Hidma is one of those military leaders who had a tremendous influence in the area and on the psyche of the Maoists. He was an invincible militaristic leader who could launch attacks, cause great damage but at the same time avoid the net of the security forces. And when that sort of a leader is hit, it will definitely hit morale. Second, it is not just Hidma who was hit. Along with him, his entire protection team and some members of Devji’s (Hidma’s closest aide) team were also picked. Many divisional committee members and platoon members have also been arrested. Now, why did they move out of Chhattisgarh? It was because they were not able to stand the pressure that was being mounted by the forces, both Central and state government forces. Today if you see, except in north, south and western Bastar, all of them have either surrendered or have been removed from the scene. Some leaders are left in Odisha but they, too, have become very weak. In the present scenario, my assessment is that this will lead to a faster decimation of the party. A large number of people are likely to surrender. If you remember when Mallojula Venugopal Rao surrendered, he had called out to everybody saying that this is not the right time to fight. He said this is the time for us to surrender and come into the mainstream. So, it’s no longer the time for them now, not for these struggles.
Deeptiman Tiwary: You’ve headed the CRPF and in your time also Hidma inflicted casualties on the Central forces and the Chhattisgarh police. What made him so elusive?
He was a man from that area. He was from Puwarti village in Sukma (Chhattisgarh) and knew the area like the back of his palm. That was his biggest advantage. Being a tribal himself, he could blend and vanish quickly. He could communicate well with people. That was one of his major strengths. There were some tactical errors that we have committed too, which probably helped them. Either some of the standard operating procedures were ignored or not followed the way it should have been. That’s the reason why we wanted to fashion Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA, 2008), on the same lines as Greyhounds, to ensure that we move in small numbers. That’s what needs to be done in these operations because when we move in large numbers, small mistakes can expose our movements.
How Greyhounds are different | Whoever joins, be it an IPS officer or a constable, they are taken based on their fitness, strength and skill sets. It is totally rank neutral. There is always a hunger to learn more, be it from the enemy or from other forces
Deeptiman Tiwary: How have counter insurgency operations evolved from the time you served with the Greyhounds to your tenure as DG, CRPF?
One of the reasons for Greyhound’s success was also the type of intelligence input that we got from the Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau (SIB) and the state police. We used to train the entire state police in jungle tactics. But when I was in SIB, or in Greyhounds for that matter, HUMINT (human intelligence) was the major chunk.
TECHINT (technical intelligence) was a small part. Today, technology plays a much bigger role in surveillance and tracking. That is one of the major changes that has happened. Hidma came into AP, the place where Naxalite movement had actually taken very strong roots, and that’s where he was decimated. And not by the TECHINT, but by sheer HUMINT. That’s the beauty of the whole thing.
Deeptiman Tiwary: You are one of the key architects of the success of the force, Greyhounds. You designed its training modules, its strategy. What made Greyhounds so successful?
Greyhounds was set up in 1989 by KS Vyas (within the Andhra Pradesh Police). That was the time when NS Bhati, a former Sashastra Seema Bal officer, joined us and trained our forces. One of the beautiful things with the Greyhounds was that this was a deputation force of people who used to come and go. Only fittest mattered. Whosoever joined the force, from an IPS officer to a constable, they were taken based on their fitness, strength and skill sets. It was totally rank neutral. They were given about 14 weeks of training in jungle warfare, totally unconventional. There are times when a sub-inspector was leading a unit which was supposed to be led by a DSP. Even among weapons, the AKs would be given not to the leader of the team but to the best shooter. We have never treated Naxals as some band of untrained, uncouth fellows. We always looked at them as people who are very good at adapting to the situation, innovating and improvising with what is there. Let’s respect them for that. We would raise ourselves much beyond them and then hit them. There is always a hunger to learn something more, both from the enemy and from other forces. That’s why we are different from other forces.
Jayprakash S Naidu: In 2021, Hidma handed over the reins of the Battalion 1 to Barsa Deva, another tribal from the same village. Now, even though Hidma is dead, there are over 100 people in Battalion 1 who have automatic and semi-automatic weapons. How do you see this?
