Vivek Katju at Idea Exchange: ‘Can’t imagine Netanyahu bucking Trump if Trump lays the law. He may turn and twist but he will listen’

Shubhajit Roy: As an Indian diplomat, how did you see the dichotomous Iran — technologically powerful but brutally repressive?

Iran was never a democracy. As a diplomat, one has dealt with all kinds of systems and governments. Khomeini introduced the Velayat-e Faqih or ‘Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist’. Velayat-e Faqih has built an institutional and coercive apparatus to sustain the Revolutionary Guards and Basij. A scholar in Tehran said these people are cultured and refined and deeply annoyed by the structure of the Velayat-e Faqih. There is a tension there. So there are three elements: Shahadat, culture and civilisation, and practicality. They are ruthlessly pragmatic. Anyone who has dealt with Iran experiences that. One never knows what is going to come to the fore. So, it is not the easiest thing to negotiate with them. And I am sure the Americans who did the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action would have felt this.

Shubhajit Roy: Iran has been under attack for four weeks now. What are they thinking?

One does not know exactly what they are thinking because it is all behind closed doors in Iran and not available to us. We don’t even know who is making the decisions. In any system, crucial matters of war and peace can only be made by the top leaders. In 1988, Khomeini accepted the ceasefire with Iraq after eight years of warfare and told his people to drink from the poisoned chalice and they accepted because Khomeini had that standing within Iran. If Khamenei had said it, they would have accepted.

After the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, who told the Japanese people that they must surrender? The emperor. And they accepted. Today, we don’t know who is taking the decisions in Tehran. Mojtaba Khamenei has been announced as the leader but no one has seen him. One hopes that he is there. But there is a gradual acceptance that they are in contact with the Americans. Hopefully we’ll get some clarity soon. Even governments today don’t have an exact sense of who they are dealing with in Tehran.

On the ongoing west asia war | ‘It’s clear that Trump has given up wanting a system change… Iran has said that there shouldn’t be decapitation strikes anymore and that’s logical. They should be given some guarantees that it will not take place’

Shubhajit Roy: Will talking to President Masoud Pezeshkian be of little value?

No, it is of considerable value when it comes to the movement of vessels from the Strait of Hormuz. Incidentally, that’s the last thing which the Iranians will open up. That’s the ace of spades. They are permitting ships to go through, and it is important to speak to Abbas Araghchi and to the President. Delhi is doing well talking to them. But I would not think that these two gentlemen are the final decision makers in Iran today.

Shubhajit Roy: On US President Donald Trump’s three-and-a-half weeks of messaging, he’s given mixed signals. What do you make of that?

At the best of times, I find it very difficult to comprehend Trump. He negotiates like a person in real estate. He can do gorilla chest thumping, make exaggerated and wrong statements, and then walk away from them. In August 2017, he announced that Pakistan must stop supporting the Taliban and threatened dire consequences. But as months passed, he had no compunctions about not standing by those threats. So today, these threats are more like, ‘Ho jaaye, toh ho jaaye. Nahi ho toh, nahi ho. What’s the harm in trying? If they agree, it’s fine; if they don’t, we’ll move on’. With all the sophistication of the American bureaucracy, here is a man who does things like this… It seems sometimes that the Americans are pleading with the Iranians to accept defeat, and they are saying why should we agree. It’s a very fluid situation, full of imponderables.

Former diplomat Vivek Katju at the Noida office on Thursday. (Express Photo by Tashi Tobgyal)

Shubhajit Roy: So, what is his exit strategy?

It’s quite clear that Trump has given up wanting a system change. He’s saying there’s already been a regime change because the decapitating strike did that. But he’s given up the idea that Velayat-e Faqih would be overthrown by Iranians and he is no longer telling them to come out on the streets. On the nuclear issue, the Iranians will perhaps want to keep the right to domestic uranium enrichment. Then he would minimise the capacity of the Iranians to project power. I think these three things are vital. He is not interested in how much the Iranians would suffer. What he thinks is suffering must come to an end. There will have to be some kind of international arrangement or agreement on the Strait of Hormuz and that will finally be the most difficult thing to achieve.

