The case pertained to properties in Coimbatore. Freepik
A Supreme Court bench comprising Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and Vipul M Pancholi set aside a Madras High Court order that had restored the probate grant, holding that the grant was obtained by suppressing material facts and without citing parties who had a direct interest in the estate.
The case pertained to properties in Coimbatore, originally owned by Eswaramurthy Gounder. In January 1976, he allegedly executed an unregistered will in favour of his daughter Sarojini; 6 weeks later, he and his sons sold the same properties through a registered sale deed. He later died in 1983. In 1997, the appellants purchased the properties from the legal heirs of the 1976 buyers. In April 2009, Sarojini filed for probate of the 1976 will before the district court. She impleaded only her two sisters. Her two brothers, also the legal heirs, were not made parties to the case. Neither were the appellants who held registered title to the properties.
The district court granted the probate in 2009. The appellants filed an application in 2015 under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act seeking revocation. The district court allowed that revocation in 2020. The Madras HC eventually reversed that order.
Eight days after filing for probate, Saorjini had filed a title suit in which she stated that the properties had already been transferred to third parties and that her brothers had obtained her father’s signature against his will.
What the law says
Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act allows revocation of probate for a “just cause”. The provision sets out when just cause exists, including where the grant was obtained by “untrue allegation”, “concealing from the Court something material to the case,” or the grant had “become useless and inoperative.” Illustrations within the section lay down various instances where probate could be revoked; these include lack of jurisdiction of the court, forgery, a codicil that alters executors mentioned under the will, unsound mind and “parties who ought to have been cited” not being cited in the grant.
Section 283 empowers the district judge to issue citations to all persons claiming any interest in the estate before probate is granted.
The court read these provisions together. The question was whether the appellants as purchasers, were parties who ought to have been cited and whether the failure to cite them, combined with Sarojini’s knowledge of the transfers, amounted to suppression of material facts within the meaning of Section 263
What the court held
The court had to adjudicate upon three issues: who counts as an interested party in probate proceedings, what kind of proceedings probate actually is and whether Sarojini’s conduct amounted to suppression within the meaning of Section 263.
On the first, the court referred to a 1972 Madhya Pradesh HC decision in Banwarilal v Kusum Bai, which the SC has on previous occasions treated as good law. The Madhya Pradesh HC had held that the threshold for challenging a probate grant is kept low, as “any interest, however slight, and even the bare possibility of an interest, is sufficient to entitle a party to oppose a testamentary document.” That threshold, the court held, extends to purchasers.
A buyer who picks up an interest in the testator’s estate from the heirs before the probate proceedings begin is not a stranger to those proceedings. They ought to be cited according to illustration (ii) under Section 263, which states that grant was made without citing parties who ought to have been cited.” And as the appellants had purchased the properties in 1997 through sale deeds, the probate petition was filed in 2009, they were entitled to notice.
On the question of what a probate grant is, the court held that once probate is granted, it operates as conclusive proof of the will’s validity against everyone, including people who were never a part of the proceedings and never had a chance to contest it. That is why the court said proper citation of interested parties is not a procedural nicety. It goes to the substance of whether the grant was validly obtained. A judgement that binds the world cannot be obtained in a room from which affected parties were quietly excluded, and the persons can file for a revocation of the probate.
The court said, “the grant of probate is a judgment in rem and conclusive and binds not only the parties but also the entire world and therefore, a person who is aggrieved thereby and had no knowledge about the proceedings and proper citations having not been made, is entitled to file an application for revocation of probate on such grounds as may be available to him.”
On the question of suppression, eight days after the probate court filing, Sarojini had filed a title suit in which she stated that her father’s properties had been transferred to third parties and that her brothers had resisted her attempts to partition the estate. None of this was placed before the probate court. The court held that “it is clear that she did not disclose the correct aspects and suppressed the relevant facts while filing for the grant of probate.”
The HC had held that probate courts only look at whether a will is genuine and cannot go into title questions. The SC did not dispute that principle but said it was besides the point. The issue was whether the grant was obtained cleanly under Sections 263 and 283. Those provisions ask the court to ensure that the process by which probate is granted is sound, the parties with a stake were informed, and that material facts were disclosed. The HC had not engaged with either provision. That omission, the SC said, was a “grave error”.