Unfortunately, I don’t know exactly what’s happening today. Hidma might have handed reins to Barsa Deva, but does he have the same persona like Hidma? Many have been associated with Hidma, but will his death have an impact on their minds? Will they say, ‘why all this struggle’? Because now, their leaders are coming out and saying that this is not the time. Their movement is being watched by Andhra Pradesh police. Just because Hidma died, the police and security forces are not going to bring down their level of alertness. It will continue till we are certain that every major force out there has surrendered.
Integrating naxals into mainstream | The purpose of surrender is to allow them to join the mainstream. In Andhra, a former leader joined politics, became an MLA and eventually a leader of the entire area
Ankita Deshkar: In several cases in the past of surrender and neutralisation, intelligence inputs have led to major operations. In Hidma’s case, what kind of intelligence inputs would such an operation get in the forest?
Generally, the information we get is indirect. For instance, in one operation, we had intelligence that a large number of shoes had been purchased in a particular village. Separately, we were told a large amount of rice, dal and other supplies were bought in another village. We triangulated this: if supplies are coming from here and equipment from there, they are likely preparing for a training camp. Then we study the map — contours, water points, locations wide enough for many people to stay — and then launch an operation. It’s rare that someone comes and says, “So-and-so is here, pick him up.” That kind of direct information comes only occasionally, if Maoists misbehave with women in villages or when a villager’s child has been taken away. Then, out of angst, people sometimes give direct information. But mostly, information is indirect. We study maps, terrain, their likely movement patterns, everything. Out of 100 operations, maybe only in one or two cases can we reach them without being detected. They have watches and security rings. If there are big leaders there can be two or three rings. When we cross a ring, we are detected and they usually open fire first. If they don’t open fire and want to surrender, we accept it. But sometimes they miscalculate. Those who survive are arrested. This is the reality.
Surrender has been a major policy of the Andhra Pradesh government, and now all states follow something similar. Anyone who wants to surrender can come through a schoolteacher, the school they studied in, a sarpanch, an MLA, a revenue officer, a contractor, anyone. We give them an open and safe route. In Hidma’s case, his mother was requesting him to come back. “Beta, aa jao,” she kept saying. Local officers even went and met her. His sister was also pleading with him. We take proactive steps from security forces and district administration to reach out to families and encourage surrender and offer protection in return.
Many leaders have surrendered over the years. We give full protection. The purpose of surrender is to allow them to join the mainstream. In fact, in Andhra, a former leader joined politics, became an MLA, and eventually a leader of the entire area. What can be more transparent than that?
Ankita Deshkar: Maharashtra has a strong rehabilitation policy for surrendered Naxals. How good are these policies in other states?
Rehabilitation policies actually started long ago in Andhra Pradesh. Other states copied and improved upon them. In the early days, those who surrendered would get Rs 5 lakh to settle down. Those who wanted to study were helped back into colleges. I know an important leader who became an engineer and a successful contractor. Others became doctors after returning to medical school. Skill development and factory employment is the next stage. In Andhra Pradesh, we had Remote and Interior Area Development (RIAD) Schemes. People who surrendered were integrated through these programmes so they wouldn’t feel abandoned or regret coming out of the forest. But, I’ve been out of this stream for eight-and-a-half years now, so I don’t know the latest specifics, but every state is continuously improving.
Ankita Deshkar: On social media, there are many people expressing sympathy for Hidma and the poverty in his village. Do encounters like this risk alienating tribal populations?
However good or bad a person may have been, for their parents, siblings and the village, they are still “their” people. Naturally, villagers will feel sympathy. What we must do is help the village move past that loss — not by giving benefits to individuals but by improving the entire village. If facilities are created — roads, water supply, access to schools, medical care — people will see tangible improvement. The message must be: ‘If he was giving you 10 per cent, we will give you 90 or 100 per cent’. That’s the stand governments have to take. This approach is why the Naxal movement vanished in Andhra and Telangana.
Manas Srivastava: How should the counter narrative be created so that insurgent legitimacy is weakened?
