misfire: Delhi HC seeks Centre’s reply on ex-IAF officer’s plea against termination

The plea states that the petitioner was terminated from service on August 22, 2022, under Section 18 (doctrine of pleasure) of the Air Force Act, 1950. The plea states that at the time of the incident, he was posted as engineering officer to the squadron and he was imparting professional and practical training only for duties that were purely of maintenance nature. The plea further adds that as an engineering officer, he never imparted training on conduct of operations, which was purely the role of commanding officer and Ops officer.

“The petitioner was not trained against the counts of blame apportioned to him in the court of inquiry and he acted in complete obedience of the SOP. The petitioner had no experience in conducting operations and handling operational emergencies and the respondents acted in a completely malafide manner by issuing the termination order,” the petition stated.

The petitioner has alleged that by invoking Section 18 of the Air Force Act, the authorities “intentionally circumvented” the process for initiating disciplinary action and the requirement of trial by a court martial, depriving him of any opportunity to defend himself.

Senior advocate N Hariharan, appearing for the petitioner, said the court martial procedure was done away with and Section 18 was used as “camouflage” to terminate his client’s services. He contended that if the petitioner’s trial had taken place through the procedure of court martial, the real picture would have become clear.

On the other hand, Additional Solicitor General (ASG) Chetan Sharma appeared for the Centre and said the petitioner was dismissed under the Air Force Act and an order of dismissal cannot be challenged unless some ground of mala fide is made out, raising objections on the maintainability of the plea. He further argued that this incident “embarrassed” the country in the international community and that the fact that the missile landed in Pakistan could have “led to a situation of war”. Sharma also argued that the petitioner came to the High Court eight months after he was terminated and similar action was taken against other officers.

“The termination order was not in the nature of a simpliciter withdrawal of pleasure of the petitioner’s appointment/ termination, however, the impugned order approves the counts of blame in the court of inquiry. The respondents have clearly used Section 18 of the Air Force Act to approve the counts of blame under the Court of Inquiry indirectly, which is clearly impermissible under the Air Force Act. As a result, the respondents have acted beyond the scope of Section 18 of the Air Force Act by issuing the impugned termination order,” the plea said.