In courtrooms across the country, cheque bounce cases follow a familiar arc: complaint, trial, acquittal or conviction. What happens after an acquittal has now become the focal point before the SC.
On February 12, a bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kumar and K Vinod Chandran referred the matter to a larger Bench to determine whether a complainant in such cases can file an appeal as of right or must first seek permission to file such an appeal from the High Court. “Leave to appeal” is the court’s permission to challenge a judgment.
The trigger is a 2025 ruling of the SC in Celestium Financial v A Gnanasekaran in which the Bench held that a complainant under Section 138 NIA qualifies as a “victim” under CrPC and has a right to file an appeal against acquittal without seeking “special leave” to do so.
However, two SC rulings, delivered in 2013 and 2015, had treated the requirement of “leave” as a part of the code structure. The present Bench noted that these judgments were not considered in the Celestium Financial ruling, and hence the issue at hand has “far-reaching consequences”. The matter is now placed before the CJI for directions.
The legal issue
At the heart of the dispute are two provisions of the CrPC—Section 372 and Section 379.
Section 372 lays down a general rule that no appeals are permitted against a judgment or an order unless the law expressly allows it. The carve-out is that the section gives a “victim” the right to an appeal against acquittal, conviction for a lesser offence, or inadequate compensation and that “such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court.”
CrPC Section 2(wa) defines a victim as an individual “who has suffered any loss or injury” and includes “his or her legal guardian or heir.”
Section 378, however, lays down the procedure for appeals against acquittals. In complaint cases, subsection 4 states that the complainant may seek a “special leave to appeal” from the High Court. Without leave, i.e., permission to appeal, the appeal cannot proceed.
For years, this meant that a complainant whose case ended in an acquittal had to first clear a threshold, i.e., to satisfy the court that there was an error in the order. Only after the leave is granted, the matter will be heard again on its merits.
The question before the court now is whether a complainant in a cheque bounce case, who claims to be a “victim” of financial injury, can bypass 378(4) and directly file an appeal under Section 372.
In Celestium Financial, the SC answered that in the affirmative.
The 2025 order
In the Celestium Financial case, the appellant firm had filed a complaint under Section 138 NIA after the cheques issued to it were dishonoured. The trial court acquitted the accused; the HC refused to grant a special leave appeal under Section 378(4).
Before the SC, the firm argued that it had suffered economic injury and therefore qualified as a “victim” under Section 2(wa) CrPC. The court agreed.
Authoring the judgment, Justice Nagarathna held that the “injury” under criminal law includes financial loss, and a person who suffers such a loss due to cheque dishonour qualifies as a “victim”.
The order stated that, “Even if the victim of an offence is a complainant, he can still proceed under the proviso to Section 372 and need not advert to sub-section (4) of Section 378 of the CrPC.”
The right to appeal, the Bench said, is not just a statutory right but “can also be construed to be a fundamental right under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.”
The court used this reasoning to establish parity, stating that if the accused has a fundamental right to appeal, the victim should also have a similar unconditional right to appeal against an acquittal under the proviso.
The order states that, “The right of a victim of an offence to prefer an appeal cannot be equated with the right of the State or the complainant to prefer an appeal. Hence, the statutory rigours for filing of an appeal by the State or by a complainant against an order of acquittal cannot be read into the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC so as to restrict the right of a victim to file an appeal on the grounds mentioned therein, when none exists.”
The practical difference is not abstract. In a leave-to-appeal regime, the court first decides whether the case deserves to be reopened. In a statutory appeal as of right, the matter is admitted, and the court re-examines facts and law.
The previous orders
In Subhash Chand vs. State (Delhi Administration), the dispute began in 1989 under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, with a complaint by the authorities that the standard of food was not up to par. After the trial court acquitted the accused in 2007, the State appealed to the Sessions Court. The accused objected, saying that
because the case had started as a complaint, any appeal against acquittal could lie only to the High Court under Section 378(4), and only with “special leave”. The Supreme Court agreed.
It held that the nature of the case at the starting point, complaint versus police report, determines the appellate route, and in complaint cases, the High Court is the proper forum.
In Satya Pal Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2015), the question arose after a trial court acquitted a husband and his family in a dowry death case. The victim’s father approached the High Court, relying on the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, which gives a “victim” the right to appeal an acquittal.
The High Court dismissed the appeal without examining whether he had first obtained permission to appeal. The Supreme Court clarified that while victims do have a statutory right to appeal, that right operates within the existing framework of Section 378. An appeal against acquittal before the High Court requires the court’s permission.
Two SC rulings, delivered in 2013 and 2015, had treated the requirement of “leave” as a part of the code structure. (File) 
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