Expert Explains | How a naval mutiny hastened India’s independence

What were the events immediately leading up to the mutiny?

You had the Royal Indian Navy (RIN), which was established on October 2, 1934, as a very small force. This came to be set up out of the Royal Indian Marine for close coast operations, with blue-water missions being largely left to the (British) Royal Navy.

When World War II started, from less than 2,000 people, the RIN grew to almost 30,000 people because of the requirements of war. (There was) a similar huge increase in the number of ships. Small ships came to be commissioned, bought or repurposed rapidly, so the RIN expanded hugely. Often, people were trained at short notice or for shorter durations and sent into war.

Notwithstanding all this, the RIN performed very well in different theatres. So, immediately after the war, there were expectations that having come out as victors, one would be rewarded in some way. There was the expectation of freedom and independence — and perhaps at the naval and unit level, people who had been inducted in a contingency now being recognised for their service and being given longer tenures in the Navy or being aided in getting a job in the civilian world. 

But a war-ravaged Britain took the decision to demobilise: so, from 30,000, they decided to reduce the strength of personnel to around 11,000. This implied loss of pride and status for many, apart from the uncertainty and feeling of British prewar promises having gone awry. 

That, of course, was in some ways the immediate spark, but there was a political cauldron caused by the Indian National Army (INA) trials, besides a lot of other issues.

For instance, they had seen in the war that, in their performance, they were second to none when compared to the white people or to other foreigners. Also, in the war, the overall British behaviour was, perhaps, because of the requirements of war, more friendly and benign. So, some of the British officers reverting to the earlier racist, arrogant behaviour suddenly after the war didn’t sit well. This was compounded by harsh language used, bad food, and terrible living conditions.

Another very important point must be remembered: between 1942 and 1945, there were nine mutinies of different sorts in the RIN, which tells you that for all their success in the war, it had been having this problem of morale and management. And most of the higher leadership — which at that time was almost completely British — was responsible for this in many ways.

What triggered the mutiny?

The most pressing immediate circumstances before February 18 — when the spark got lit — is that on December 1, 1945, Navy Day was to be celebrated. It was supposed to be a big event. But the night before (November 30), some sailors on the HMIS Talwar, which is a shore establishment (a naval base built on land) but also the Navy’s signal training centre located in Bombay, hoisted brooms and buckets and wrote slogans like “Down with the British” and “Quit India” to signal a kind of dissatisfaction against the British. And that shocked them.

Immediately, an investigation was launched, and the commanding officer was changed. They brought in Commander Arthur Frederick King, who was supposed to be a disciplinarian, but they didn’t get the underlying issues of morale. This act of hoisting brooms and slogan writing was repeated on February 1 when the Commander-in-Chief RIN, Vice Admiral J H Godfrey, was to visit Talwar. 

A few days before February 18, King came into the Ratings mess, wanting to show he was in charge. He thought that the sailors were being disrespectful or were not deferential enough. So he abused them and called them “sons of coolies”, which incensed them. They made a formal complaint against him to the second-in-command — the executive officer — who duly informed King of the complaint.

The headline of ‘Hindusthan Standard’ on February 22, 1946. Photo: File

In the normal course of events, when a complaint comes against you, and you’re the commanding officer, you can’t adjudicate over it. He (King) could have apologised, and they might have withdrawn it, but he didn’t. Nor did he send the complaint up. Instead, he adjudicated and, in turn, accused them of lying, thus refusing to take any action.

All of that added up to the events of February 18.

One more thing: these sailors belonged to the communication branch, since the Signal School was the communication training school. In those days they Communication Sailors were better trained and often more educated than the rest, so they knew and could grasp things better.

Upon commencing their strike — they called it “a strike” — the message was sent across to all ships and establishments using the wireless radios. So, from Karachi to Kolkata to all naval stations and then to places outside, it spread like wildfire because they had the communication channels.

What were the demands of the protesting sailors?

