Engagement without recognition: Decoding New Delhi’s approach to Taliban government in Kabul

Engagement without recognition

The actions of recognising a government or state, and establishing an embassy in that state, are distinct political acts which are governed by different norms of international law and practice.

Officially recognising the Taliban-run Islamic Emirate would entail India’s acceptance of its de jure nature. This would in turn mean that India deems the Taliban’s violent displacement of an elected government in 2021, to be a legitimate form of governmental transition within a recognised state. This would be similar to when India, in the 1980s, became the sole country to recognise the legitimacy of the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan that was established after the 1978 coup.

However, this does not mean that India cannot use traditional diplomatic tools to engage with the de facto entity ruling Afghanistan. Engaging with the Taliban does not violate any norms of international law as they presently stand (lex lata). International conventions such as the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations (1961) and Consular Relations (1963) are functional documents meant to standardise and codify international practice regarding the rights and responsibilities of diplomatic and consular missions of a sending state, in a receiving state. They do not (and are not meant to) classify when a state can or cannot formally recognise a government.

The sui generis (of its own kind) predicament in Afghanistan has also meant that in the years prior to India’s own decision to re-open its Kabul embassy, India has been able to passively allow the steady change of the de facto character of the Afghan Embassy in New Delhi even while it flies the older flag of the de jure Republic.

For instance, across 2023, the Taliban government in Kabul and Afghan missions in India were mired in a tussle for control, with the overarching question being whether diplomats representing the older Republic, now represented the new Islamic Emirate.

Both the incumbent diplomats in India who executed vital consular functions but without a government to represent, as well as the Taliban in Kabul who attached high importance to continuity in diplomatic functioning reached a modus vivendi (practical compromise) by side-stepping the question.

By December, 2023, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) had submitted to Parliament that the Afghan Embassy “continues to function”. While some diplomats had left, “remaining Afghan diplomats based in India have taken over the responsibility for the continued diplomatic functioning”. On October 12, 2025, Muttaqi himself confirmed that “even those from the former government now work with us”.

Cumulatively, along with India’s own steady increase in diplomatic interactions with the Taliban across the last two years, this has meant the assertive use of an ‘engagement-without-recognition’ model.

India has used this model even for other states (such as Taiwan) or governments (such as the Myanmar junta) which it does not recognise. The former is represented by the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Centre in New Delhi, and the latter controls the Myanmar Embassy through staff appointed by the de facto military leadership ruling Myanmar from 2021.

Evidently, global trends also reflect shifts in international practice and norms. Former Al Qaeda leader Ahmed al-Sharaa being fêted by the United States as Syria’s legitimate leader, arguably also created a geopolitical window for India to further engagement with the Taliban, even as Muttaqi himself remains a UN-designated terrorist.

India’s model for engagement is also not reliant on future recognition of the Taliban government, even if the possibility of a future Taliban-designated Ambassador in New Delhi remains. Notably, it is not unusual for Embassies to function without Ambassadors. For perspective, the US Embassy in New Delhi did not have an Ambassador for 26 months between 2021 and 2023.

What have other countries and the UN done with the Taliban?

Unlike avenues of diplomatic interaction, the question of granting political recognition is more linked with international practice. As the formal representative of the international comity of nations, the United Nations’ (UN’s) recognition in particular is a benchmark for legitimacy and remains the Taliban’s foremost foreign policy goal.

Broadly, Kabul must satisfy the UN on three fronts: an inclusive government, dismantling terror groups operating in Afghanistan, and respect for human rights and liberties, especially of women and girls. Given the Taliban’s failure to meet a satisfactory threshold for all three thus far, the UN continues to reject the group’s efforts to claim Afghanistan’s UN seat. In November, 2024, the UNGA Credentials Committee rejected the Taliban’s request for the fourth year in a row.

More functionally, the UN’s non-recognition also leaves other states’ abilities to host Taliban senior representatives subject to UN permissions. Muttaqi’s ongoing visit to New Delhi was itself possible due to the UNSC 1988 Sanctions Committee approving an exemption to his international travel ban on September 30.

However, even as such political restrictions exist, the on-ground realities in Afghanistan continue to favour the Taliban, which faces limited existential challenges to its rule. Notwithstanding a festering jihadist insurgency led by the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), other relatively secular forces such as the National Resistance Front (created by Ahmad Massoud in August, 2021 and based out of Panjshir province) have proven incapable of altering the status quo.

Here, the acceptance of the Taliban by regional states and the lack of appetite by extra-regional (Western) states and their fatigue towards Afghanistan further reduces the possibility of international support for armed resistance. This has bolstered the Taliban’s claim of complete control over Afghan territory.