Shubhajit Roy: What is Iran’s off-ramp?

Iran has said is that there shouldn’t be decapitation strikes anymore and that’s logical. They should be given some guarantees that it will not take place. Now, reparations, I don’t really think so. The nuclear thing, the Iranians have always been very conscious of their rights. And the rights that international law gives them. To what extent will they insist on what they are now saying about the right of their proxies, is open to question.

On India-iran relations | ‘Iranians are far-seeing people. They haven’t said anything, even though the ship torpedoed by the Americans, was returning from India. India is a major country and Iran doesn’t want to alienate us. This is their pragmatism’

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Shubhajit Roy: How do you see India’s position evolving in the last three and a half weeks of this war?

The perception in the first four to five days of this war conveyed by the Modi government was that it was more in harmony with the interests of the Arabian Gulf than with any other. And at that stage, Indian analysts within the government may have been of the view that Iran was finished one way or the other. And that our interests were very substantial in the Gulf. After all, we have one crore people and interests in the energy flow being maintained. We have trade interests, transit interests, IMEC (India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor). So, I believe they said that the preponderance of interest is so substantial that even if the perception is there that we are leaning to one side, so be it. Maybe the foreign interlocutors were telling the government the same thing. But later, perhaps, after four or five days, it dawned that not condoling the death of a leader of another country, one which is in your region, in your neighbourhood, is wrong. And therefore, Vikram Misri (Foreign Secretary) went and signed the condolence book. The missions were also allowed to sign condolence books, wherever these were opened by the Iranians. Now, the focus seems to be on our interests in the region and that is paramount and logical. But the perception persists that we are leaning to one side. But look at the Iranian reaction. They’ve been very wise. They’re far-seeing people. And their system is a far-seeing system. They’ve overlooked the first four days. They haven’t said anything, even though that ship, which was torpedoed by the Americans, was returning from India. So, they have taken all that in their stride at the moment. Because India is a major country and Iran doesn’t want to alienate us. So, this is where their pragmatism comes from.

Shubhajit Roy: Pakistan has positioned itself as a mediator. What is your view?

As a dalal? That is the word my former colleague (External Affairs minister S Jaishankar) had used. In the ’90s, the Pakistanis had a dreadful time when there was a proxy civil conflict between the Sunnis and the Shia Tanzeems in Pakistan. And it is no secret that the Saudis were behind the Sunni Tanzeems and the Iranians were behind the Shia Tanzeems. So, that’s the last thing that the Pakistanis would want at this stage. Recently, there’s been a fairly turbulent relationship on the Baloch issue between the two countries. And not in the distant past, the Pakistanis did some strafing in Iranian territory, what they claimed were Baloch militant strongholds. But the predominant feeling in Pakistan seems to be to capitalise on the present opportunity to shore up or to burnish this diplomatic standing. Part of the thinking is that if Pakistan becomes the venue for any contact between the Americans and the Iranians, then that will bring about a lot of positive perceptions about Pakistan. And if it doesn’t work, then what do they lose? Second, it has improved their standing in the Islamic Ummah. That they are the only Islamic state with nuclear weapons and yet in the Ummah they are not taken seriously, is something that really infuriates them. They feel they might improve their position.

Vikas Pathak: The Opposition is questioning the timing of the PM’s visit to Israel. Is the criticism valid?

The timing of the Prime Minister’s visit to Israel was intriguing. When the visit took place, it was quite clear that Trump was gathering what was being called a naval armada. And while negotiations were going on, which the Omanis were doing at that stage, the chances of a military conflict were substantial. The government still hasn’t clarified why it decided to go ahead.

On Dhurandhar | ‘It is a lot of fiction. Everyone speculates that there’s some kind of messaging. Such messaging, if it is taking place, is childish. If you are taking it as entertainment, then it is fine’

Vikas Pathak: India had largely de-hyphenated itself from Pakistan. However, after Operation Sindoor, Pakistan appears to be regaining diplomatic attention. Could the shift harm India’s strategic interests?

