Expert Explains | Why the Quad has never picked up momentum

What is the Quad?

After the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004, India, Japan, Australia, and the US came together in an informal arrangement to coordinate disaster relief operations. In 2007, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, commonly known as the Quad, kicked off. It never really picked up momentum, and while it was revived in 2017, the Quad at best has sputtered along since.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has compared Quad to sea foam, which will just fizzle out.

The major reasons for this are that the four constituents don’t always have the same aims, and China strenuously opposes the grouping.

Beijing says the Quad’s purpose is mainly to target China. After the recent meeting on May 26, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said at a presser, “We do not support ⁠the formation of exclusive cliques or bloc confrontation. No cooperation should undermine mutual trust and cooperation among regional countries.”

What do its four members want from the Quad?

For Australia, Beijing’s intimidating posturing means it has to expand strategic outreach and security partnerships, but it remains heavily dependent on China economically.

India needs to balance China in view of the shared border and the security calculus. It is also strongly opposed to China’s design of carving out a unipolar Asia, but Delhi remains wary of compromising its strategic autonomy.

Tokyo views Quad as an essential security imperative, given the tensions in the South-East China Seas due to Beijing’s apparently expansionist designs.

For the US, the Quad is perceived as the pillar of its Indo-Pacific strategy and as the mechanism to balance out China without military confrontation. In fact, Washington perceives the Quad as a networked security architecture that substantiates American primacy in Asia. Under Donald Trump, however, the US seems to be leaning towards a bilateral deal with Beijing.

These different priorities explain why the Quad’s progress has been incremental rather than decisive. The security cooperation remains constrained, lacking a NATO-like collective defence mechanism, and there is no binding treaty obligation.

What are the takeaways from the May 26 Quad meeting?

The recent Quad Foreign Ministers meeting has attempted to break fresh ground. The meeting focussed on maritime security, resilient supply chains, critical minerals and energy security amid geopolitical uncertainties.

Important initiatives were unveiled for enhanced maritime surveillance coordination, an energy security framework and cooperation on critical minerals, to reduce dependence on China and the consequent vulnerabilities of supply chains.

The grouping also announced its first joint project — development of port infrastructure in Fiji — signalling forward movement from dialogue to concrete deliverables.

What is Quad Plus?

Periodic discussions around ‘Quad Plus’ have surfaced from time to time, although its expansion remains unlikely in the near future. South Korea is among the strongest candidates, given its growing Indo-Pacific orientation. However, China’s sensitivities and Seoul’s focus on the Korean Peninsula remain a constraint.

France, as an Indo-Pacific resident power with military presence in the region, also makes a convincing option. Paris already works closely with Quad members.

Vietnam is a natural contender, in view of its disputes with China in the South China Sea and growing strategic convergence with Quad members. However, Hanoi’s policy of avoiding military alliances limits participation.

United Kingdom, after Brexit and joining the AUKUS alliance (Australia-UK-US), may be inclined to join Quad too, but risks substantiating the Chinese narrative of ‘block politics’. New Zealand has frequently figured in Quad Plus conversations, in view of its close linkage with AUKUS. But Wellington’s cautious foreign policy would avoid an obvious tilt.

What is the way ahead?

The Quad’s future lies in strategic clarity among all members. To ensure organisational depth, the Quad needs to move towards permanent institutional architecture, alongside enhanced military operability, synergised technology partnerships and strengthened maritime capacity building in the Indo-Pacific.

The real test of Quad is not whether it becomes an Asian NATO, but whether the four democracies, with varying interests, can sustain strategic cooperation in the era of great power competition.

(The writer is a war veteran, currently professor, Strategic-IR, Lal Bahadur Shastri Institute of Management)