Cognizant of this reality, the question of granting recognition or engagement then has become one of geopolitical expediency and realpolitik. While Russia (also under US sanctions, like the Taliban) became the first state to formally recognise the Taliban in July 2025, other states have followed their own engagement-without-recognition models thus far. By 2023, China had become the first to both dispatch an Ambassador to Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover and accredit a Taliban-appointed envoy. The UAE was next to accept the credentials of a Taliban-appointed ambassador.

In Central Asia, Uzbekistan was the first to accept a Taliban ambassador, while other Central Asian states host Taliban diplomats at varying levels. For Central Asian states, geographical proximity and the presence of terror groups in Afghanistan, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Tehreek-e-Taliban Tajikistan (TTT) have compelled them to maintain relations with the Taliban so as to prevent any spillover effect.

Despite its severe downturn in ties with the Taliban, Pakistan too upgraded its diplomatic representation in Kabul from Chargé d’Affaires to Ambassadorial level in May this year, with the Taliban, subsequently, reciprocating by posting an Ambassador to Islamabad.

Even as they push their own forms of engagement-without-recognition, regional states are also seemingly united in their opposition to foreign militaries in Afghanistan which could raise the specter of violence again. India joined other states (including Pakistan) in the latest Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan to reiterate this position, especially in light of US President Trump’s recent efforts to regain control of the Bagram airbase in Afghanistan’s Parwan Province.

The geopolitics at play

The Taliban’s near-complete control of Afghan territory and the absence of effective foreign-backed armed resistance already created the structural factors necessary for India to adopt a different approach in 2021, compared to the first Taliban government of the 1990s when New Delhi backed the Northern Alliance, a conglomerate of anti-Taliban groups. However, three specific drivers have contributed to India’s comfort with pushing the limits of engagement-without-recognition:

First, is the Taliban’s own proactiveness in seeking foreign engagement, even if states offer it incrementally without overt recognition. In the last four years, even as India’s embassy and four consulates remained shut, the Taliban actively lobbied for Indian re-engagement with Kabul.

It took special care to guarantee that Afghanistan will not become a haven for anti-India groups, given that the IC-814 hijack experience is seared into India’s diplomatic institutional memory. The Taliban seemingly passed India’s litmus test on anti-terrorism when Muttaqi spoke to External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar in May 2025 and condemned the Pahalgam terror attack, a few months after the Indian Foreign Secretary’s own ground-breaking meeting with Muttaqi in Dubai. Jaishankar’s fresh appreciation for the Taliban’s condemnation of the Pahalgam terror attack during their first in-person meeting last week has also helped Muttaqi reaffirm the Taliban’s distinction from Pakistan sponsored regional terror networks.

Second, which further enables the first, is the ongoing sharp breakdown in Pakistan-Afghanistan ties in contrast to the celebratory forecast for bilateral ties when the Taliban took Kabul in 2021. The Taliban, as further evidence of a diversified, engagement based, foreign policy, has been disinclined to categorically support Pakistan’s demands from Kabul.

It has shown continuity with past Afghan governments in not recognising the Pakistan-Afghanistan border (the Durand Line, which Pakistan considers a settled international border) as final and has not abandoned the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) with whom the Taliban has the shared experience of fighting US-led NATO forces. For Pakistan, both positions are anathema, especially since the TTP’s attacks have resurged in Pakistan since the Taliban’s takeover in Kabul.

This has led to violent clashes between Taliban and Pakistani forces, with an especially marked escalation during Muttaqi’s ongoing visit to India. Even as Pakistan’s strong structural ties with the Taliban remain, its discomfort with Kabul’s assertiveness has increased India’s comfort in cautiously increasing engagement with the Taliban.

Third, is India’s opportunity to leverage the Taliban’s economic needs. India has long had a robust humanitarian and development portfolio in Afghanistan, having invested over $3 billion across sectors and undertaken large scale infrastructure projects. Given the Trump administration’s termination of all foreign assistance to Afghanistan earlier this year, Kabul’s loss of its largest financial donor has caused the Taliban to focus on garnering greater investment from regional states such as India.

Muttaqi’s remarks across events in New Delhi focused on showing Afghanistan to be a positive investment environment, with the Taliban also inviting Indian firms to invest in Afghanistan’s mining sector. He reiterated Afghanistan’s continuing interest in connectivity projects such as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline and increased transit through the Chabahar port in Iran. Even as Pakistan remains an unavoidable obstacle for TAPI and India’s investment in the Chabahar port remains vulnerable to US sanctions, the Taliban’s need to unlock greater Indian engagement remains.

Here, Indian diplomatic missions reverting to full functioning will have the downstream impact of generating greater trust among Indian firms and investors since it reflects New Delhi’s faith in the Taliban’s guarantees of security.

Bashir Ali Abbas is a Senior Research Associate at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi. Bantirani Patro is a Research Associate at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.