On Operation Sindoor, the Pakistanis have played their cards, with Trump in particular, to ingratiate themselves with him. PM Shehbaz Sharif has gone to the extent of saying that “you have saved millions of lives” and of course, that is music to Trump’s ears. And we’ve kept silent. As for mediation, you can only be a mediator if any one side wants you to be one. In the early ’50s, during the Korean War, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was approached to be the mediator and that is why we played a very prominent role and are standing in the world roles. It’s certainly odd that Shehbaz Sharif has tweeted that they will be honoured if they host this meeting in Pakistan. That’s unusual. I certainly wouldn’t have liked our PM to do that. So, if the world had come to the ruling dispensation to say that Modiji is a shanti doot.. But that opportunity is not there. People have to come to you. You don’t start soliciting to be a shanti doot. And therefore, the government, the way it’s played in the end, is right. Whether the word dalal should be used or not I will leave that to more learned people.

Former diplomat Vivek Katju (right) in conversation with Shubhajit Roy, Diplomatic Editor, The Indian Express. (Photo: Tashi Tobgyal)

Shubhajit Roy: What would you have advised to be done differently?

I can’t ever imagine myself to be in an advisory role. But one thing I would have said is that it’s in keeping with our tradition to condole the death of the Ayatollah. And we should have taken his name. I don’t think the government has taken his name even now. Apart from that, one would have crafted messages in a way that would have shown us the perception of maintaining a greater balance. At the moment, it would seem that the Iranians have shown the wisdom of maintaining their links with India, allowing our ships to go. The PM has spoken twice to the Iranian President. Jaishankar has spoken five times to Araghchi. So the communication channels are active at the highest level. They should be maintained. We pursue America and Israel too, with equal vigour. This is the ultimate test of diplomacy.

Shubhajit Roy: But what about the unpredictable X-factor, Mr Trump?

One way of dealing with him is to ignore what you feel can be ignored. And that is what the government decided for his claims that he had mediated and saved the lives of millions . You ignore it. The second is to be combative and to say that “no, what you are saying here is not correct.” And that depends on the context. If something that he is saying is so vile to the people here, that you are compelled to put your stand on the record, then that should be done forthrightly. Otherwise, it is best to ignore him.

Former diplomat Vivek Katju at the Noida office on Thursday. (Express Photo by Tashi Tobgyal)

Vandita Mishra: On the government’s silence on the West Asia War — the spectrum between responsible statecraft and moral cave-in, where would you place yourself?

I’ve always believed in statecraft being an instrument for safeguarding and promoting interests. I find that morality and ethics, while we may all want them, have little role. Whenever a government or a State says it’s acting ethically, I think there should always be suspicions. The same governments can act very unethically…It’s a different matter to assess whether the statecraft or the diplomacy that we have practised, since the war, has safeguarded and promoted our interests. For the time being, some energy flows are taking place. For the time being, our people there, the 90 lakh to 1 crore people, are safe. But if this breaks down, then we’ll be in very deep trouble.

Vandita Mishra: You’ve dealt with Pakistan. Have you watched Dhurandhar? What did you think of it?

I suppose it’s a lot of fiction. Everyone speculates that there’s some kind of messaging going through. Such messaging, if it is taking place, is childish. If you are taking it as entertainment, then it is fine.

Shubhajit Roy: What would you have advised the Opposition?

I would have advised them to continue to play their political games if they want to. I really believe that the Opposition must come together on matters which are true challenges. Back in 1994, Benazir Bhutto had cut off all contracts between India and Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif won the early 1997 election, and became the PM. He indicated that he wanted to resume dialogue. It was HD Deve Gowda’s government and Mr IK Gujral was the External Affairs Minister, and they decided we should. Before the dialogue began, Mr Gujral briefed all the Opposition leaders and of his own coalition. I recollect one of the senior Opposition leaders saying, “Go ahead, do it. We are in full support of this”. That was there in those days. Attacks on each other were never acerbic. Now perhaps those traditions are no more.