The demands were a good combination of both immediate as well as political things. They were related to taking King to task through disciplinary action against him, and bettering their service conditions. But it also included that Britain should withdraw from Indonesia, that INA detainees must be given free trials, things like that. So, the demands were being centred around the Navy and at the same time, had a larger world-view with a political context to it.

For example, withdrawal of British Indian Army soldiers from Indonesia. So, it was a part of the anti-imperial movement — it was about saying that we will not heed to or will no longer be agents of imperial expansionism or conquest as it used to be earlier.

Other demands included no victimisation of strikers, speedy demobilisation with fair prospects for peacetime employment, better quality rations and Indian-style food, parity with Royal Navy scales of pay and allowances, travel facilities, and access to NAAFI (Navy, Army, Air Force Institution) stores, which were like the armed forces’ canteens of today. In those days, only British personnel were allowed.

What was its immediate fallout? How did the British respond?

The British were rattled. They responded with disproportionate force. The immediate fallout from the Indian side was that it spread far and wide. Across naval stations, but not just involving the Navy but the people, particularly in Mumbai and Karachi and also other places.

Some 78 ships, 20 shore establishments — you’re talking of almost nearly 100 naval units and nearly 20,000 people joined in the strike. Now, that is kind of completely unprecedented, in the sense that the entire Navy almost rose as one and was engulfed in this mutiny.

They took over Butcher Island (now known as Jawahar Dweep, located off the coast of Mumbai), which had ammunition. They trained their guns on imperial symbols — places such as the Gateway of India, the Taj Mahal Hotel, the Yacht Club. They formed a Naval Strike Committee. Bombay, Karachi, Visakhapatnam, Jamnagar, Kolkata — all of these places came to be involved. Importantly, they called themselves the Indian National Navy and the Azad Hindis, after the Azad Hind Fauj (INA).

They brought down the British flags on the ships and hoisted a combination of the Congress and Muslim League flags. They carried out a sit-down strike.

Now, the fascinating thing is that in Bombay, civilian port and dockyard workers, almost three lakh mill hands, railway workers, student unions — all of them joined the protest and public transport came to a halt. Commercial establishments were shut down. Food was supplied to ratings by Mumbai citizens. In other places like Kolkata, Ahmedabad, Madras, Vizag, and several places, this spread in different orders of magnitude.

There was a police firing on February 22 as well, where a minimum of 400 people — some place it at 500 or 700 — died in the firing and about 1,500 to 2,000 were injured. Most of these deaths were not from the Navy but civilians.

Some units of the Air Force — the Royal Indian Air Force and the Indian Army too started to exhibit what the British called “mutinous conduct”. The British realised that Indian soldiers and Indian Air Force personnel were not cooperating with them in putting down the strike. So, they came down very heavily.

Now, that is very important because if the few core elements of the State — the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force — are not at your disposal, then you can no longer rule over the country. To a lot of people, this is the last war of independence, because it is the realisation with the naval mutiny that the military and the coercive elements of the State no longer are with you.

What was the mutiny’s significance in the movement for Indian independence?

Several historians — including myself — have come to believe that it certainly hastened or accelerated our independence. The mutiny made the British realise their time was up and they better leave ASAP, cutting their losses.

There is a quote attributed to Justice (Phani Bhusan) Chakravartti of the Calcutta High Court  — he was also then the officiating governor of West Bengal. Former UK Prime Minister Clement Attlee came to India in 1956 and spoke to him. In his book, Justice Chakravartti mentions that Attlee said that it was the INA trials and the RIN mutiny that made the British leave India. While people may debate that contention, the point is that there are reasons now to believe that the naval uprising resulted in the hurried British departure.

Right after independence, the mutiny didn’t get the kind of traction it also could have got because it didn’t have a charismatic leader — someone like Netaji (Subhas Chandra Bose), who was a rallying figure for the INA. Also, a newly born Navy after independence was uncomfortable with the idea of a mutiny — and correctly so. So, it didn’t get the attention it deserved — as in people didn’t know the kind of impact it had, which we now probably know and can appreciate better.