When Naxalism was at its peak in Andhra, we had our own cultural troop. They would go into the interiors, set up a stage for three-four days and would enact what happens when you actually join the movement — you lose touch with your family, with your good life and how you are stopping development that is being brought in by the government. In those days, we also made cassettes with songs, sometimes the same tunes like what Gaddar would sing. Now, the scenario has changed. So now, one of the things that our security forces even CRPF do, particularly in Andhra and Telangana, is they take children from interior villages, bring them to cities, show them what the world is like outside and how they can benefit from it. This sort of support from the security forces is enormous.
In our own CRPF camps, we started hospitals in interior areas. In fact, Naxals threatened the public not to go to these hospitals or take medicines from there. We would tell the people you don’t have to tell us where the Naxals are, simply come and use our services. Now, having taken a benefit from us, they would tell us not to go to this place in the evening, etc. that kind of information. So, slowly, trust building happened between the security forces and the villagers. That has to continue and bridges have to be built continuously.
Ritika Chopra: When the government sets a deadline to eliminate Naxalism, how does that translate into operation planning?
I’ll put it this way, if deadlines are given, it will make the forces look at their own strategies, tactics and revise whatever they are doing. If the home minister or somebody says this should be closed in six months, if not six months, it may take eight months, but then it is reachable and done. When state forces and Central forces work seamlessly together, then you get better results. That’s one of the things you see happening in Chhattisgarh now.
Ritika Chopra: What are the key elements of a long-term strategy to prevent the revival of the movement?
Even if you have removed the thorn it doesn’t mean that the field is ready for the seeds to be planted. We have only removed the weeds. The rest of the cultivation still has to happen. Which means the government and its agencies should move in. If there are no schools, schools should start. If you read the year 2000 report of Naxals on Telangana and Warangal districts (to give due credit to them, they record most of the things that they speak of) they say that the situation from the 1980s to 2000 has changed enormously and that the type of struggle for land is no longer relevant. They say that women who were earlier only in villages now are going on cycles and to cities for jobs. Earlier, teachers and medical staff would not go into interior villages for fear of being harmed. Now all that is gone. So we have to make sure that schools, hospitals and developmental agencies move in there, stay where they are posted and make their services available to the public.
Deeptiman Tiwary: Were there any key mistakes, both operational or political, that delayed India’s success against Maoists? What would you have done differently?
Take the example of Andhra, whichever may be the political party, it was never said that you stop anti-Naxal operations. Yes, there was a time when the Naxals came out for talks and when that happened, there was a cessation of operations from our side. In fact, when the talks were going on, I had become Greyhounds’ chief. I said we have been asked not to conduct operations but it doesn’t stop us from training people. So, I sent my officers to different districts to train local people on jungle warfare. I got my boys to move from village to village. You don’t engage with the enemy or go in search of them but you see what’s happening. In some states, there was a refusal to accept that Naxals are a threat. And that is something which helped them sustain. It’s like a balloon, half filled with air, you press one place, it goes to another place. So they were able to move from place to place. And look what happened. They ran from there, they came here and they were shot. Suppose the Andhra police had closed shop saying that nothing is happening in our area, then? So any day it can happen, we must be alert.
Deeptiman Tiwary: In 2003, CPI Maoist Ganapathy had said that ‘As long as there is socio-economic inequity, I will raise the dalam even in Washington DC’. Can Maoism be revived in India?
Long ago, somebody had said that Haryana is such an advanced state, how can there be a scope for any movement like Naxalism? My response then was that inequity need not necessarily be financial. Even in social status, if there’s inequity and people feel the pinch, somebody can always stand up and say this is unfair. And when he feels he is not heard for too long, then it that can take the shape of violence. So why do you give scope for that? So if there is something that is perceived and if we, as security officers or police officers, can address part of it, let us take it as a divine duty that we should attend to that immediately and see that this sort of injustice is not just felt and seen. Let’s put an end to that and that can happen. So it need not necessarily be Ganapathy, it can be anybody else, it can be you, it can be me. Only thing is, we should feel that pinch so much that we stand up and speak out.
Former CRPF DG and Greyhounds architect K Durga Prasad. (Illustration by: Suvajit Dey) 
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