What makes West Bengal’s brand of political violence unique? An Expert Explains
As Suvendu Adhikari prepares to take oath as West Bengal Chief Minister, a look at the nature, roots, and trajectory of political violence in the state — and what needs to change for it to end.
Broken bricks lie scattered on the ground after a clash between supporters of Trinamool Congress and BJP, in Shibpur, Howrah, on May 7, 2026. Photo: PTI The killing of a close aide of BJP leader and West Bengal Chief Minister-designate Suvendu Adhikari near Kolkata on Wednesday night was the latest chapter in the decades-long cycle of political violence in the state. That this happened despite the presence of a record number of security force personnel present to monitor and prevent post-poll violence in Bengal only seems to highlight its persistence.
Biswanath Chakraborty, professor of political science at Rabindra Bharati University, Kolkata, spoke to The Indian Express about the nature and roots of such violence, what makes it different from that in other states, and what needs to change for it to end.
Political violence is not unique to West Bengal: there have been instances in other states such as Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Kerala, among others. What makes Bengal different?
In other states, we often notice that caste violence, religious violence, (and) identity involvement are there, and politics comes later on. But here, it starts from political rivalry and nowadays, it has started turning into identity politics. This is the difference.
In West Bengal, political violence is structural and it is everyday violence, unlike other states. Political violence was basically ideological in earlier days — during the early Left period in the 1950s and 1960s. But during the Left regime of 34 years, political violence was used strategically to ensure party dominance against the opposition.
During Trinamool Congress rule, it became a structural phenomenon, and secondly, it turned from ideological and political orientation to economic orientation. So, TMC uses political violence to control local resources. That is why both inter-party and intra-party violence have been observed during the TMC regime.
How do you define political violence in West Bengal?
Whatever violence is related with politics, or when political leaders and cadres are involved in different forms of conflict, is called political violence. Under this definition, there are different forms and categories of political violence in West Bengal. Sometimes, mental violence, physical torture, and political murder also comes under political violence.
Rape has also been allegedly used as a form of political violence to suppress the opposition. Verbal violence, too: if you attend any political rally in West Bengal, particularly during elections, you will find that political leaders use violent language directed against opponents. In that way, they create mental pressure on the opposition.
What are the roots of such violence and how has its trajectory evolved over time?
There are three or four roots of violence in West Bengal. First of all, during the colonial period in West Bengal, the Anushilan Samiti, Jugantar Samiti, and other organisations wanted to overthrow British rule through violence. So, we nurtured violence against colonial rulers through such organisations. Even Subhas Chandra Bose wanted to overthrow British rule using a counter-military organisation. So, violence was very much part of Bengal politics during the freedom struggle.
After independence, when West Bengal became a state, Congress ruled for more than 13 or 14 years. During the initial stage, the [undivided] Communist Party of India (CPI) was the principal opposition party. Up to 1955, they believed in armed struggle and wanted to overthrow the government through armed struggle — that is why they were banned at times. After the ban was removed, they accepted parliamentary democracy, though they still believed violence had a role in politics. The way they organised mass movements against the Congress government in the 1950s and 1960s involved violence in one movement after another.
There were many incidents during the Food Movement [1959 uprising against the then Congress government owing to acute food shortages, hoarding, and high prices] and protests against fare hikes. So, there were many instances when the CPI, the communists, and the Left believed in violence against the government and exercised violence in state politics. The ruling Congress party also used counter-violence through the police administration and party workers.
Security officials in Chaura Basti area of Shibpur, Howrah, on May 7, 2026. Photo: PTI
So, violence and counter-violence always remained constant factors in West Bengal politics. During the 1970s, there was the extreme Left group that broke away from the CPI(M), known as the Naxals. They started the Naxalite movement against landlords, intellectuals, and what they called bourgeois classes, and openly declared armed struggle. Mass killings started. After that, when [Congress leader] Siddhartha Shankar Ray became Chief Minister, he also used police force against the Naxals as counter-violence.