Monojit Majumdar: There seems to be a clear difference in the war goals of the US and Israel. If Trump pulls back but Netanyahu does not, where might this lead in the short and longer term?

I can’t imagine Netanyahu bucking Trump if Trump lays down the law. He may turn and twist but he will listen. I don’t think he has enough elbow room with the Americans. The lobby is not exercising the same role that it used to. Its stranglehold is weakening. That was also exhibited in the revulsion in fairly substantial sections of American opinion about what is happening in Gaza. Netanyahu either led Trump to believe or led sections of the American administration who have access to Trump to believe that once we have this decapitating strike, we remove the leadership, we inflict all this tremendous pain, we wipe out their own identity. Then, they will come to their knees. I think what they didn’t figure was the Iranian capacity to bear pain. And that they will be effective in choking off oil supplies. Perhaps they didn’t even gauge that the Iranians will hit the Arab Peninsula states (the Gulf states) the way they have.

Saptarshi Basak: According to New York Times, Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud is telling Trump to finish the job, cut off the head of the snake. What do the Saudis gain if the Iranians are destroyed?

The Israelis quite clearly want the Velayat-e Faqih system to be uprooted. There is little doubt that the Israelis wouldn’t mind Iran becoming a black hole. That would impact very seriously on the interests of the region as well as global interests. Israelis feel that they have shelter against that. Now, do the Saudis and the Gulf states want the same thing? I think the feeling in the Gulf has been that the theocratic structure which is there in Iran is not in their interest.

Saptarshi Basak: Even at the cost of an emboldened Israel, of a much stronger Israel?

What will a stronger Israel do? You see the Arab Peninsula States. A stronger Israel’s negativity would first be shown on the Palestine issue. We all know what they have done in Gaza. And none of the Arab States has been able to do anything about it. So, one can sort of think that they have calculated that Israel does not have all that much capacity or interest to damage the Arab Peninsula states.

Harikishan Sharma: Had there been a politician in the Ministry of External Affairs instead of a bureaucrat, do you think there would have been a different stance on foreign policy?

I think my former colleague is no longer a diplomat. He has been a minister for seven years and in this time he has become quite a politician, a very fine politician, wouldn’t you say? So, I think that if you would ask me this question years ago, perhaps I would have given you a different answer. But today, Jaishankar is a politician. His language and his demeanor is that of a politician, and it is natural.

Damini Nath: I wanted to ask about the Epstein files in the US. From the emails, he met many powerful people, including leaders, diplomats, and even a former Indian diplomat who is now the petroleum minister. Is this just reality: do diplomats have to meet such power brokers, or can it be avoided?

I won’t comment on the Epstein episode because I really don’t know enough about it, except for what is in the media. As for do diplomats meet or have to meet all kinds of characters, savoury, unsavoury, people you would not normally welcome in your homes? Yes. In pursuit of your interest and in your dealings as a diplomat, you come across all kinds of people. And if they are holding office in a particular country, then you deal with them. But did I have contacts which were not professional? No. You don’t socialise with them.

Shubhajit Roy: You were a negotiator for the Kandahar Hijack. Do you think your portrayal was fairly accurate in the Netflix mini series IC 814: The Kandahar Hijack? Secondly, how difficult was it for you on the tarmac?

I don’t speak about official matters that I was involved in. You asked me about the movie, I looked at it and people said, this man is your character. I could not see myself in his character.

More than 26 years have passed. It was a painful memory. In Kandahar, the country was caught in a very, very difficult situation. And we had to extricate ourselves with the least cost. All nations find themselves in such situations sometime or other. Different nations behave differently. But at the end of the day, for the government, the predominant thought is always to get out of it, paying the least price. What we can really debate is, with the luxury of hindsight, whether we could have come out of that hijack differently, paying a lesser price. But a price certainly had to be paid. Have we learned the lessons from that hijack? And if so, what are those lessons and have we implemented those in our overall schemes of handling such terrible events?