But electoral political violence started in West Bengal during the 1972 Assembly elections, when rigged elections first began in the state. After that, in 1977, there was a genuine election, but after five years of Left rule they also started using rigging and election violence. TMC later expanded this violence to an unbelievable scale. If you look at the last three panchayat elections (2013, 2018, and 2023), a large number of people died. Opposition candidates were denied the right to file nominations. Voters’ rights were denied. In the 2023 panchayat election, more than 100 people died, hundreds were injured, and many houses and private properties were destroyed.
Even after the 2021 Assembly election, which was conducted by the Election Commission, there was post-election violence. There was a National Human Rights Commission inquiry. After hearings, the Kolkata High Court ordered a CBI inquiry into the post-election violence, but the CBI failed to arrest many of those directly involved or accused of instigating the violence.
So, violence is a very useful weapon for Bengal politicians to win and suppress people.
What triggers this form of violence? And how does it manifest in Bengal’s everyday life?
Manifestation is in the form of extraction of money. Local politicians use their boys to extract money from shopkeepers, street vendors, and rickshaw pullers. If the opposition organises any programme, rally, or function, immediately the ruling party disrupts the programme. They beat opposition members. If there is any conflict between two families, political parties intervene and create a kind of kangaroo court to decide who is right or wrong. Through these kangaroo courts, they earn money from both conflicting parties.
There are different forms: beating opponents, giving verbal threats, threatening to kill someone, throwing bombs. The important thing is that the administration often remains silent.
The main reason for violence is that whoever comes to power politicises the administration at a very high level. Mamata Banerjee personalised the administration. In West Bengal, the administration no longer maintains even a minimum separation between politics and administration — they have become so mixed that it is very difficult for opponents or anyone outside the ruling party to get justice if they are victimised.
Even if you go to court, ruling party cadres may come to your home and threaten you further. Another reason is that execution of court orders is very weak in West Bengal. The ruling party often controls lower institutions in one way or another.
At the same time, a large section of the media is not free to raise violence-related issues. There is also social tolerance of violence. People often believe the ruling party has the right to exercise violence over the opposition. That is why I say violence is an everyday phenomenon in Bengal.
During the Left regime, violence was strategic. Whenever needed, it was used to suppress the opposition. But during the TMC regime, violence shifted from ideological and political motives to economic motives — mainly extraction of money.
After the BJP’s victory in West Bengal, Prime Minister Narendra Modi appealed for “badlaa nahi, badlaav” (change, not revenge). He appeared to echo what Mamata Banerjee herself had said upon coming to power in 2011 after 34 years of Left rule. Yet, the cycle of violence persisted. What needs to change for this to end?
First of all, you have to establish the rule of law. You need political will. There has been an absence of rule of law in West Bengal for a long period.
Second, depoliticisation of the administration is necessary. In parliamentary democracy, politics and administration should work together at the upper level, but at the grassroots level — municipalities, wards, local governance — everything is determined by politics. We have a political society. Why should everything be determined by politics?
Third, we need jobs. Why are people getting involved in violence? Because many people have no work and depend on political leaders for livelihood. I cannot engage in violence because I have a job. If you provide employment, then people will not involve themselves in political violence or work for leaders. Leaders use these boys for political gain because they have no jobs.
You also need to build public trust that this vicious cycle of violence can end. Mamata Banerjee promised change and people believed her, but in practice she used violence even more extensively than the Left. She ensured continuity of her regime through violence and by using criminals in society in a way similar to what other regional leaders did in UP and Bihar.
So, the ruling party has to show political commitment, and it must repeatedly show that it is against violence. That is how change can come in West Bengal.
TMC supporters can claim that Bengal hasn’t seen the kind of mob lynching or bulldozing of houses as in other states. Would you say it has been successful in curbing another kind of violence?
For the time being. But not as a method to change the minds of people (in terms of social tolerance of violence).
